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1.0. Xinjiang: An introduction.        
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is situated in the northwestern 
corner of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and borders Afghanistan, India, 
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Mongolia. As China’s 
largest province it amounts to a sixth of its land area, contains huge deposits of oil and 
gas, and furthermore, houses the China’s nuclear test facilities. A glance at a map of 
the region reveals Xinjiang’s remoteness, with its southern borders actually closer to 
Baghdad or New Delhi, than to Beijing, the political centre of present day China. 
Historically, Xinjiang constituted a pivot in the trade routes of the fabled Silk 
Road, and thus functioned as a “cultural blotter” for different civilizations from the 
Middle East, Europe, the Indian subcontinent and China proper (Starr 2004:7).  
Moreover, the dramatic topography has had a fragmenting effect on Xinjiang and 
exposed it to centrifugal forces, pulling the region in different directions. Hence one 
may observe an utterly complex cultural zone, with a great variety in the way people 
settle, cultivate the land, practice their religion, and finally, how they perceive the 
ruling Chinese Communist party (CCP) (Perdue 2005:32, Millward 2007: XII). 
Regarding Xinjiang’s function as a “cultural blotter”, it has throughout the 
course of history attracted a variety of polities, historical formations and warlords, 
aspiring to be the region’s dominant loci of command. Hence, it has not been a matter 
of course that the issuant communist regime (incepted in 1949), should succeed in 
their attempt to “lock-in” (control) the region and its indigenous people. Quite the 
contrary, the authorities have encountered ardent opposition from the numerically 
dominant Muslim Uyghurs of Turkic kinship. Even though other minority groups also 
occupy a role in present day Xinjiang, this thesis mainly concerns the centre-periphery 
relation between the governing Han-Chinese authorities and the Uyghurs. 
My expressed aspiration is to illuminate how the PRC government launches 
successive territorial, jurisdictional, economical and cultural thrusts toward Uyghurs, 
in their process of state and nation-building in Xinjiang. Sharply different from their 
dominant Han-Chinese counterpart, Uyghur counter-cultures have mobilized to protect 
their distinctiveness (resist PRC nation-building). Some Uyghur movements have even 
challenged China’s state building project, by advocating the initiation of an East 
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Turkistan state at the territory of Xinjiang. Thus, Beijing has effectuated a variety of 
strategies to effectively “lock-in”/neutralize Uyghur separatist sentiments and ensure 
their allegiance to the Chinese nation.1 However, the two sides seem diametrically 
opposed, and the following question emerges; why is the territory of Xinjiang so 
pivotal for the communist leadership and what is actually at stake?  
 In brief, the geopolitical location of Xinjiang (adjoining eight countries) is a key 
aspect in this regard, where the authorities want to be influential in the “new Great 
Game” of Central Asia. Another important factor is the presence of radical Islam in 
Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, literally on the doormat of China. Hence, the 
PRC authorities have been firmly present in Xinjiang, ready to deter regime-
threatening movements. From a geo-economical perspective, Xinjiang has also been of 
significance, serving as a transit area for energy transportation from the neighbouring 
Kazakhstan to China proper. Furthermore, Xinjiang itself possesses rich deposits of oil, 
natural gas, coal and nonferrous metals, which is alluring for the Chinese authorities.  
 Section 1.1 now proceeds with a review of Xinjiang’s historical junctures, in 
order to comprehend contemporary developments in the region. These historical 
considerations are simply put, a sine qua non for the understanding of both Uyghur 
grievance and the PRC’s prevailing modus operandi in Xinjiang. This in turn paves the 
way for an elaboration of my research questions in section 1.2. 
 
1.1 The Xinjiang-conflict in a historical perspective. 
To the dismissal of Michael Dillon, James Millward and other Sinologists, official 
Chinese publications assert that Xinjiang has always been an integral part of China:  
Since the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C-24 A.D.), Xinjiang has been an inseparable 
part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation […]. The Chinese central governments 
of all historical periods exercised military and administrative jurisdiction over 
Xinjiang. The jurisdiction of the central governments over the Xinjiang region was at 
times strong and at other times weak, depending on the stability of the period.2 
 
The mentioned Sinologists argue that Xinjiang by and large remained independent 
from China proper until the inception of the PRC in 1949. Prior to this, the region was 
imprinted in warlord rivalry and exposed to competition from a variety of political 
formations (Dillon 2004:17-18, Millward 2004:2-4). However, it is undisputed that the 
                                                 
1      The Chinese nation is officially constituted of 56 ethnic groups, and numerically dominated by the Han-Chinese (92 percent). 
2      PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 1). White Paper. 
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Qing imperial dynasty’s (1644-1911) annexation of Xinjiang in 1760, brought a more 
permanent presence from the hinterland. The Manchus from Manchuria (northeastern 
regions of present day China) invaded China in 1644, which heralded the era of the 
Qing dynasty. The Qing utilized an expansionist approach and gradually annexed 
Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet into their empire (Dillon 2004:17). 
In their endeavours to make Xinjiang an integral part of the Qing dynasty and 
fortify the link between Xinjiang and China interior, garrisons and military state farms 
were established with Ili as the administrative centre.3 The Qing utilized existing 
political and economical structures to govern the region, but contact with the local 
peoples was nonetheless minimized. Thus, this became an epoch of minimal 
interference in the indigenous peoples’ religious and cultural way of life (Perdue 
2005:338, Millward 2007:107). Due to this shrewd approach, major alienation and 
uprisings were avoided until the 1820s, when Qing’s custom regulations generated 
grievance and uprisings. This challenged their presence in Kashgar and other nearby 
cities. Jahangir from the neighbouring polity (khanate) of Kokand (present day in 
Uzbekistan), invaded Kashgar and massacred fleeing Qing troops. In 1827, Jahangir 
was ousted by Qing armies and in the following years, the first Hans from China 
proper settled into southern Xinjiang (Dillon 2004:17-19). This heralded a shift from 
an accommodative approach towards the indigenous people, to a policy where the 
“superior” Chinese mindset was promoted (Millward 2007:107). 
In 1862, a large-scale rebellion broke out among Chinese Muslims (Hui)4 in the 
northwestern provinces Gansu and Shaanxi. This uprising spread to Xinjiang where 
Uyghurs and other groups accompanied the rebellious Huis. The indigenous peoples’ 
grievance over heavy taxation and forced labour yielded a vigorous riot and with that, 
the Qing lost their control over Xinjiang. Yakub Beg (warlord from Kokand) filled this 
power vacuum and established an emirate with Kashgar as its centre. The era of Beg 
became imprinted in order, tightening of security and central planning, where the rule 
of Sharia was enforced. At this time an imperial rivalry (“The Great Game”) between 
Russia and Great Britain, loomed large in Central Asia. Thus, Beg’s emirate seemed to 
                                                 
3     Ili is the Russian name and is known as Yining in Chinese and Ghulja to the Kazakhs and Uyghurs. These state farms are considered to 
be historical forerunners for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan). Ever since its inception in 1954, the paramilitary 
Bingtuan has been a paramount “state building tool” for the PRC government, in their endeavours to counter separatist movements. 
4    Hui is also known as (T)Dungans and in the 2000-census, they constituted 4,6 percent of Xinjiang’s total population (18,5 millions). 
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provide Great Britain with a desired buffer between their vassal state India, and an 
expanding Russia, with territorial ambitions in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Russian 
forces eventually entered into Ili (northern Xinjiang) in 1871. Beg then found it 
opportune to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia, while simultaneously 
aspiring to maintain good relations with the British. Consequently, Xinjiang was 
anything but the Qing’s chasse garde, and Beg’s emirate (from Urumqi and 
southwards) was not under any substantial threat until late 1870s, when he 
encountered his nemesis, the Qing commander Zuo Zongtang (2007:122-25). 
 General Zuo embodied military ingenuity by setting up secure supply lines 
inside the China mainland and establish depots in Shaanxi and Gansu. Furthermore, he 
employed native troops more adaptable to the regions’ demanding conditions. With a 
remarkable effort, Zuo’s endeavours eventually materialized and as the emirate 
imploded, Beg allegedly committed suicide. Hence, Russian forces withdrew, and in 
1884, Xinjiang was assigned provincial status and formally incorporated into the 
empire. The Chinese name Xinjiang (new frontier/territory), first gained currency as a 
political label with this provincehood (Tyler 2003:70-87, Dillon 2004:17-19).  
The post-1884 era witnessed a remarkable change in the mindset of rulers and 
intellectuals. Thenceforward, they came to view the region as an inseparable part of 
the dynasty. Political diversity became an anathema and the new Xinjiang-policies 
favoured a Chinese-style administration, exclusively governed by Han Chinese. The 
officials endorsed intensified influx of Hans and provided an assimilative Confucian 
education for segments of the Turkic population. With the Republican revolution in 
1911, the Qing Empire came to an end and its successor the Republic of China, was 
officially inaugurated on January 1, 1912 (Millward and Tursun 2004:63). 
At this stage, the autocratic Han, Yang Zengxin, positioned himself as governor 
of Xinjiang, with seemingly proxy in blanks. Yang managed to isolate Xinjiang from 
China proper and enforced strict control until he was assassinated in 1928.5 However, 
his successor, Jin Shuren was unable to effectively exert control and his departure 
from the tradition of co-opting indigenous leaders, alienated Xinjiang’s ethnic groups 
and their leadership (2004:71, Dillon 2004:20). Jin’s misrule eventually sparked off 
                                                 
5      Yang maintained a centralized control by balancing various ethnic groups, and allowing their leaders to enrich themselves. This was an 
incentive for the indigenous elites to uphold their allegiance to Yang (Millward 2007:182-83). 
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large-scale rebellions, and in 1931, the Gansu-based Hui warlord Ma Zhongying 
entered Xinjiang, seemingly to support local Muslims in their uprisings. Governor Jin 
appointed the Manchurian Sheng Shicai to military counter Ma and other regime-
threatening forces, but he nevertheless fell in a coup in 1933. Jin was then succeeded 
by Sheng, whose anti-Japanese stance (Japan had at this stage annexed Manchuria and 
Inner Mongolia and glanced at Xinjiang) ensured a strong support from the Soviet 
Union. As rumours indicated that Japanese aides had sided with Ma, the Soviet 
leadership stepped up its assistance to Sheng (Millward and Tursun 2004: 71-77). 
By the end of 1933, Sheng’s position was “extremely shaky” due to the threat 
of Ma’s armed forces to the north, and the inception of a rival polity in Kashgar, the 
Sharia-governed Turkic-Islamic Republic of East-Turkistan (TIRET). TIRET’s leaders 
created a framework for an independent state (cabinet, national assembly, constitution, 
and own flag6), and was also perceived as a threat by Soviet leaders. Their main fear 
was that pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments could spill over to Soviet Central Asia. 
TIRET’s dialogue with delegates from Nazi Germany and Japan gave rise to even 
more concern, and in toto, the presence of TIRET and the anti-Soviet warlord Ma, 
made Soviet support Sheng with military forces and technology (Dickens 1990).  
The interference from Soviet forced Ma’s units to move southwards to Kashgar, 
where they in February 1934 brutally dislodged the TIRET-regime. This in turn 
attracted a military offensive from Sheng, and subsequently Ma mysteriously fled into 
Soviet (unknown faith) (Millward 2007:200).7 At this stage, Sheng consolidated his 
power basis and operated de facto independently, although his position was de jure 
subordinated to the Chinese National Government in Nanjing (Guomindang, GMD). 
Sheng immediately prohibited the presence of secessionist movements, and in order to 
generate some regime-loyalty among the indigenous people, a few of their leaders 
obtained senior posts in his administration. Moreover, with inputs from his Soviet 
advisors, Sheng effectuated a “Stalinist-type ethnic taxonomy”, where the Turkic 
Muslim oasis dwellers were referred to as Uyghurs, while other groups were defined 
as Kazakhs, Tungans (Hui), Hans and so forth (Millward 2007:207).  
                                                 
6        This is considered to be a paramount juncture for Uyghur nationalism and initially the founders of this polity referred to it as the 
Republic of Uyghuristan. However, it was soon changed to TIRET as other Turkic people also resided in Xinjiang, and occupied a position 
in the government (Millward 2007:201-03). 
7        Regarding Ma’s faith, it is assumed that he either died in connection with the W.W. 2 or was liquidated by Stalin (Millward 2007:200). 
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Xinjiang in the late 1930s and early 1940s was a region imprinted in chaos, 
where Turkic Muslims continuously launched rebellious efforts against Sheng. At this 
stage, Sheng embodied the “tidesman” by frequently shifting his outside patrons, and 
in 1944 this strategic positioning led to his downfall.8  In late 1944, Kazakh and 
Uyghur movements ousted Sheng and GMD troops from Ili/Ghulja in the north. The 
Soviet Union endorsed this rebellion and in November 1944, the East Turkistan 
Republic (ETR 1944-49) was proclaimed in northern Xinjiang. While the Chinese 
authorities and scholars today label the struggle against Sheng as “the Three-Region 
Revolution”, and moreover, depict it as a part of the “Chinese Democratic Revolution”, 
the ETR’s inception itself, is viewed as a conspiracy by a “few feudalist top figures” 
(Li 2005:151). According to the Chinese scholar Li Sheng, religious figures and 
feudalists in the region insisted on “taking the splittist road”, and thus, contradicted the 
“fundamental interest of people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang” (2005:157, 162).9 
Initially, the ETR had an Islamic orientation, but already in 1945, it appeared 
more secular and pro-Soviet. Eventually, the Soviet Union pressed the ETR leadership 
to reach a cease-fire with the remaining Guomindang military forces in Xinjiang.10 
Hence, they governed Xinjiang jointly, but a profound mutual mistrust prevailed from 
the very start, and the coalition fell apart in 1947. The ETR government continued to 
govern in the north, but like the GMD regime in Urumqi, it came to an end in 1949, 
when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered the region. This heralded an era of 
unitary communist rule throughout Xinjiang (Dillon 2004:32, Millward 2007:210-31).  
 
The “peaceful liberation of Xinjiang”: An era of unitary communist rule: 
The Chinese regime officially depicts this event with the following words;  
Xinjiang was peacefully liberated on September 25, 1949 […]. The people of all 
ethnic groups in Xinjiang greeted the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
together with the rest of the Chinese people on October 1, 1949.11  
                                                 
8        For several years, Soviet was Sheng’s patron, whose position in Xinjiang depended upon outside assistance. In the spring of 1942, he 
shifted to the nationalist GMD (supported by the U.S.). When Soviet prevailed over Germany in the 1943-battle of Stalingrad, Sheng 
unsuccessfully tried to bandwagon with Stalin, but was eventually removed from power by the GMD in 1944 (Millward 2007:211). 
9       Comparing TIRET (1933) with ETR (1944-49), Li asserts that the latter regime was more “devastating in arousing separation and 
harming the political and social landscape in Xinjiang” (2005:150). Moreover, it allegedly “was a historical retrogression disrupting China’s 
unity, and seriously violated the fundamental interest of the Chinese people and people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang” (2005:148). 
10      Xinjiang Turkic nationalists did not unitarily endorse the ETR. Some even supported the GMD (among other the departed Isa Yusuf 
Alptekin (1901-1995) as they had different perceptions on how to achieve genuine autonomy for the region. Millward actually asserts that 
the indigenous people in reality were caught “between the Soviet Scylla and the Chinese Charibdis” (2007:230). 
11      PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 3). White Paper. 
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Only with this territorial penetration were local warlords and Xinjiang’s indigenous 
people subjected to one dominant loci of command. Thenceforward, the Chinese 
authorities embarked on a continuous process of territorial consolidation in Xinjiang. 
A priority was given to confine the establishment of alternative political formations in 
the region, which evidently conflicted with Uyghur nationalists’ aspiration for a 
continuation of the ETR. The latter’s momentum became further impaired in 1949, 
when prominent Uyghur leaders were killed in a mysterious plane crash on their way 
to Beijing for negotiations on Xinjiang (Dillon 2004:34).  
During the period of 1949-1955, the government sought to generate support 
from the masses by initiating land reforms. The landowners’ land were expropriated 
and redistributed to the poor peasants. This initial phase refrained from alienating the 
poorer local segments, whereas the well-educated local elites were undermined 
(Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:307). Furthermore, institutionalized Islam in Xinjiang 
became regulated under the supervision of the authorities. The mosques lost a valuable 
source of revenue with the confiscation of their arable land, and the prohibition of 
Islamic taxes further deteriorated their position (Millward and Tursun 2004:88). 
In 1954 and 1955, the region underwent two landmark organisational 
restructurings, which had ripple effects extending to present day Xinjiang. The first 
juncture refers to the establishment of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (henceforward Bingtuan). The second juncture refers to the 1955-
event, where Xinjiang became the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). A 
comprehensive assessment on these events and their importance for Xinjiang 
constitutes the backbone of chapter 4.1. However, at this stage, a brief historical 
outline seems suitable in order to grasp the historical context. 
In 1954, demobilized PLA-troops and conquered Muslim and Guomindang 
forces, were transformed into the centralized and paramilitary Bingtuan. The initiation 
of Bingtuan served the twofold purpose of cultivating land for agricultural enterprises 
and to defend Xinjiang’s borders. Later, and until today, the Bingtuan has functioned 
as an instrument to clamp down on domestic riots as well. Since its founding days, the 
Bingtuan has also absorbed the influx of several million Hans and dramatically altered 
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the region’s ethnic composition. These Hans have been provided with education, jobs 
and social benefits (Taylor 2003:135, Wiemer 2004:169). 
With the XUAR’s autonomous status in 1955, it seemed like the numerically 
dominant Uyghurs attained a de jure proxy to govern themselves, but in reality they 
were not allowed any genuine autonomy. Compared to ordinary provinces, Xinjiang 
actually enjoyed less legislative autonomy and the authorities embarked on stricter 
policies toward the minorities. China-wide campaigns like the “Hundred Flowers 
movement” (1957, incarceration of several minority leaders), the “Great Leap 
Forward” (1958-60, merger of enormous agricultural cooperatives), and the infamous 
“Cultural Revolution” (1966-76), embodied this approach. This era became imprinted 
in chaos, starvation, massive influx of Hans, attacks on indigenous peoples’ way of 
life, and a mass-exodus of Kazaks and Uyghurs into the Soviet Union.12 The latter 
event contributed to further acidify the Sino-Soviet relation, and on several occasions, 
the former allies came at brink of war (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:300, 306-7).  
With Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, reforming forces inside the 
Communist party gained ground. Two years later in 1978, Deng Xiaoping came forth 
as PRC’s new leader and initiated reforms of economic liberalization. Moreover, the 
regime allowed the indigenous people to cultivate and preserve their distinctiveness, 
without the restrictions that hallmarked the previous decades. Hence, several mosques 
reopened and Islamic literature circulated overtly. In the spirit of the times, China 
further normalized its relationship with neighbouring countries, and renewed cultural 
and economic interaction with the rest of Central Asia (as old as the fabled Silk Road), 
which replaced forty years of isolation (Gladney 2004a:110, Bovdington 2004:132).   
At the same time many Uyghurs voiced grievance over the presence and 
continuous influx of Hans, and demanded independence for Xinjiang (Dillon 2004:59). 
The Baren uprisings (nearby Kashgar) in 1990 constitute a critical juncture in this 
respect, where Xinjiang now glided into overt conflict and violence. In addition to the 
influx by Hans, other factors like nuclear weapons testing, birth control policies and 
the exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources generated Uyghur grievance. Some 
Uyghurs even employed an Islamic terminology and allegedly advocated Jihad against 
                                                 
12      Thousands of Kazakhs and Uyghurs migrated to Soviet in 1962, as they perceived the political climate there to be more tolerable 
(Dillon 2004:30). 
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the Hans. The PLA was brought in to gain control of the riots, and in the end this 
entailed several Uyghur casualties (Dillon 2004:62, Millward 2004:14).  
The Baren uprisings heralded the outset of a decade with dramatic large-scale 
uprisings. This tense situation was reflected in the Document number 7, a classified 
paper by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Politburo in 1996. Xinjiang was at 
that stage identified as the most serious threat China’s territorial integrity and social 
stability. Implicit, the situation in Taiwan and Tibet, caused less concern than the 
critical developments in Xinjiang (Dillon 2004:136).  
The state of high alert may also be traced back to the implosion of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. In the wake of this critical juncture, independent Turkic states were 
established in Central Asia and de jure internationally recognized. The new course of 
independency inspired many Uyghurs and triggered a reminiscence of the two 
previous East Turkistani republics (1933 and 1944-49). Uyghur voices for a change of 
status quo have been noticeable, but marked by diversity the last fifteen years. Three 
main trajectories for a preferable end state arguably stand out (Starr 2004:345-349): 
1. General improvement of Uyghurs’ socio-economic status under Chinese rule. 
2. De facto provincial autonomy, as the region already holds de jure autonomy. 
3. Territorial secession from China, either materialised in an Islamic state based 
on the rule of Sharia, or a national state based on the rule of secular law. 
The trajectories of number two and three are unconceivable options for the 
authorities, as they aspire to have an everlasting hold on the region. A well adapted 
Xinjiang is so pivotal due to the region’s geopolitical and geo-economical location. 
Hence, the notion of East Turkistan constitutes an anathema, only referring to the past 
before the “taming of the wild” Xinjiang. Official documents on the whole emphasize 
that Uyghurs’ future prospects lie within the PRC. Several Uyghurs have reconciled 
with this reality and aspire to improve their social status within the Chinese framework. 
 Conversely, some Uyghur movements (secular as well as Islamic) have 
advocated the initiation of a new East Turkistan Republic. The PRC authorities 
employ a vide range of strategies to counter these movements, and their determination 
have increased further in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. These measures have 
arguably restricted ordinary Uyghurs in their daily life, although the Chinese 
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authorities stress that their policies only target Uyghur East Turkistani groups with an 
“evident” link to international terrorism. Thus, they justify their course of action as an 
inseparable part on the international “War on terrorism”. As a result, the international 
media has also become more attentive of developments in Xinjiang, as they arguably 
“identify” a potential “clash of civilisations” à la Samuel Huntington. 
Recently, the Chinese authorities have encountered a significant challenge with 
the dissenting Uyghur voice of Rebyia Kadeer.  The previously incarcerated human 
rights activist and “Mother of all Uyghurs”, Kadeer (released from Chinese 
imprisonment in 2005), vigorously entered the international scene to “illuminate the 
inner life” of Xinjiang, and to rally support for their cause. This culminated on June 5, 
2007, when Kadeer obtained a private audience with the U.S. President George W. 
Bush, and was able to address the situation in Xinjiang. This is of great concern for the 
Chinese regime, who vigorously ambitions to defame Kadeer as “a convicted 
criminal” in the international discourse.13 Tensions between the Uyghur diaspora and 
the PRC are likely to intensify further as the Beijing Olympics approaches in 2008.  
 
1.2. Research questions and their utilitarian value for the studies of Xinjiang. 
An advancing international research-milieu has over the last decades provided 
innovative studies and a variety of approaches to explore the internal dynamics of 
Xinjiang. Hence, invaluable in-depth studies have been conducted on such various 
topics as the PLA, Bingtuan, Islam, Uyghur identity, educational systems, linguistic 
standards, Uyghur folklore, economical projects, topography, Uyghur expatriates’ 
activities and so forth. The annual academic output has been noticeable and the tragic 
incidents on September 11, 2001, with its ripple effects on Xinjiang, further increased 
the public and scholarly interest for the region.14  
 In the wake of September 11, 2001, the increased interest has occasioned 
several extensive volumes from notable experts on Xinjiang. Thus in 2004, the 
comprehensive volume, the “Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland” edited by Fredrick 
                                                 
13    PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 7 June, 2007”.  Yu 
stated the following: “Every one knows well what kind of person Rebiya Kadeer is. She is a convicted criminal. The relevant remarks and 
activities of the US are blatant interference in China's internal affairs. We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to it”. 
14    In general this event had ripple effects on various territorial centre-periphery conflicts around the world. In its aftermath, a window of 
opportunity unveiled for several regimes to bandwagon with the U.S. in the “War on terrorism”. The implication of this rapprochement was 
unambiguous. Regimes like Russia (Chechnya) and China (Xinjiang, Tibet), seemingly obtained a carte blanche to clamp down on separatist 
movements, and in the Chinese discourse, Uyghur nationalists and separatists were suddenly equated with international terrorism.  
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Starr, enabled an ordinary reader to grasp the complexity of present day Xinjiang. This 
volume comprised all major aspects regarding Xinjiang, and these authors have also 
published several articles on their own. In addition, the scholarly books by Michael 
Dillon (“Xinjiang- China’s Muslim Far Northwest”, 2004), and James A. Millward 
(“Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang”, 2007), complement the “Xinjiang 
China’s Muslim Borderland” in the academic sphere. Moreover, Chinese scholars 
published the book “Xinjiang of China: Its Past and Present” in 2005, which enabled 
the reader to comprehend how the Chinese authorities perceive the situation.  
However, Xinjiang has not received sufficient attention from political scientists, 
working systematically within a state- and nation-building paradigm. Previously 
published papers and volumes have overwhelmingly been written in the pen of 
anthropologists, historians, sinologists and researchers of religious practise. A thesis 
embedded in theoretical conceptualisation of state- and nation-building, may thus fill a 
void in the literature.15 Considering this, my focus is directed at the centre-periphery 
dynamics of Xinjiang, where the PRC authorities have aspired to foreclose the 
region’s external boundaries, consolidate the territory and administer it (state building). 
This has been followed by their centre-initiated efforts to weaken the Uyghur identity, 
and thereby strengthen a notion of China as the “Motherland” (nation-building).  
These successive PRC state- and nation-building thrusts toward the peripheral 
Xinjiang have been initiated to establish Beijing as the undisputed territorial, 
jurisdictional, economical and cultural epicentre. Peripheral Uyghur counter-cultures 
(nation-builders), on the other hand, mobilize to preserve their distinctive markers 
(religion, language, historical interpretations and folklore). Hence, an aspiration is to 
maintain a strict demarcation between “us” (Uyghurs) and “them” (Han Chinese), and 
thereby “fortify” their primordial boundaries (identities and traits). The nucleus of a 
centre-periphery conflict of this calibre is the centre’s initiatives to “lock-in” the 
peripheral territory, its people and resources, in order to control the course of events. 
Contrary, the indigenous peoples of the periphery typically aspire to undermine these 
efforts. Consequently, the subsequent research questions transpire for my thesis:  
                                                 
15       Nicolas Becquelin has written two articles (about 30 pages each) which have incorporated the most central aspects of state- and nation-
building. I find his contributions to be very perceptive, and my aspiration for this thesis, is to analyse these processes further. 
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1. Which state building strategies have the PRC authorities employed in order 
to secure Xinjiang from territorial secession and incorporate it to China “proper”?             
In this regard, what functions can be attributed to the PLA, the Bingtuan, demography 
policies, and finally, China’s involvement in international security arrangements? 
2. In the PRC’s nation-building endeavours to cultivate a broader Chinese 
identity and weaken the “primordial” Uyghur identity, which strategies have unfolded? 
Moreover, how have these centre-initiated policies affected Uyghurs in their practice 
of Islam, their language and other expressions of their cultural heritage? 
3. What kind of strategies do Uyghur counter-cultures inside Xinjiang, as well 
as expatriate Uyghurs, employ in order to counter the PRC’s nation-building efforts 
and thereby conserve their distinctive markers? Furthermore, do any Uyghur separatist 
groups pose a credible threat to China’s territorial integrity in Xinjiang? 
My approach to the field of Xinjiang-studies is comprehensive (all-embracing) 
in its form, rather than an embedded study of a particular phenomenon. By such a 
study, my ambition is to illuminate the major aspects of this centre-periphery relation. 
Potentially, this approach may provide the more experienced scientists with a linkage 
between their often particularistic approach, and an overall state- and nation-building 
framework. Another aspiration is to introduce state- and nation-building 
conceptualizations and keywords, which may have utilitarian value for the wider study 
of Xinjiang, as well as potentially facilitate prospective comparative centre-periphery 
studies, inside as well as outside contemporary China.  
 In Chapter 3, I give a comprehensive presentation of the central terminologies 
and conceptualizations that occupy the centre-stage of this dissertation. However, a 
short introduction may be suitable at this stage. The nucleus of state- and nation-
building is the process of “locking-in” a certain territory and group, by establishing 
various boundaries that do not render possible their “withdrawal”. These boundaries of 
territorial, economical, jurisdictional and cultural character refer to a distinction of 
privileges, titles and duties between the ones within a demarcated system, and the ones 
 20
situated outside it. The boundaries do not necessarily overlap within a system, but 
typically have done so in the age of European national-states.16  
As a centre embarks on the process to subject a periphery under its domain, the 
former utilizes “boundary-transcending/penetrating technologies” to undermine a 
periphery’s primordial boundaries, and establish a wider set of common boundaries. 
This is then succeeded by a centre’s consolidating efforts (boundary-building and 
boundary-maintaining). An exposed periphery may on the other hand invoke various 
counter-forces to solidify their primordial boundaries and to undermine the centre’s 
endeavours. In a centre-periphery conflict where the centre exerts control in the 
territorial, jurisdictional and economical domain, the resistance of a counter-culture 
may still be persistent in the cultural sphere (preserving their distinctiveness). In 
addition, these forces may potentially aspire to challenge the territorial loci of 
command and work towards a territorial boundary-transcendence (separatism). How 
one should characterize the Xinjiang-conflict will be clarified as the thesis unfolds. 
 
1.3.      Xinjiang a terra incognita for social scientists? 
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, Xinjiang’s remoteness began to attract a new generation of 
scholars and in the following decades, several scientists conducted fieldwork in the 
region. Some even learned to master Uyghur and Mandarin, which truly was a great 
asset for their fieldwork. Several incidents of violent Uyghur grievance in the 1990s 
and the events on September 11, 2001, made international scholars further attentive 
toward Xinjiang’s the centre-periphery dynamics. Simultaneously, the PRC applied a 
more authoritarian management style in the region, and thus, preferred to obscure the 
internal dynamics of Xinjiang, only showcasing histories of alleged socio-economic 
improvements and ethnic harmony. Consequently, the region has in reality been sealed 
off for international scholars aspiring to conduct fieldworks on ethnic tension, PRC’s 
repressive policies in Xinjiang, Uyghur separatist sentiments and so forth.17  
                                                 
16      At least prior to the extensive EU-integration, an implication of travelling to another territorial polity was the simultaneous “entry” into 
a new juridical, economical and cultural system (boundary transcendence). Arguably the EU-integration de-accentuates these boundaries.   
17      In 2001, the Hong Kong-based Herbert S. Yee conducted a survey on Uyghur-Han relations in Xinjiang. Prior to the survey, Yee visited 
government officials and agencies in Beijing to secure permissions and cooperation from Chinese cadres at various levels. Yee persuaded 
governmental officials about the relevance of the study, referring to the general theme of ethnic solidarity, deliberately avoiding a wording 
with reference to ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, he encountered opposition from local authorities, ranging from confiscation of completed 
questionnaires, pressure from local cadres, forced modification of questions now resembling propaganda slogans, and finally, at some places 
he was even denied to conduct his survey (2005:36, 43, 50). This example illustrates the difficulties attended with fieldwork in the region. 
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Another important consideration is that as the Chinese authorities have 
intensified their surveillance and restrictions of Uyghurs in their daily life, where the 
latter part has become even more reluctant/ scared to reveal their sentiments to 
foreigners. Colin Mackerras experienced this first hand when he visited Xinjiang in 
October and November 2003. In the end, he was unable to obtain any useful insight on 
Uyghurs’ feelings toward separatist movements (2005:12). Thus, Fredrick Starr timely 
asserts that “strict controls arising from acute political sensitivities make it all but 
impossible for social scientist to conduct the kinds of field research, interviews, and 
surveys in Xinjiang that would be the norm for rigorous study elsewhere” (2004:16). 
This is naturally a dilemma for NGO’s and scientists in search for reliable information, 
but nevertheless the reality for this particular field of study.   
Reading through these reports, I chose not to survey Uyghur grievance by 
attempting to conduct an overt fieldwork in Xinjiang. I rather confined myself to travel 
around in Xinjiang for two weeks as a prime facie tourist, which enabled me to obtain 
some first hand impressions on the region. The purpose of the journey was primarily to 
observe how the government expands in the region, with a massive inflow of regime-
loyal Han Chinese into the Uyghur’s areas.18 I did met with some Uyghurs fluent in 
English for discrete conversations, and the information provided was considered to be 
a bonus for my part. In order to attain new and interesting information for the project, I 
therefore chose to conduct my main fieldwork outside Xinjiang. In brief, my angle of 
incidence was to organize in-depth interviews with exiled Uyghur leaders in Bishkek 
(Kyrgyzstan) and Almaty (Kazakhstan), who enjoy greater latitude for expression. 
 
1.4. Structuring the thesis: Chapter 2-6. 
In chapter 2, I give an account of the applied research design and methodological 
challenges associated with my approach. For analytical purposes and the transparency 
of the dissertation, I decompose my overall scientific approach into research questions, 
                                                 
18      Another consideration for my fieldwork was obviously the scope- and time-limitation of my thesis. Fieldwork in Xinjiang can be very 
time-consuming, but considered by the Chinese scholar Wang Jianxin to be an essential criteria in order to generate in-depth information. In 
his extensive fieldwork (totalling 22 months between 1991 and 1998), Wang made an interesting observation: There are two groups of 
authorities (communist cadres and clerics) who simultaneously maintain order in the village. The cadres occupy the administrative 
management (outer community affairs), while clerics provide religious training and maintain the social order (inner community affairs). 
Wang argues that non-Muslim outsiders initially encounter secular official representatives (outer community affairs) and fail to observe the 
genuine inner community affairs. To be accepted into the inner Uyghur community affairs is at best a lengthy process, and most likely 
rendered impossible, due to the authorities policies of contraction the last few years (2004: 9-10).  
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analytical categories (theory), the data collection, and finally how one may proceed 
with the analysis. These principles are in fact “hidden analytical girders” for the thesis. 
 Moving on to chapter 3, I present Stein Rokkan’s theoretical paradigm of state- 
and nation-building, along with Stefano Bartolini’s perceptive elaborations. The 
nucleus of this chapter is to illuminate the dialectics of order; a centre’s attempt to 
“lock-in” territories/actors by boundary-building, and movement; a periphery’s 
boundary- transcendence endeavours, which characterize the centre-periphery relation. 
 The PRC government’s state- and nation-building campaigns in Xinjiang 
constitute the “backbone” of chapter 4. The first section deals with the Chinese 
authorities’ efforts in the process of external boundary-demarcation and internal 
structuring (state building). In particular, I survey the most paramount “state building 
tools” available for the authorities; the PLA, the Bingtuan and the massive influx of 
regime loyal Hans to the region. The second section comprises PRC nation-building 
policies, which aim at weakening Uyghurs’ distinctive markers and bring them closer 
to the Chinese “mindset”. The central question to address is how this affects Uyghurs 
in their practice of Islam, their language and their cultural heritage.  
 In chapter 5, I give an account of the Uyghur diaspora and their strategies to 
internationally defame the Chinese authorities. In this regard, a central aspect is their 
internet activities, which resembles “cyber-separatism”. In addition, I depict the actual 
conditions for non-violent Uyghur separatist activities in the countries adjoining 
Xinjiang. With the closure of the thesis in chapter 6, I summarize the main aspects of 
this centre-periphery conflict and present some prospects for Xinjiang. 
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2.0. Methodological approach: Constructing an applicable research design. 
In order to employ an applicable research design for my study, one plausible strategy 
may be to review Robert K. Yin’s seminal work on case study research. His 
epitomizing contributions help the prospective researcher to comprehend when the 
case study is the method of choice, and further when it should be renounced. In 
addition, he illustrated the necessity of a research design which truly links together the 
initial research questions, empirical testing, and the conducted analysis. Knowledge of 
these principles is simply of paramount importance for the scientific voyage (1994:18). 
The applicable research design is adjusted to the established research questions, 
the scenery (are central actors’ conduct prone to manipulation?), and finally, whether 
the exploration focuses on contemporary or historical phenomena. Yin argues that case 
studies are justified as the strategic choice when the phenomena/ actors are 
contemporary, not easily distinguishable from its context, and not prone to 
manipulation (1994:1-9). Following Yin’s line of reasoning and my area of research 
(mainly contemporary), the framework of a case study seems suitable for this thesis. 
 With reference to a definition of case studies and its operational procedures, no 
common understanding has emerged. John Gerring simply states; “regretfully, the term 
‘case study’ is a definitional morass” (2004:341). Nevertheless, Svein Andersen has 
provided a suggestive conceptualisation which is applicable for studies of singular-
cases as well as comparative-case studies: 
1. A-theoretical designs impart the social reality, rather than to develop notions and 
theories (in a theoretical vacuum). 
2. Theory-interpretive designs utilize a theoretical framework to structure the 
revealed empirical material. Graham T. Allison’s “Conceptual Models and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis”, may be illustrative in this regard. 
3. Theory-generating designs (Grounded Theory) approach the field with an ambition 
to reveal theoretical patterns from the data, and thereby develop an inductive 
theoretical framework, rather than one deducted from a priori hypotheses.  
4. Theory-developing designs have an inherent purpose to foster generalizations. 
These designs transform simple theoretical conceptualizations into a more 
profound theoretical framework, by employing a priori deduced set of hypotheses.  
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In Andersen’s 2 x 2 matrix, the first and second approach only have a 
descriptive purpose in relation to a particular case, whereas the third and fourth 
approach occupy a generalizing purpose beyond the actual studied case (1997:15,127-
128). My approach will be more thoroughly presented in the following subsections, 
but a singular theory-interpretive case study (2) which employs analytical categories 
to structure the empirical material, seems to be a plausible strategy.  
For analytical purposes and the transparency of the dissertation, my overall 
scientific approach may be decomposed into the research questions, analytical 
categories (theory), the data collection, and finally, the analysis. These components 
enable us to understand the nature of the research design, and illuminate the 
continuous interrelation between them (King et. al. 1994:13, Engelstad et al. 2000:86) 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
2.1. Research questions: Descriptive, normative or constructive questions?   
The most critical component about doing case studies relates to the development of the 
initial study questions, in what Karl Popper referred to as the “context of discovery” 
(Yin 1993:109, Hovi and Rasch 1996:20-30). Without guidance and direction 
embodied in the worded questions, the path to observations and knowledge may 
become hampered and indistinct. Thus, the scientist needs to invest time in the process 
of creating, introducing and specifying the research questions. In the creating phase, 
questions mirror the researcher’s field of interest and experience. Further, questions 
Analytical 
categories 
Analysis Research 
questions 
      Data 
collection 
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are introduced through a double-dialogue with colleagues and the society. Finally, a 
specifying process prepares, defines, and concretizes the questions. The research 
questions addressed in this thesis have previously been prepared in a dialogue with co-
students at the University of Oslo, and through a systematic consultation of the 
available Xinjiang-literature. Hence, an outspoken aspiration with my research 
questions is to provide some new perspectives to the field of Xinjiang-studies.  
 Furthermore, what kinds of questions do scientists forward and why? 
A. Ascertaining questions (descriptive approach) aspire to unveil information about a 
previous or current phenomena, and possible courses of development. 
B. Appraising (normative) questions approach a social reality with a normative 
conceptual lens, to reveal the social value of a particular phenomenon. 
C. Constructive questions deal with how actors may and should act in order to 
improve a particular social reality (Engelstad et al 2000:104-115). 
 In this dissertation, only ascertaining questions have been forwarded, focusing 
on the previous and actual situation in Xinjiang, and supplemented with some 
prospects for the future. The personal rationale behind my descriptive approach arises 
from the notion that this may be a sustainable start for an academic novice. Normative 
assessments and guidelines for an improvement of a social reality require more 
academic experience and knowledge about Xinjiang, than I currently possess.  
 
2.2. Analytical categories (theories): A deductive process or inductive theory? 
Ever since Glaser and Strauss introduced Grounded Theory in the end of the 1960s, an 
ongoing debate has taken place between the deductive framework of organizing a 
study, and Grounded Theory, which is theoretical patterns generated from the field of 
study. The latter approach criticizes a deductive approximation with its deduced 
hypotheses and conceptual lenses. Vivian Vaugham follows this line of reasoning; “the 
paradox of theory is that at the same time it tells us where to look, it can keep us from 
seeing” (in Andersen 1997:131). Thus, Glaser and Strauss assert that theory should be 
grounded in the field, not compelled and dictated by an a priori theory. The data 
should make the theory meaningful and not the other way round. In the end, this 
“would contribute toward closing the embarrassing gap between theory and empirical 
research” (Strauss and Corbin 1994:257). 
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Advocates of a deductive approach on the other hand, argue that theories and a 
priori hypothesis are sine qua non for the validity and reliability of the conducted 
research. In a deductive scheme, Popper advocates the composition of daring and 
falsifiable hypothesis derived from a theoretical framework. This is followed by a 
critical match-test of the hypotheses against the existing empirical data (Hovi and 
Rasch 1996:20-30). Moreover, Stinchcombe asserts that a theory is strengthened if a 
repeated test of the derived hypotheses confirms the initial findings (1968:19-22). 
 In my survey of the centre-periphery dynamics in Xinjiang, I find it suitable to 
apply Stein Rokkan’s theoretical framework and conceptualisations on state- and 
nation-building. However, although I employ this theoretical framework prior to my 
conducted fieldwork, I have not derived any hypotheses for critical testing. My angle 
of incidence is to provide a general account of the situation in Xinjiang and not 
specifically testing (falsifying) hypothesis. The “unreliable nature” of information 
from Xinjiang (as a terra incognita), renders it utterly difficult to embark on a process 
of critical testing. Moreover, I find that Rokkan’s perceptive theoretical considerations 
and keywords are not primarily designed for hypothesis testing, but rather equip the 
prospective researcher with a more adequate analytical terminology for analysis of 
centre-periphery relations. This is also why my aspiration is to introduce Rokkan’s 
insights and conceptualizations to a wider audience of Xinjiang-scholars. 
 
2.3. Collecting the data: My preparations and dialogues with the field of study. 
Preceding subchapters focused on rationales behind my research questions and the 
application of a theoretical framework. Fields of focus in this section concern pre-
fieldwork preparations and the data collection. Thorough preparations guide the phase 
of data collection, and with subsection 2.3.1., I briefly illuminate how I proceeded. In 
subsection 2.3.2., I direct the focus on applied methods for the data collection, and 
elaborate on my quest for multiple sources of evidence (data triangulation). 
 
2.3.1. Pre-fieldwork preparations: Employing a case study protocol.  
The skills required for collecting case study data are much more demanding than those 
for experiments and surveys […]. During data collection, only a more experienced 
investigator will be able to take advantage of unexpected opportunities rather than 
being trapped by them (Yin 1994:55).  
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Thorough preparations are thus pivotal for the data collection and Yin advocates the 
application of an overall research guideline (case study protocol) for these endeavours. 
Such a protocol may provide the prospective scientist with general procedures and 
codes of conduct for a stringent operation. A protocol can be organized by the 
following main sections:  
1. A general synopsis, stating the projects purpose, theme and its relevant literature. 
2. Procedures in the field, permission/access to important materials/persons/sites.  
3. Relevant questions for the case study, which keep the scientist “on track” and 
provide guidance to the needed information, and for what purpose. 
4. A guide for the final rapport and its potential audience, established prior to the data 
collection (1994:63-74).  
 At a very early stage in the research process, I obtained the most relevant 
literature on Xinjiang and was endowed with a solid contextual understanding. This in 
turn enabled me to develop an overall sketch for my thesis (addressing Yin’s four 
guiding principles), and moreover illuminated the opportunities and limitations that 
appeared with my project. As Xinjiang seem to be a terra incognita for international 
scientists, I precluded the option to conduct an overt fieldwork in the region. Hence, I 
shifted my focus to Uyghur diasporic groups in the countries adjoining China, and 
eventually found Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to be of particular interest. Then I met 
with Semet Abla, the leader of the Norwegian Uyghur committee, who provided me 
with contextual information about the Uyghur Diaspora and general customs (“do’s 
and don’ts”). Moreover, he connected me with Uyghur exile leaders in Central Asia 
and in that sense, resembled William Whyte’s key informant “Doc”, from his seminal 
study “Street Corner Society” (Yin 1994:84).  
 At this stage, I started to develop my interview questions, obtained the 
necessary permissions (visas) well ahead of my departure to Central Asia (and later 
Xinjiang), and composed principles of discretion for the fieldwork, in order to avoid 
“the governmental radars” of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. While these regimes are not 
as repressive against Uyghur separatist sentiments as the PRC government, they still 
put a significant pressure on the Uyghur expatriate leaders. Thus, I had a responsibility 
not to further jeopardize these leaders, and this liability extended to the content of my 
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thesis (not revealing information that may severe their situation). The same 
considerations applied for my journey to Xinjiang, where I at random encountered 
Uyghurs willing to talk. In this setting, I never took any notes as the conversations 
progressed. Only at a later stage, I discretely wrote non-traceable notes.  
 
2.3.2. In dialogue with the field: Various angles of incidence.  
To avoid insufficient data in the phase of the analysis, a plausible strategy has been to 
collect different kinds of data (data triangulation). An old saying, testis unus, testis 
nullus, one source, says really nothing, is a rather strict principle. Nevertheless, 
different, independent and consistent sources enrich the analysis (Kjeldstadli 
1999:178). Yin endorses this as converging patterns of evidence from several sources, 
may strengthen the validity of the project (1994:92). However, the amount of utilized 
sources depends on research parsimony, structural restrictions (access), and the scope 
of the thesis. Notwithstanding these challenges, multiple sources of evidence have 
been applied, and a distinction can be made between sources accessible from my 
location in Norway, and those sources situated in Xinjiang, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), 
Almaty (Kazakhstan) or elsewhere.   
 In Norway, I enjoyed unlimited access to a variety of Uyghur expatriate internet 
sites, along with Chinese White Papers (official statements on the situation in Xinjiang, 
religious conduct in China, minority rights and so forth) and other online PRC 
documents. Additionally, I managed to obtain literally all the recent academic 
literature on Xinjiang. In reference to my fieldwork abroad, I conducted as previously 
mentioned, several interviews with Uyghur expatriate leaders in Bishkek and Almaty.  
At a later stage, an observational round trip in Xinjiang provided me with a wide range 
of first-hand (in situ) impressions of the region. Finally, my information collection 
abroad came to an end as I met with a Hui Chinese scholar in Beijing, whose extensive 
knowledge of ethnic relations in Xinjiang, shed additional light on my questions. 
 With a view to the interview setting in Bishkek and Almaty, I conducted 
conversational and topical interviews. Hence, I operated with questions that were not 
accompanied by fixed alternatives of reply for the respondent. However, at some 
questions I employed covert alternatives of response, in order to properly handle the 
coding/note-taking. Beyond the main questions my conversional structure opened up 
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for follow-up questions and probes, which ensured more in-depth information. With 
the words of Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin: ”The main questions help you make 
sure you are answering your research puzzle; the follow-up questions and probes 
ensures that you get depth, detail, vividness, richness, and nuance” (2005:129). This 
was especially successful in Bishkek, where I enjoyed simultaneous access to a 
Norwegian person fluent in Russian, and his Uyghur assistant. Consequently, these 
conversations were very precise in nature, whereas my interview in Almaty suffered 
some setbacks, due to my interpreter’s poor English. However, a modest knowledge to 
the Russian language enabled me to cross-check the answers at times of potential 
misapprehension.  
 
2.4. Data analysis and source reliability: Codes of scientific conduct.  
Analysis entails classifying, comparing, weighing, and combining material from the 
interviews to extract the meaning and implications, to reveal patterns, or to stitch 
together descriptions of events into coherent narrative (Rubin and Rubin 2005:201). 
 
Simultaneously as the prospective investigator embarks on the analysis of 
content, Starr timely reminds us that the researcher should enforce an inherent 
scientific scepticism regarding the source’s origin. He simply contends that “there is 
hardly any fact concerning Xinjiang that is so solid, no source of information that is so 
independent, and no analysis based on such overwhelming evidence that someone does 
not hotly contest its validity or meaning” (2004:6). The obvious implication of this is 
that governments, scholars and NGOs in their assessments of Xinjiang, should be 
aware of potentially exaggerated “victimology” from Uyghurs as well as the PRC 
government. In particular statements from the Chinese authorities insist on being the 
“exclusive representative of reality”. The book “Xinjiang of China: Its Past and 
Present”, by Chinese Scholars and made available at the PRC embassy in Norway, is 
illustrative in this regard; “it (the book) has been written on the basis of reality with the 
purpose of respecting history and clarifying the truth” (2005: Cover).  
Another important consideration for the investigator is to scrutinize whether 
external conditions have influenced the originator’s statements. As previously 
mentioned, Uyghurs situated in Xinjiang generally avoid passing critical remarks on 
the Chinese authorities, due to a fear of retaliations. Expatriate Uyghurs in the 
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neighbouring countries of China, operate with some restrictions, but nevertheless 
enjoy greater latitude of expression. Finally, Uyghurs in northern Europe and North 
America may enjoy extensive freedom of expression and movement. This naturally 
affects their operations as well as discursive intonation. Although a survey from the 
Chinese scholar Yang Shengmin has “revealed” that a predominant number of the 
Uyghurs “are proud of being a Chinese national” and “agree that participating in 
separatist activities is harmful to the majority of the people” (2006:10, 13), this may 
still only reflect that the Uyghurs do not dare to unmask their original preferences. 
Likewise, expatriate Uyghurs may also potentially usurp “the genuine Uyghur voice” 
abroad, and manipulate it to serve its own political objectives.   
 With this in mind, Ottar Dahl’s lucid principles for a thorough scrutiny of the 
employed sources, seem to provide an adequate starting point for the researcher 
(1973:48-52).19  
 
Figure 2. 
                1. Discovering a source.         2. Determining a source’s origin. 
 
 
4. Determining a source’s         3. Determining the content  
                    status of applicability.                                                                             (interpretative phase) 
 
 
These components operate in a reciprocal action and may be applied for all kinds of 
sources. Provided that the investigator automatically exposes newly acquired sources 
to this rigid process, it may arguably be possible to decrease the gap between the 
actual course of event and the account of this event. Thus, to reveal “wie es eigentlich 
gewesen” as Lepold von Ranke once put it (Powell 1990: XV).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19        The illustration is my own, based on Dahl’s insights. 
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3.0. Theoretical framework: The dynamics of state- and nation-building. 
Recollecting my research questions in brief, this study directs at the centre-periphery 
interactions between the Chinese authorities and the indigenous Uyghurs in Xinjiang. 
This complex and multidimensional relationship is evidently marked by diverging 
modi operandi and aspirations. Consequently, this thesis surveys the PRC authorities’ 
state building campaigns (external territorial demarcation and internal structuring) and 
their nation-building endeavours (external cultural boundary-demarcation and internal 
cultural standardizations). Moreover, I scrutinize the peripheral Uyghur counter-
cultures, whose ambitions and actions to undermine the PRC state- and nation-building 
machinery, enables one to study a classical centre-periphery conflict in display. In this 
regard, I find the perceptive works of Albert O. Hirschman, Stein Rokkan and Stefano 
Bartolini, to provide a suitable theoretical basis for the analysis. 
 
3.1. State formation: External boundary-demarcation and internal structuring.  
“The history of each territory is essentially the history of successes or failures in the 
conflict between boundary-reduction and boundary-accentuation” (Rokkan 1999:103). 
 
In his theorizing of state formation, Rokkan thus directed his main focus at processes 
of boundary-demarcation and the inherent tension between initiatives of boundary-
reduction and initiatives of boundary-accentuation. The keyword for his overall study 
is thus boundaries. In this regard, the effectiveness of the centre-elites’ state building 
efforts depends upon whether they possess adequate “technologies” capable of 
controlling various boundary transactions. Concerning a polity’s territorial borders, 
this implies a prevailing state where their coercive agencies have a certain capacity to 
prevent undesirable “entries” or “exits”. Otherwise, these borders would simply be 
“lines on the map” (a totally open society) as Rokkan put it (1999:103, 109). 
In the ongoing process of polity formation and consolidation, Rokkan then 
identified two intertwined dynamics; a centre’s external-boundary demarcation 
(gradually foreclosing spatial boundaries by confining member exits/ entrance of non-
members) and internal structuring (hierarchy and differentiation of member’s roles/ 
titles/ privileges) (Flora 1999:8). By establishing coercive agencies, the governing 
centre-elites thus aspire to de jure monopolize and legitimize their operations to exert 
effective threats of violence (their ultima ratio, decisive argument), both outwards and 
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inwards (domestication) (Flora 1992:87). Max Weber illustrated this crucial link with 
his threefold definition of a political formation as; “1) any hierarchically structured 
organization for the maintenance of order; 2) within a defined geographical area;         
3) through the use and the threat of physical coercion” (Bartolini 1999:1).  
The link between a polity’s external territorial consolidation and its internal 
political structuring evidently has a solid “pedigree” in the study of state formation. In 
the analysis of these processes, it is required to survey both the centre-building elites’ 
efforts to “lock-in” peripheral actors and resources in a bounded social system 
(domesticating their strategies), and the diverging forces of transcendence/ movement 
(boundary-de-accentuation) (Bartolini 1999:1-3, Ferrera 2003:3). More precisely, the 
process of “locking-in” refers to mechanisms (“carrots and sticks”) employed by the 
centre-building elites’ to enforce their subjected population to consume “territorial 
public goods” (member rights, privileges and obligations). This is in reality a set of 
boundaries which distinguish between the “ins” and “outs”, provided that the centre 
possesses technologies capable of preventing undesired transcendence (“exit”) or 
penetration (“entry”) of their bounded system (Bartolini 1999: 7-11).  
With figure 3, Bartolini conceptualized the relationship between a polity’s 
external boundary-demarcation and internal structuring (I have slightly modified it). 
The core of his argument is that these processes can be seen as functions of each other 
(reciprocal influence). This also extends to the relationship between boundary-building 
(accentuation) and forces of movement (de-accentuation), as for instance the increased 
capacity of a centre to hold transcendence at bay, weakens peripheral forces aspiring to 
break away from the centre’s domain. Thus, one may read the scheme along “any of the 
arrows indicated” (not fixed between dependent and independent variables) (1999:1-3). 
 
Figure 3.  Bartolini (1999:43).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External territorial 
consolidation and 
relations. 
Exit (entry) options 
(de-accentuation) 
External boundary- 
building    
(accentuation) 
            Internal structuring 
               centre formation  
               system building 
               political structuring  
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A more comprehensive assessment of processes of boundary-demarcation and its 
tension (accentuation versus de-accentuation) will be presented later. Now I proceed to 
survey the concept of “distance” and its inherent centre-periphery polarity. 
 
3.2. Centre-periphery interactions: Spatial- and non-spatial distances (spaces). 
Rokkan asserts that the concept of distance comprises geographical, social, cultural 
and political differences, and thus, he refers to both spatial distance and socio-cultural 
distance. For analytical purposes, Rokkan then makes a distinction between two main 
types of distance; a) geographical space and b) membership space (socio-cultural 
distance between the ins” and “outs”). He points out that the membership space and its 
boundary to “entry” is “much firmer than the geographical boundary” (1999:104).  
Linking this insight to my study, an implication could be that while the PRC 
authorities manage to obtain military-administrative control in Xinjiang (employing 
what I characterize as “technologies of deterrence” towards external threats and 
“locking-in technologies/mechanisms” to domesticate the people in Xinjiang), they 
may nevertheless struggle to weaken Uyghur’s primordial boundaries and cultivate an 
overall Chinese identity (nation-building). With Rokkan’s word, this would imply a 
state where the PRC authorities’ “boundary-transcending/penetrating technologies” 
(attempts of boundary-de-accentuation) manage to overcome the periphery’s 
boundary-maintaining counter-forces (accentuation) in the sphere of force, but not in 
the firmer non-spatial membership sphere (Rokkan 1999:103). 
Continuing to survey distance, the following question emerges; which main 
features can be attributed to centres and peripheries? In brief, centres are privileged 
locations, exerting control over major flows of transaction and information within a 
given territory. A distinct trait is its proximity to collective decision-making processes, 
which congregate the dominant actors. Rokkan distinguished between three sets of 
resource holders/ progressive centres; a) economic centres for barter of commodities/ 
services and other transactions (headquarter of major economical institutions),            
b) cultural centres (messages/codes/rites for religious and educational activities),          
c) military-administrative centres (personnel, central ministries, courts, legislative 
assemblies) (1999:110). These centres may coincide geographically (monocephalic 
structure) or be scattered across the territory (polycephalic structure). 
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 In brief, an ideal-type periphery may be contrasted to these centres by the 
following key traits: Dependence, upon one or several of the above-mentioned centres 
(not controlling their own fate, often endowed with minimal resources to preserve their 
distinctiveness, a poorly developed economy, often dependent on a single commodity). 
Distance (spatial), often a conquered territory administrated by officials responsive to 
the territorial centre, rather than the indigenous people of the area. Difference, some 
sense of a separate identity is pronounced (also nurtured by centre-periphery distance 
and dependence). The ideal typical periphery is comprised by all these key traits, but 
also actors situated in a spatial centre, may be peripheral to a polity’s cultural, 
economical and political institutions (Flora 1992:88-89, Rokkan 1999:110-11).  
Despite peripheries’ ideal-typical traits of dependence, distance and difference, 
they may still attempt by varying degree to counter-mobilize against the centres’ 
system-building initiatives. Rokkan’s model below illustrates the multidimensional 
centre-periphery tension in both spatial and non-spatial spheres (1999:118): 
 
Figure 4. Rokkan: Model for integration and resistance among centres and peripheries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Territorial                               Territorial 
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                    Elite alliances   mobilization  
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According to Rokkan, the potential reach (“penetration capabilities”) and scope 
of centre-initiated thrusts toward peripheries depend on the following conditions:  
 1. Physical conditions of transportation and communication: The contours of 
landscapes, the distances across waters, making for higher or lower barriers between 
areas of settlement. 2. Technological conditions for movement: Horses, ships, canals, 
paved roads, later railroads, steamers, planes. 3. Military conditions for expansion 
versus retrenchment: Differences in levels of organisation, in skills of strategy and 
tactics, in the technology of war, all helping to increase or decrease the temptation to 
conquer territory. 4. Economic conditions for cross-territory transactions: Differences 
in resource endowments, in production and in markets, making for higher or lower 
incentives to barter and to trade. 5. Cultural conditions of communication: Ethnic 
affinities or enmities, differences in language, in moral codes, in religion (1999:109).  
   
3.3. Differentiation and the conceptual linking of centres and peripheries. 
The previous subchapter illuminated Rokkan’s distinction of different centres and 
peripheries (figure 4). This distinction was greatly influenced by Talcott Parsons’ 
“Societies” (1967) with its focus on processes of differentiation within territorial 
systems. Rokkan reinterpreted Parson’s work and illuminated four basic processes of 
territorial and functional centre-differentiation: 1. Economic-technological. 2. 
Military-administrative. 3. Judicial-legislative. 4. Religious-symbolic (Flora 
1992:89).20 Albert Hirschman’s “Exit, voice and loyalty” (1970), was another 
academic contribution with a profound impact on Rokkan’s theoretical modelling of 
state- and nation-building. Hirschman, mainly occupied in the sphere of economy, 
elegantly pinpointed individuals’ alternative courses of actions (“exit” or “voice”, and 
the mediating “loyalty”) as consumers of products/services, or as members of an 
organization. Hirschman’s insights enabled Rokkan to observe structures and 
processes at all levels of society which ensure; a) a minimal maintenance of a system 
(“loyalty”), b) some intra-communication within a system and inter-communication 
between systems (“voice”), and finally, c) sources of breakdown/ transcendence of 
established boundaries (“exit”) (1999:100-101). 
 
                                                 
20      In some models, Rokkan merged military-administrative differentiation and judicial-legislative differentiation. 
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Table 1 illustrates Rokkan’s macro-conceptual elaborations on Hirschman: 
General Sources: Hirschman 1970, Rokkan 1973, 1987, 1999, Flora 1999, Bartolini 1999.  
 Intrigued by these observations, Rokkan aspired to fusion Hirschman’s 
innovative classification of decision systems, with Parson’s insights on differentiation. 
The result was a complex model (figure 5) where primordial peripheral communities 
became linked with differentiated central communities, through the channels of force, 
culture, law and economy. The dialectics of order (centres’ “locking-in” of resources 
and actors), and movement (boundary-breakdown/transcendence, succeeded by an 
“entry” into other entities), were incorporated into this model. The focal point of study 
was thus the continuous tension between processes of order and movement, within a 
centre-periphery paradigm (Rokkan 1974: 49, Flora 1992:92, 96). Einar Berntzen and 
Per Selle assert that Rokkan with his adaptation to Hirschman, moved from closed 
                                                 
21      In succeeding articles like “Exit, Voice, and the state” (1978) and “Exit, Voice, and the fate of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR)” (1993), Hirschman focused more on the state and dynamics between “exit” (out-migration) and “voice”. He discovered that while 
his previous conceptualisations had accounted for a diversity of experiences in economic and social life, it nevertheless had some defects. In 
preceding works, he depicted a negative relationship between “exit” and “loyalty”, where the presence of accessible “exit-alternatives” 
tended to eliminate the incentive for discontent individuals, to “voice” their grievance. Hence, “exits” were typically imprinted in silence, but 
this notion has been rejected by studies of political activists’ out-migration (1993:175-77). “Voice” and “exit” have typically worked in 
tandem as it did in GDR in 1989, and in my own study of Uyghur expatriates, where “exits” from Xinjiang territory, has been accompanied 
by an intense “voice” to defame the Chinese authorities at the international arena.   
Table 1 Micro Level- Hirschman Macro level- Rokkan 
“Loyalty” “Loyalty” holds “exit” at bay. When individuals are 
discontent with an outcome, the strategy is to “voice” 
demands and hope for an improved situation. Typically 
there is a higher degree of “loyalty” from members of 
organizations, than from consumers of 
products/services. Loyal members often “leave no 
stone unturned before he resigns himself to the painful 
decision to withdraw or switch” (Hirschman 1970:82). 
“System-formation”: Structural incentives and regulations to 
stay within the system. System maintenance by cultural 
integration, where the centre through a chain of succeeding 
thrusts, attempts to construct a shared system of norms, values 
and identities (language, “way of life”, cultural perceptions etc.). 
-Rokkan and Hirschman acknowledged the existence of 
organisations, whose management equate “loyalty” with their 
members’  “silence” (mainly in authoritarian arrangements). 
“Voice” “Voice” has the functioning of alerting a firm or 
organization of its failing. “Voice” plays a more 
important part for a member of an organization, than to 
a consumer of products/services. With the presence of 
accessible “exit-alternatives”, the role of “voice” tends 
to be undermined, as consumers silently “exit” and 
thereby make an “entry” into alternative arrangements.  
“Political structuring”: Internal communication and political 
structuring, where oppositional “voices” are legitimized through 
a chain of locks in democratic regimes (democratization; the 
dismantling of internal thresholds for participation):  
1. Legitimating (allowed to express “voice” without sanctions).  
2. Incorporation in the system (participant rights).  
3. Representation in law giving assemblies. 
4. Executive power access (Rokkan 1987: 274-275).  
In authoritarian regimes like China, “voice” has been restricted 
and institutionalized by the principle of Democratic Centralism. 
“Exit” 
 
 
 
Individual transcendence of a boundary. Provided that 
the expected outcome is not met after purchasing a 
product/ service or holding a membership in an 
organisation, the individual might chose to leave or 
stop consuming a particular brand/service (“exit”). The 
threat of “exit” is a member’s most “potent weapon”.21 
 
“Centre-formation”: The establishment of boundaries to “lock- 
in” actors and resources in a polity, versus “breakdown”, 
manifested by the transcendence of some boundary. An “exit” is 
always followed by an “entry” into an alternative arrangement, 
which in the hypothetical event of a territorial breakaway of 
Xinjiang, would imply the “entry” into an East Turkistan state. 
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models imprinted in traits of permanency (a priori given and closed boundaries) to 
more open and dynamic models, with the continuous construction-reconstruction of 
boundaries (1988:251). With the three-dimensional figure 5 (it has a “kinship” with 
figure 4, as they both illustrate the centre-periphery link) and table 2, Rokkan outlined 
this continuous tension (order versus movement) and consequently, provided an 
illustration of his theoretical fusion of Hirschman and Parson (1999:123,125).22 
 
Figure 5: The basic model:  Central establishment   Rokkan (1999:123). 
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22     Rokkan expressed that the model “is essentially a device for the ordering of questions and data about similarities and differences among 
historically given political systems”.  Thus, it enables us to observe the centre-periphery dynamics through four main dimensions (1999:124). 
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Table 2. Hirschman and Parson combined (Rokkan 1999:125). 
 
Periphery- 
Centre balance Force   Culture   Law   Economy 
   
Degree of  Strenght of  Strenght of  Strenght of  Integration/ 
Periphery  extractive   standardising  centre-imposed  separation of 
Integration: agencies,   agencies vs.  vs. local/regional   primary economy 
Entry variables, extent of   strength of counter-  legal traditions   
Potentially  opposition to   agencies    
Voice variables such agencies 
 
Degree of   Balance on internal vs. Distinctiveness vs. shared- Distinctiveness vs. shared- Openness vs.  
centre dist- external resources of   ness of religious and/or ness of territorial legal  closedness of 
inctiveness: military agencies (alliances, linguistic standards  system   territorial economy 
Exit variables territorial ‘temptations’) 
 
Over-time processes  Penetration:  Standardisation:  Equalisation of rights  Redistribution of 
of system-building: State building  Nation-building  of participation:  resources/benefits: 
Loyalty variables     stricto sensu     Political citizenship  Social citizenship 
 
 
Moreover, table 3 in a more detailed fashion, depicts strategies employed by the 
centre-building elites to “lock-in” a periphery’s resources and actors (generating 
behavioural conformity), and potential strategies of counter-mobilization for the latter: 
 
Table 3.  Exit options and boundary building (Bartolini 1999: Appendix table 1.4.) 
  
 Exit option units Boundary building mechanisms 
Economy -goods 
   -services 
      -tourists 
         -corporations 
            -investors 
               -customers 
-embargoes 
   -tariffs 
      -labour-market controls 
         -credit/capital controls 
            -nationalisation of economy 
Culture -messages, news 
   -styles, ideas 
      -fashion, fads 
         -scribes, scientists 
            -religious/ideological orders 
               -intellectuals 
                  -missionaries 
-prohibition 
   -censorship 
     -loyalty-building rites/symbols 
        -control of socialising agencies 
          -nationalisation of culture 
Politico- administrative 
(functional regimes) 
-voters 
   -candidates 
      -legal claimants (judges/cases) 
         -sub-state governments 
           -students 
             -welfare recipients 
-protection of citizenship 
   -national specific social rights 
     -professional credential control 
       -national jurisdiction 
         -national educational title system 
Force(coercion/ 
extraction 
-soldiers/armies 
   -police 
 -spies 
   -underground movements 
     -organized crime 
        -tax 
          -territorial secession 
-territorialisation of defence 
   -territorialisation of policing 
     -borders control 
       -territorial extraction system 
          -restriction on residence 
            -restrictions on travelling 
 
These four dimensions of boundary-demarcation have tended to overlap and 
coincide in the European context (the emergence of nation-states). Hence, crossing a 
state’s territorial border has also entailed an “entry” into alternative arrangements of 
coercion, economical markets, cultural communities, welfare system, educational 
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doctrines, and legal jurisdiction (Bartolini 1999:13-14, 2006:5-6) .23 Rokkan employed 
these four fundamental processes of system building for his study of political 
formation in Europe.24 Moreover, he suggested four time phases attached to these 
processes (thrusts), which in principle could be applied to “Western as well as non-
Western” cases of study. The first and second thrusts are initiated from the centre 
toward the periphery, while the third and fourth thrusts embody internal restructuring 
and increased “legitimate” involvement of the periphery (while China has some 
redistributive arrangements (4), the channels for active participation (3) seems limited). 
1. State building stricto sensu, the establishment of a centre (centres), which 
penetrates and gain military-administrative control of a surrounding territory. Central 
repressive and extractive agencies are assigned to provide a common defence of the 
polity, regulate resource extractions, and maintain internal order/ dispute-settlements.  
2. Nation-building refers to processes where the centre provides a cultural 
demarcation outwards and cultural standardisation within the polity. Thus, they initiate 
processes to increase the national awareness, which is embodied by compulsory 
schools (presenting standardized perceptions on the nation-state’s history, often one 
lingua franca penetrating throughout the territory, common religious cultural and 
religious rites) conscript armies, a nationalised mass media, and communication 
channels between the central elite and the population situated in the peripheries.   
3. Active participation, where socio-political movements enter the system and 
eventually transform the participants into political citizens (“within exit”; from 
pacified to activated). In these processes of democratization (dismantling internal 
thresholds), Rokkan presented the following chain of thresholds (1987:274-275):  
A. Legitimating (latitude of expressing “voice” without sanctions).  
B. Incorporation in the system (participant rights).  
C. Representation in law giving assemblies. 
D. Executive power access.  
4. Redistributive arrangements with a nation-wide scope (public welfare 
systems; partly equalisation of economic conditions through socio-economic solidarity 
between better-off strata and poorer segments) (Rokkan 1999:131-134). 
                                                 
23     Bartolini’s fascinating studies of EU’s formation (integration and broadened jurisdiction) have however illuminated a weakening of the 
nation-states’ distinctiveness, and at some levels a re-demarcation by extending the scope to a Euro-polity (economical, jurisdictional, 
cultural, military overlapping arrangements) (1999, 2006). 
24     Rokkan was inspired by the Almond-Pye committee’s comparative studies of political systems and six long-term development-
phases/”crisis” (Flora 1992: 118-119).  
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3.4. Non-spatial boundaries and perceptions of collective identities. 
Rokkan’s explanatory schemes and models incorporated both geographical and socio-
cultural factors as underpinnings of political territoriality. Thus, Hans Vollard asserts 
that he avoided the “territorial trap”, where geographical factors alone illuminate the 
dynamics of exit-options, voice-arrangements and authority regarding structuring/de-
structuring of polities (2005:3-5). This has been illustrated with preceding subchapters 
in the passages of “distance” (centre-periphery) and polity-formation (differentiation).  
However, while Rokkan to some extent depicted “nation-builders”, mobilized 
peripheral counter-cultures, and constellations of collective identities/ belief-systems 
(socio-cultural boundaries), the potential and necessity for a more extensive 
assessment is evident. In this regard, Stefano Bartolini perceptively elaborated on 
Rokkan’s dialectic of order-movement and masterfully incorporated the insights on 
collective identities, inter-group interactions and perceptions of social mobility, into 
his analysis of boundaries. These reflections are simply invaluable when analysing and 
comprehending the potential reach and scope of the PRC’s overt and covert policies, 
toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang (aspiring to impair their distinctiveness (boundary-
reduction/de-accentuation) and strengthen an overall Chinese identity). 
 Bartolini employs Bernhard Giesen and Shmuel Eisenstadt’s volume “The 
construction of collective identity” (1995) as a starting point in his analysis of 
collective identities and permeability. In this regard, Giesen and Eisenstadt 
distinguished between three major codes of collective identity (Bartolini 1999:24-25): 
1. Primordial elements as indicators of identity, with “permanent”/unchangeable 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity (race), generation and kinship. Primordial 
collectives do not have any missionary agenda. “The others are not guilty of wrong 
choice- simply, they cannot be educated or convinced, converted or adopted” 
(1999:24). Thus, these boundaries are settled and not prone to transcendence.  
2. Conversely, civility codes (boundaries) are more permeable where an 
outsider may be accepted, provided that the local practices and institutional 
arrangements are adopted and not questioned. More precisely, this refers to the 
outsider’s acceptance of a community’s social practice (behavioural rules, traditions, 
rites and so forth.), which is regarded as the nucleus of their collective identity. 
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3. Cultural (or sacredness) collective identity is universalistic in its orientation, 
with a missionary agenda. Hence, boundaries can be crosses by communication, 
reorientation and education. An “entry” into their “way of life” is rendered possible by 
reorientation and adoption of their “superior” normative standards.  
While Giesen and Eisenstadt’s distinction of collective identities may indicate 
various focal points for transcending demarcated social boundaries, additional insight 
may be provided by reviewing social psychologists’ comments on the potential reach 
and scope of group behaviour. In this respect, Tajfel and Turner contrast interpersonal 
behaviour versus intergroup behaviour. Interpersonal behaviour refers to an interaction 
fully determined by individual traits (not affected by belonging to a social group), 
whereas intergroup behaviour refers to an interaction fully determined by the influence 
of a social group (their codes of conduct), upon its members. Bartolini notes that the 
scope (level of intensity) of an intergroup-conflict, is more extensive where individual 
interaction can be traced back to their group belonging (1999:32-33).  
Another important distinction can be made regarding individuals’ perception of 
a society as “open” (social mobility) or “closed” (social group stigmata). In the case of 
Xinjiang, a question is whether Uyghurs experience that positions in the labour market 
and the Communist Party are accessible /permeable (social mobility), or out of reach 
due to their minority background (group stigmata).  Bartolini asserts that intergroup 
(unitary) behaviour and within-group loyalty is fostered by the latter perception. 
Conversely, social mobility beliefs foster greater in-group variability toward members 
of the outer-group, and thus, a decreased level of tension. Below is a figure originally 
by Bartolini, which I have slightly modified in order to illustrate the dynamics of 
group belief systems and group structures (1999:32-34): 
 
Figure 6.          Group structure rigidity/permeability 
 
Rising of boundaries                    Decline of boundaries 
New technologies of locking-in                                  New technologies of exit 
 
       Belief system 
Social stigmata belief                                 Social mobility belief 
 
Strengthening of in-group identity          Decline of in-group identity 
Strengthening of in-group behavioural-              Decline of in-group behavioural- 
conformity             conformity 
Strengthening of inter-group conflict                Decline of inter-group conflict 
More inter-group type relationship           More interpersonal type relationship
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Summing up in brief, Bartolini linked notions of group identity and its 
dynamics (codes of collective identities, inter-group interaction, perceptions on socio-
economical prospects and so on), with conceptualizations of boundaries (“exit”/ 
“entry”). His contribution may especially enable the prospective researcher to more 
thoroughly assess the PRC’s “penetration capabilities”, regarding their ability to 
weaken and transcend distinctive Uyghur markers (membership space: non-spatial 
boundaries). Moreover, to identify which spheres Uyghur counter-cultures mobilize 
most intensively in, along with potential outcomes of this interaction. By incorporating 
these insights with Rokkan’s overall state- and nation-building framework, the 
researcher may be endowed with conceptual tools to conduct a comprehensive analysis, 
covering all the major aspects of Xinjiang’s centre-periphery dynamics.  
Hence, at this stage it might be plausible to provide a refinement of my research 
questions (previously forwarded in section 1.2.), into a more distinct Hirschmanian-
Rokkanian “exit”, “voice”, “loyalty”-jargon. This recapturing may also be helpful for 
the reader, before the subsequent chapters unfold. 
In the process of external boundary-demarcation (confining member “exit”/ 
non-member “entry”) of Xinjiang territory and its internal structuring (hierarchy and 
differentiation of roles/titles/privileges), which main strategies can be ascribed to the 
Chinese authorities? Moreover, which “technologies of transcendence (“exit”)” do 
expatriate as well as domestic Uyghur movements employ, to hamper these processes 
of centre formation (state building)? 
In the cultivation of a broader Chinese identity (nation-building to generate 
regime-“loyalty” and weaken primordial Uyghur boundaries), how do the authorities 
regulate the Uyghur “voice”, regarding their practice of Islam, distinct language and 
cultural expression? Likewise, what kind of strategies do Uyghur counter-cultures 
(Uyghur nation-builders) in Xinjiang as well as expatriate Uyghurs employ, in order to 
demarcate and strengthen their traits of distinctiveness (membership space)? 
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Chapter 4:  
 
PRC state- and nation-building in Xinjiang. 
 
  
Photo Truls Winje: This enormous statue in Khotan eternalizes Chairman Mao’s meeting with the electric worker Kurban Turum in 1959. 
Allegedly, Turum set of from Khotan to Beijing on a donkey, to present Mao with dried fruits. When he eventually reached Urumqi, the CCP 
apparatus flew him to meet Mao in Beijing. 
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4.0. Chinese state- and nation-building in Xinjiang (1949-2007).   
   
Recollecting the introduction of Xinjiang’s history in chapter 1, the region has 
throughout the course of history attracted a variety of politico-religious formations, 
aspiring to dominate the territory and its indigenous people. Prospective candidates for 
an all-embracing control of Xinjiang, have encountered a wide range of challenges, 
and I argue, been in need of acquiring the following capabilities: Sufficient regime-
loyal manpower, equipped with “technologies of deterrence” toward external as well 
as domestic threats; sustainable transportation axes ensuring a stable flow of crude 
materials, manufactured goods and relief/enforcement of manpower; and finally, a 
perceptive strategy to attach legitimacy to the centre’s operations, and if possible, 
generate a collective notion à la one “Manifest Destiny” (cultivating a group identity). 
With the inception of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and Xinjiang as 
an inseparable part of this arrangement, the communist authorities embarked on an 
ambitious project to “tame the region’s wildness”. The following subchapters survey 
the centre-building communist elite’s endeavours to “lock-in” peripheral 
resources/actors by external boundary-demarcation and internal structuring. The 
presentation furthermore accounts for a significant barrier to the PRC’s state- and 
nation-building endeavours; the mobilization of Uyghur counter-cultures.  
             
4.1. State building in Xinjiang: External demarcation and internal structuring.  
Xinjiang was peacefully liberated on September 25, 1949. As the liberation struggle 
gained momentum across the country and the revolutionary struggle of the people of 
all ethnic groups surged forward in Xinjiang […] (they) welcomed […] the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army [PLA]. The people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang greeted 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China together with the rest of the Chinese 
people on October 1, 1949 (Xinjiang White Paper 2003).25  
 
When the PLA forces entered Xinjiang in 1949, this heralded an era of all-embracing 
PRC state building in the region. In this respect, the PLA and from 1954, the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corp (Bingtuan), became instrumental in the 
government’s endeavours to effectively demarcate PRC-boundaries outwards and 
maintain order inwards. These “boundary-penetrating technologies” (and later 
“technologies of consolidation”), have simply been of vital importance for Beijing’s 
                                                 
25     PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 3). White Paper. 
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ongoing operations in Xinjiang. Thus, my focus is inevitably directed at these centre- 
vectors’ procedures and capabilities, to operate effectively in this vast region. 
Moreover, I briefly survey their partaking in Xinjiang’s historical junctures 
(1949-2007), involving on the one hand disputes with neighbouring countries 
(especially between 1960 and 1990), and on the other, the emergence of large-scale 
internal uprisings and even acts of terrorism (particularly in the 1990s). The latter 
incidents and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 greatly altered the Chinese 
authorities’ threat perception. From then on, the government tightened their grip in 
Xinjiang and simultaneously aspired to establish good relations (converging threat 
perceptions), and reciprocal frontier demarcation-agreements with their neighbouring 
countries. Hence, a major strategy was to prevent these countries from facilitating 
exile Uyghur activities on their own soil, by embarking on regional integration and 
bilateral arrangements. This will be accounted for in detail later.   
Finally, I address another recent state building campaign; “Open up the West”, 
which have focused on: a) infrastructural developments and b) settler colonization. 
The expansion of arterial highways and rail-road systems has been initiated to 
penetrate more profoundly into “Uyghur heartland” southwards. Moreover, the PRC 
authorities have conducted large-scale extractions of oil, gas and coal, which have 
been simply alluring to scores of migrating Han-Chinese. With these infrastructural 
developments deeper into Xinjiang, the government has also ensured that Han settlers 
have followed along, and as such, strengthened their hold vis-à-vis the Uyghurs.  
  
4.1.1. State building: PLA and the Bingtuan as paramount vectors of the centre. 
When the PLA moved into Xinjiang in 1949, they embarked on a comprehensive task 
of external boundary-demarcation, with 5,400 kilometres of borderland (adjoining 
what today are eight countries). Guomindang forces (about 80,000) and other local 
forces (about 25,000) were absorbed into the PLA (100,000) and thus, the armed 
forces altogether comprised about 200,000 soldiers. Their main assignment was to root 
out internal threats and deter potential external aggressors, something that they 
seemingly managed to do within a relatively short period (Shichor 2004:132).  
 In these founding days of the PRC, the government cultivated peaceful 
coexistence with their neighbouring countries, and the Soviet Union was not 
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considered to be a military threat, although borderlines were unsettled and some 
mutual mistrust survived (2004:137). Hence, much energy was invested inwards by 
eliminating potential national enemies of the regime (converting local leaders into 
loyal CCP cadres).26 By and large, the regime managed to establish and maintain 
control in the region, at the expense of warlord rivalry and shifting alliances.  
At this stage, the most prominent leaders in Xinjiang had dual roles, possessing 
senior posts within the Party, as well as prominent roles within the PLA. Wang Zhen 
and Wang Enmao embodied this at the beginning of the 1950s, and were instrumental 
in the demobilization of military units into the paramilitary Bingtuan. Wang Zhen then 
moved on to more senior posts, whereas Wang Enmao became Xinjiang’s cadre par 
excellence, until he was forced out during the Cultural Revolution (Dillon 2004:77-8).  
 
Textbox 1. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan). 
 
The corps serves as a powerful colonizing force, reclaiming land to settle new immigrants […] 
securing the territory with a string of cities, farm complexes and industries; attracting demobilized 
soldiers to settle in Xinjiang; and consolidating territorial control (Becquelin 2004:367). 
 
The Bingtuan was officially established in 1954, and composed of demobilized Guomindang (GMD-
Nationalist), Ili National Army (INA), PLA soldiers and criminals, who were redeployed into the 
semi-military working corps of the Bingtuan (Toops 2004b:246). Viewed through a “Rokkanian 
lens”, the Bingtuan’s boundary-consolidating capacity at strategic locations throughout Xinjiang, was 
simply a sine qua non for the government’s state building project. At first, the corps embarked on the 
vast territory with very modest manpower, but at later stages absorbed and administered the massive 
influxes of Han Chinese for permanent settlement (Bovingdon 2004:26). Hence, Millward and Tursun 
argue that the Bingtuan was “the direct descendent of Qing-era state farms” (2004:90).          
        The passage from the Xinjiang White Paper below, illustrates Bingtuan’s twofold orientation 
with its “production and militia duties”, although a focus on “stability and safety” is most evident;  
As an important force for stability in Xinjiang and for consolidating frontier defence, the XPCC 
[Bingtuan] adheres to the principle of attaching equal importance to production and militia duties. It 
has set up in frontier areas a “four-in-one” system of joint defence that links the PLA, the Armed 
Police, the XPCC and the ordinary people, playing an irreplaceable special role in the past five decades 
in smashing and resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration, and in 
maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.27  
 
This principle of simultaneous production and militia duties makes Tyler to ascribe Bingtuan with a 
persistent “Jekyll-and-Hyde identity” (2003:196). Over the last years, its enterprise activities have 
accelerated, but as it deputy commander admitted in 1998: “To the outside, it is a business group; 
internally, it is still the Corps”. In the 1990s, the corps role of enforcing order and counter separatism 
                                                 
26       The leadership of the East-Turkistan Republic (1944-49) were all killed in a mysterious plane-crash and the Uyghur nationalists 
Muhammad Amin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin fled to Turkey in 1949. Other leaders were “re-educated” and became communist cadres. 
27       PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 8). White Paper. 
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got a major boost (Becquelin 2000:78-80), and this seems to further increase in the post 9/11-era. 
In this regard, the Chinese scholar Ma Dazheng mentions that while the total population of the 
Bingtuan is about 2,4 million people, over 1,8 million are situated in the north, and only 600,000 to 
the South. Hence, he advocates the following layout for the Bingtuan; “maintain the north and 
strengthen the south”. Only by this procedure can “it live up to its historical mission” (2005:257). 
 
The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps’s current status. 
 
Bingtuan is organised along 14 divisions (reclamation areas), comprising 174 agricultural/ 
stockbreeding farms and around 4,400 industrial, construction, transport and commercial enterprises. 
Moreover, the corps handles its own judicial system (own justice departments, courts and prisons) 
and welfare questions (education, hospitals and pension funds) (Ma 2005:251). This makes Tyler 
depict it is as “a state within a state”, reporting directly to Beijing (2003:194).  
 
Regarding China’s external affairs, the relationship to Soviet deteriorated by the late 
1950s, at the same time as tensions rose between India and China.28 Thus, the PRC 
authorities had to simultaneously clamp down on internal sentiments for separatism 
and externally, deter potential state aggression. Bingtuan was a paramount vector in 
this respect, as it embarked on a policy of “two circles and one line”. According to Ma 
Dazheng, the “circles” referred to Bingtuan farms circling the fringes of the 
Gurbantunggut dessert (north) and Taklamakan dessert (south), while the one “line” 
referred to the presence of Bingtuan regiments in the border area, ready to counter 
“Soviet hegemonism” (2005:256). In 1962, mostly Kazakhs and some Uyghur illegally 
escaped to Soviet and tensions rose as Soviet consulates in Xinjiang were forced into 
inactivity. From 1966 and onwards, several thousand minor incidents took place, 
involving Xinjiang’s frontier posts, Soviet troops, and Soviet-sponsored ethnic 
guerrillas. In 1969, clashes along the border caused heavy casualties, and the PRC 
government expected an all out attack from their neighbours (Shichor 2004:138-9). 
 During the 1960s, the deteriorated relationship with the Soviet Union naturally 
caused great concern, but Wang Enmao also had to deal with a substantial internal 
threat, the radical Mao-loyal Red Guards, an offspring from the infamous Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76). In 1964, the PRC triggered their first atomic bomb at Lap Nor’s 
                                                 
28      Michael Dillon argues that the deteriorated Sino-Soviet relation was caused by Khrushchev’s speech in 1956, where he denounced 
Stalin (perceived by Mao as threatening to his own position). Moreover, Moscow perceived the PRC’s campaign Great Leap Forward and 
later the Cultural Revolution, with great scepticism (2004:56). Regarding Sino-Indian tensions, this made the PRC government forge a 
strategic link with Pakistan and they settled their differences over the Kashmir-Xinjiang border. In 1962, Indian troops and Chinese troops 
frequently clashed, but due to “China’s edge in the region, India has consistently avoided provoking China ever since” (Shichor 2004:136, 
143-44). 
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nuclear installations in Xinjiang, and Wang endeavoured to keep this installation away 
from the Red Guards. Hence, he established his own Red Guard units (elements from 
the Bingtuan) and suppressed rival Red Guards. Beijing then ordered Wang to disband 
his personal units, but as he failed to comply, he was removed at a moment where 
China feared a large scale attack from Soviet. Moscow did actually contemplate a 
surgical strike against Lap Nor, but in the end, tensions decreased as both parts agreed 
in covert conversations to avoid armed confrontations and border-disputes. With 
Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the Chinese offensive against Vietnam, 
Beijing-Moscow relations once again soured. However, armed confrontations were 
evaded, although China, in cooperation with the U.S. found it opportune to hamper 
Soviet’s military campaigns in Afghanistan (Tyler 2003:150-1, Shichor 2004:135-149). 
 The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 radically changed the 
geopolitical environment in the region, and thus, the PRC’s threat perceptions. 
Soviet’s natural successor Russia was greatly impaired, and the emerging independent 
Central Asian states did not constitute any credible threat to the PRC. However, 
internal problems had started to emerge in Xinjiang, through the rise of ethno-
nationalism and general discontent with the PRC government (Becquelin 2000:66).  
According to James Millward, Xinjiang witnessed “three clusters of events” in 
the 1990s, which had a profound impact on the government’s regional operations 
(2004: VIII). With the Baren-uprising nearby Kashgar in 1990, the region slided into a 
decade of conflict and violence. The PRC apparatus was taken by surprise of this well 
organized rebellion (logistically supported from abroad), which was embedded in an 
Islamic ideology. PLA-Bingtuan forces eventually quelled the uprising, but it only 
came to an end with numerous fatalities and thousands of incarcerated Uyghurs (Tyler 
2003:164-5, Millward 2004:14, Dillon 2004:62-64). Secondly, in 1992-93, a series of 
explosions and bombings at civilian targets (buses, stores and cinemas) caused several 
fatalities. Thirdly, from the spring of 1996, until the winter months in 1997, Uyghur 
militants conducted protests, bomb incidents and assassination of Uyghur cadres.  
The latter “cluster” corresponded with the inauguration of the Shanghai Five in 
1996 (textbox 2), and the initiation of the “Strike hard” anti-separatist campaign. The 
Ghulja-uprisings (Ili) in 1997, marked the apex of this overt Uyghur “voice” and was a 
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response to the government’s plan of action. As grievance escalated, several hundreds 
lost their lives, and afterwards, numerous Uyghurs were either convicted to prison or 
received capital punishment (Millward 2004:15-18, Dillon 2004: 94-98). Later that 
month, on February 27, memorial ceremonies were held for the departed Deng 
Xiaping, and Uyghur militants simultaneously triggered off bombs at three Urumqi 
city-buses(9 fatalities) (Millward 2004:18). While some violent repercussions 
followed, Gladney observed a marked decline in “civil unrest and so-called separatist 
events”, due to the PRC’s hard clampdowns and large scale arrests (2004b:381). 
 
Textbox 2.  Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 
Confronting the “three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism”. 
 
At Shanghai Five’s inception in 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
assembled (annual summits) to address concerns regarding border control, insurgent Islamic forces, 
smuggling and so on. An outspoken ambition was to launch a package of tension-reducing efforts 
including: A non-aggression pact, obligation to inform each other about major military activities near 
the international boundary line, and exchange of military observers (Dillon 2004:154, 168). 
        The raison d’être for the PRC’s involvement was to make these countries clamp down on 
Uyghur exiles and diasporic “East Turkistan movements”, whereas the other countries’ main 
incentive to bandwagon with the PRC, was based on the latter’s economical potential. Hence, Sean R. 
Roberts argues that the other countries were initially reluctant to fight Uyghur separatists, but as 
“Muslim militancy” increased its visibility, they became more accommodating toward the Chinese 
authorities (2004:233-34). In June 2001, the Shanghai Five mechanism transformed into a higher 
level of intergovernmental cooperation as the five countries in addition with Uzbekistan, signed the 
declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
a greater emphasis was put on combating the “three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism”. 
This in turn has entailed a state where exiled Uyghurs within the SCO have been more sanctioned. 
        Moreover, in recent years India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran have obtained status as SCO-
observer countries and while disagreements and competition still remain among the SCO-countries, 
separatist sentiments and international terrorism seem to loom larger in their thinking than the 
potential for external state aggression.  
 
 
Xinjiang in the aftermath of September 11, 2001: A looming Islamic threat? 
On September 2, 2001, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan organized a trade fair 
in Urumqi to attract Chinese and international investors. While acknowledging some 
acts of separatism in the past, it was emphasized that; “by no means is Xinjiang a place 
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where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often”. He also noted that the 
current state was “better than ever in history”.29 Only nine days later, this account was 
dramatically altered with the incidents on September 11. In the aftermath, the PRC 
authorities sought to bandwagon with the U.S. in their “War on terrorism”. According 
to Dillon, they thereby aspired to obtain a carte blanche to clamp down on Uyghur 
“terrorists” in Xinjiang (2004:157). On 18 September, 2001 the PRC’s Foreign 
Ministry’s Spokesman Zhu Bangzao, made an interesting remark in this regard:30 
Question from the press: Does China wish the US to soften its position on China’s 
handling of the Xinjiang splittism after the terrorist attacks on the United States?  
Bangzao: The United States asks for China’s support and assistance in the fight 
against terrorism. China, in the same token, has reason to ask the Untied States to give 
its understanding and support in China's fight against national splittism and terrorism. 
 
Hence, the Chinese authorities manoeuvred to incorporate Uyghur separatism as 
an inseparable part of the “War on terrorism”. The previous depiction of “a handful of 
separatists” was now referred to as “a full-blown terrorist organisation” (Millward 
2004:11, Clarke 2005:15). In the Chinese discourse, many Uyghur Muslims were 
suddenly equated with Islamic terrorists, and when some Xinjiang Uyghurs were 
discovered on the ground with Taliban in Afghanistan, this profoundly hampered the 
prospects of moderate Uyghur (Fuller and Lipman 2004:341).31 Thus, the Chinese 
authorities’ threat perception gained momentum, and they found it opportune to clamp 
down on all kinds of Uyghur dissent, as a part of the broader campaign against 
international terrorism.32  
On January 21, 2002, the Information Office of the PRC State Council issued 
the document “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity”, 
which in a detailed fashion accounted for alleged terrorist acts (quantifying casualties 
and fatalities) by Uyghur separatist groups. Moreover, as the document’s title implies, 
the authorities requested frank support from the international community: 
                                                 
29      Human Right Watch (2005). “Devastating Blows and Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang” (2005), and Millward (2004:11).    
30      PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). “Foreign ministry regular press conference by spokesman Zhu Bangzao”. 
31      Twenty-two Uyghurs were detained by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay. However fifteen have been released, and in 2006, five of these 
were granted political asylum in Albania, to the great dismay of the Chinese authorities (Shichor 2006:107). 
32      Human Right Watch (2005). “Devastating Blows and Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang” (2005): “Since September 11, 2001, 
China has attempted to position its repression of Uighurs as part of the global “war on terror.” By exploiting the climate that followed the 
attacks on the United States and the fact that some Uighurs were found fighting in Afghanistan, China has consistently and largely 
successfully portrayed Uighurs as the source of a serious Islamic terrorist threat in Xinjiang”. The annual Amnesty International report from 
2005, states: “The authorities continued to use the “global war on terror” to justify harsh repression in Xinjiang, resulting in serious human 
rights violations against the ethnic Uighur community. The authorities continued to make little distinction between acts of violence and acts 
of passive resistance”.     
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The Chinese government opposes terrorism in any form; at the same time it opposes 
the application of double standards concerning the anti-terrorism issue. Any tolerance 
or indulgence toward the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces will not harm China and the 
Chinese people alone. Today, as the international community becomes more clearly 
and deeply aware of the harm brought about by terrorism, we hope that all peace-
loving people throughout the world, regardless of ethnic status or religious belief, 
region or country, political or social system, will fully recognize the nature of the 
“East Turkistan” terrorist forces and the serious harm caused by them, see through all 
their disguises, and jointly crack down on their terrorist activities, leaving not a single 
opportunity for them to exploit to their advantage.33  
 
Scrutinizing this document, Millward found several aspects problematic as many 
small-case incidents (labelled as acts of terrorism or separatism) could simply have 
been criminal acts. The document was also too vague when it referred to a unified 
“East Turkistan terrorist organisation” (2004:12-13). The Human Right Watch report 
“Devastating Blows and Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang”, reasoned along 
similar lines as it allegedly revealed numerous inconsistencies in the document (2005). 
  Nevertheless, the PRC managed to convince the U.S. about “East Turkistan 
terrorism”, and on August 26, 2002, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard 
Armitage, announced that the United States had added the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) to its list of terrorist groups. Symbolically, the United Nations 
announced on September 11, 2002, that it was placing the ETIM on a U.N. list of 
terrorist organizations, requiring all U.N. members to freeze the group’s financial 
assets and ban its members from entry.34 A number of international experts assert that 
this was in fact a “trade off” (tit for tat) between the U.S. and China to; a) make China 
a partner in “War on terrorism”, b) improve and stabilize the fragile bilateral relations, 
and finally, c) soften China in the prelude to the Iraq-war (Clarke 2005:12). 
About the same time, Shichor was officially invited to Xinjiang to view the 60-
minute video documentary “On the Spot Report: The Crimes of Eastern Turkistan 
Terrorist Power”, “showcasing” irrefutable evidence of terrorist activity. It referred to 
four main terrorist groups: (1) The Party of Islamic Reformers, (2) The Allah Party of 
East Turkistan, (3) The Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization and (4) The Eastern 
Turkistan Islamic Movement. But as Shichor remarked: “At best, they are – or were –
small and loosely organized of little operative value. At worst, they may have been a 
                                                 
33      PRC State Council (2002): “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity”.  
34      Dumbaugh, Kerry (2003). “China–US Relations”. Issue Brief for the U.S. Congress. 
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figment of Chinese imagination or even invented by Beijing” (2006:102). Although 
Shichor acknowledges the presence of some Uyghur violence/ acts of terror, the 
numerous inconsistencies in their documentation, simply impair the PRC’s credibility.  
On December 18, 2003, the People’s Daily published the article ”Combating 
terrorism, we have no choice”, with a list of “Eastern Turkistan” terrorist organisations 
issued by China’s Ministry of Public Security:35 (1) The Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), (2) The Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), (3) 
The World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and (4) The Eastern Turkistan 
Information Center (ETIC). Zhao Yongchen at the Ministry's Counter-Terrorism 
Bureau; “called on the authorities in all countries to disband the four organizations, to 
ban their activities, support, financing and protection of these organizations and to 
freeze their assets”. From the issued list in the 2002-documentary, only ETIM and 
ETLO figure on the list from 2003. Regarding the non-mentioned groups, Shichor asks 
in a rhetoric manner: “Are these terrorist organizations or not?” (2006:102). 
Concerning the question whether East Turkistan Islamic groups constitute a 
genuine threat to the PRC or are “figments of Chinese imagination”, Kenneth George  
Pereire from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), argues that ETIM 
in particular is a genuine threat, with an evident link to al-Qaeda. Thus he notes;  
Al-Qaeda and other global jihadist groups will continue to work with ETIM and with 
other Uighur groups. In the not too distant future, there is a possibility that ETIM may 
even adopt suicide tactics in China. Unless the Uyghur grievances are addressed, the 
potential for greater radicalisation of the Uyghur conflict along the Islamic path can 
pose a real challenge to the Chinese government.36 (2006).  
 
On January 8, 2007, China Daily published an article which claimed that the local 
police had destroyed an ETIM-terrorist camp in South Xinjiang. Allegedly, the police 
killed 18 terrorist and captured 17, along with their weapons.37 Whether this incident 
actually took place is a plausible question, but in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
the PLA, Bingtuan and the People’s Armed Police Force, have nonetheless been 
increasingly attentive to deal with new “threats”. However, Beijing’s deployment of 
                                                 
35      Peoples Daily (2003). “Combating terrorism, we have no choice”. 
36      In particular, Pereire is concerned about a video released in 2006, entitled “Jihad in Eastern Turkistan”. The video allegedly displays 
Uyghur militants from ETIM along with their weapons and training methods, the World Trade Centre incidents, and finally, it showcases 
their enemy, embodied by Xinjiang’s number one communist cadre, Wang Lequan. Another similar video with about the same content is 
accessible at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP135206. I have also come across the alleged 
homepage for the Islamic Party of Turkistan, which calls for Jihad against the PRC and displays photos of their sabotage acts in Xinjiang. 
This is accessible at http://www.tipislamyultuzi.com/mazmun/summary/summary.html.  
37     China Daily (2007). “Police destroy terrorist camp, killing 18”. 
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proper trained soldiers in the region is still modest, with about 50,000 to 60,000 PLA 
troops, according to Shichor (2004:123). Moreover, he asserts that their “relatively 
shallow military presence in Xinjiang, both in quantity and definitely in quality”, 
reflects that “Beijing firmly controls Xinjiang and does not perceive any real, serious 
or immediate “terrorist” threat to its national security in the northwest” (2006:107).  
Martin Andrew argues against the latter depiction as Xinjiang’s new 
infrastructure (oil refineries, pipelines, railways and power stations) is vulnerable to 
sabotage by insurgents. Thus, he asserts that the PRC security forces have displayed 
their force in order keep insurgency in check. Additionally, Andrew asserts that 
Xinjiang is a prioritized region, due to its function as testing ground to develop 
military equipment and techniques for high altitude warfare (2005). One may also add 
another aspect which arguably has been an incentive for a strengthened presence of the 
PLA and Bingtuan in Xinjiang; the “entry” of the U.S. into the Central Asian region.  
Indisputably, with the latter’s presence in Afghanistan and the rapprochement 
by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (allowing U.S. military bases at their 
territory), China was eclipsed and lost momentum in the “new Great Game” of Central 
Asia. The U.S.-led “War on terrorism” removed Taliban and “an alleged sanctuary for 
Islamic militants in Central Asia”, but at great cost; China was no longer in headship 
of their own “backyard” (Clarke 2005:12-13, 19). From a geopolitical point of view, 
the U.S. was still perceived as a competitor, and as unlikely as it sounds; in a “worst 
case scenario”, it posed a threat to their territorial integrity in Xinjiang. Shichor is 
naturally aware of this situation, and asserts that the presence of U.S. forces is 
especially of concern if the “the situation in the Taiwan Strait deteriorates”. Then the 
U.S. “would not simply [be] a challenge but also an additional front” (2004:160). 
 Consequently, it became imperative for China and Russia (also eclipsed by the 
U.S. in their “near abroad”) to increase the relevance of the SCO. On the agenda were 
military rapprochement (joint exercises, technology exchanges/ trade of military 
systems to counter the “three evils of separatism, terrorism and extremism”) and 
increased economical cooperation, which in China’s case mainly concerned pipelines 
and stable energy supplies (Huang 2006:17). Thus, over the last few years several joint 
exercises have been held, and in order to draw Uzbekistan away from the U.S. orbit, 
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the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure was established in Uzbekistan in 2004, to 
coordinate these countries’ counter-terrorism efforts (Clarke 2005:14, Huang 2006:18). 
In 2004-05, the SCO attracted more countries when Mongolia, Pakistan, India and Iran 
obtained observer status. Hence, the SCO rose in regional prominence and from the 
perspective of external boundary demarcation, the Chinese authorities have gained 
tremendous momentum ever since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. Their 
territorial integrity seems not to be exposed to any genuine traditional security threats 
(state aggression) in 2007. Quite the contrary, diplomatic efforts and demarcation-
agreements have been a prevailing trend between China and its adjoining countries. 
 
Textbox 3. Territorial boundary-demarcation agreements involving Xinjiang. 
China- Russia (55 km): In 2001, respectively Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin signed the “Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”. In article 4, both sides acknowledged each other’s territorial 
integrity.38 In 2004, China and Russia issued a joint statement expressing that “the trend of the boundary line 
between the two countries has been completely determined”.39 
China-Kazakhstan (1,700km): In 1998, president Zemin and his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev 
signed a border agreement which “finally, thoroughly and irrevocably” settled outstanding frontier disputes 
(Dillon 2004:147, Shichor 2004:155,). 
China-Kyrgyzstan (1,000km): Initially a border agreement was completely settled in 1999, but the Kyrgyz 
opposition disputed president Askar Akaev’s consent with the PRC. In 2002, the Kyrgyz People’s Assembly 
finally ratified the border agreement (however with dismay) (Shichor 2004:156).  
China-Tajikistan (450km): The border demarcation line was finally settled in 2002 (Shichor 2004:155). 
China-India (200km): No final demarcation line has been settled. However, over the last years the two 
countries have come to terms on both parts’ modus operandi in the border area.40 
China-Pakistan (600km): “In March 1963, the two countries signed a boundary agreement on China's 
Xinjiang and the adjacent areas whose defence was under the actual control of Pakistan”.41 
China-Afghanistan (92km): Border delimitation agreed in 1963. Tensions increased with the Soviet-sponsored 
coup d'état in 1978, and the Soviet Unions occupation (1979-89). After the Taliban regime fell in 2001, the 
PRC authorities emphasize “respect for Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”.42 
China-Mongolia (--): No information is available regarding any border demarcation agreement between the 
two countries. However, several bilateral meetings have been held the last decade and one Chinese official 
simply noted in 1999; “border conflict does not exist between China and Mongolia” (Shichor 2004:155). 
 
Moving on with the next section, I survey the non-military aspects of the PRC state 
building campaign, in particular settler colonization and infrastructure-development. 
                                                 
38       PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”. 
39       PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). “China and Russia issue a joint statement”. 
40       PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003).  “China-India: Declarations of principles for relations”. 
41       PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). “Bilateral Relations: China-Pakistan”. 
42       PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). “Bilateral Relations: China-Afghanistan”. 
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4.1.2. The PRC government’s endeavours to deepen its inroads on Xinjiang.  
With the inception of the PRC in 1949, the authorities aspired to integrate (“lock-in”) 
Xinjiang more tightly with China proper, through the spheres of force, law, economy 
and culture. The spatial dimension (Xinjiang’s proximity to Central Asia and the vast 
distance to Beijing) was especially pronounced, and thereby it was of vital importance 
for the PRC government to increase its presence all through the region. In this regard, 
the preceding subchapter accounted for organizations (PLA-Bingtuan) responsible for 
external boundary demarcation and the maintenance of internal order.  
Continuing with this section, I survey other PRC state building strategies which 
have tended to be intertwined with the increased inroads of PLA-Bingtuan into the 
region. A key aspect in this regard has been the centre’s all-embracing efforts to “open 
up” the region. From 1999 and onwards, this has been embodied by the campaign 
“Open up the West” with a) a further expansion of Xinjiang’s communication axes 
(arterial highways/railways and telecommunication), and b) an extensive extraction of 
Xinjiang’s raw materials (oil, gas, cotton and agricultural products). This in turn has 
attracted large-scale influxes of regime-loyal Hans, which profoundly strengthens 
Beijing’s hold on the region (territorial boundary-accentuation).  
Going back to the inception of the Bingtuan in 1954, the centre obtained a 
paramount law enforcement instrument which was entrusted to be a main “absorber” 
(accommodator) for the migrating Hans. The Bingtuan was assigned to implement a 
wide range of entrepreneurial tasks, along with an extensive reclamation of Xinjiang’s 
wastelands. Given the topographically challenging conditions in this vast region, a 
prerequisite was a sufficient amount of manpower. Hence, the government partly 
endorsed and partly forced Han settlement in Xinjiang, and with a rapidly increasing 
Han-constituency, Xinjiang’s demographic composition changed dramatically.  
In a 1941-census, the Uyghurs constituted about 80 percent of Xinjiang’s total 
population of 3.73 million (Toops 2004b:245). At this stage, the Han population stood 
at a modest five percent, and Sean R. Roberts explains this with the region’s historical 
reputation as an “uncivilized backwater” (2004:221). Thus, with the communists’ 
assumption of power, they initiated a policy to change Xinjiang’s demographical blend 
at the expense of the region’s indigenous people. Christian Tyler asserts that 
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approximately half a million PLA soldiers and civilians (technicians, engineers, 
doctors, teachers and tradesmen) were transferred to Xinjiang in the first few years of 
the PRC (2003:135). At this stage, there was a precarious need for an inflow of “high 
calibre personnel” according to the Xinjiang White Paper: 
Since the founding of New China, considering Xinjiang’s remoteness, backwardness 
and shortage of high-calibre personnel, the state has assigned, transferred or 
encouraged over 800,000 intellectuals and professional and technical personnel from 
inland regions to work in Xinjiang. Large numbers of university graduates, scientists, 
technicians and highly-trained professionals have been assigned to Xinjiang.43 
 
Moreover, the authorities wanted to import a regime-loyal Han-constituency to 
counter Uyghur sentiments for independence. Hence, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
governmental campaigns depicted Han settlers’ struggle to cultivate Xinjiang’s 
wasteland, as an act of national heroism. Allegedly, this image inspired many Hans to 
start a new life in Xinjiang, and between 1954 and 1961, roughly 1.5 million people 
migrated to the region (Toops 2004b:256). For the period between 1950 and 1978, 
Bovingdon notes that about 3 million Hans were “cajoled, induced, or ordered” to take 
up residence in Xinjiang (2004:23-24).  
Besides the strategy to colonize Xinjiang with Hans, the government also 
viewed the designation of the province into the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
in 1955, as a policy to quell Uyghur separatist sentiments. The rationale behind the 
arrangement was not to make the Uyghurs “masters of their own house”, but to keep 
them within the “Chinese house”. By a shrewd politico-administrative engineering, the 
PRC authorities parcelled out the territory “bit by bit”, and designated “sub-
autonomies” to minor ethnic groups (Bovingdon 2004:14). Hence, they in reality 
undermined the overall governing capacity of the Uyghurs (view textbox 4).  
 
Textbox 4. Politico-administrative formation: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
In 1955, Xinjiang became the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and de jure 
“an ethnic autonomous area with the Uyghur people as its principal body”. Moreover, it was 
divided into a range of “sub-autonomies” according to Xinjiang White Paper:   
Within the territory of the autonomous region, there also exist other areas where other ethnic 
minorities live in compact communities. There, corresponding ethnic autonomous areas have 
also been established. Currently, the whole region has 5 autonomous prefectures for 4 ethnic 
groups — Kazak, Hui, Kirgiz and Mongolian; 6 autonomous counties for 5 ethnic groups — 
Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Tajik and Xibe; and 43 ethnic townships.44 
                                                 
43      PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 10). White Paper. 
44      PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 8).  White Paper. 
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In 1955, the designation of the XUAR seemingly entitled the Uyghurs to be responsible for 
the region’s overall management, and according the Xinjiang White Paper (2003: Part 2):  
As the constitution stipulates, the head of an autonomous region, autonomous prefecture or 
autonomous county shall be a citizen of the ethnic group exercising regional autonomy in the 
area concerned; and the other members of the people’s governments of these regions, 
prefectures and counties shall include members of the ethnic group exercising regional 
autonomy as well as members of other ethnic minorities.  
 
However, the influence of Uyghurs have been undermined by a) the “Noah’s ark”-principle 
of sub-autonomous areas and b) the central PRC government’s bypass of the local autonomy. 
      Regarding the division of the region into a number of smaller autonomies, Bovingdon 
alleges that this was a “stroke of administrative genius”. By parcelling out the territory “bit 
by bit” to Xinjiang’s 13 different minzu i.e. nationalities, the authorities sought to counter- 
balance the numerically dominant Uyghurs. In a “state building framework” this entailed an 
alignment between the central government and Xinjiang’s other groups (converging political 
interests). This arrangement has limited the Uyghurs’ influence, which in turn has made the 
other ethnic groups more status quo oriented (2004:13-16, 28).  
      Although the government waves the banner of Xinjiang’s autonomy, many scholars 
assert that the region actually enjoys less legislative autonomy than ordinary PRC provinces. 
According to Matthew Moneyhon, the current implication of autonomy in the region “means 
modernization, sinification, and ultimately, integration into the Han framework” 
(2002:152).45 Bovingdon argues that the Hans colonize Xinjiang’s governmental institutions 
at all levels, and that the indigenous cadres in reality act as a useful device to implement 
unpopular policies (instruments in the PRC’s “puppet show”) (2004:4). 
 
Returning to the influx of Hans, the region has also undergone years with a net 
outflow (the “peacock flying to the south-east”). Viewed through the lens of Rokkan’s 
centre-periphery paradigm, the PRC’s “locking-in” (order) mechanisms were thus the 
potentially suffering party, at the income of conflicting Uyghur separatist tendencies 
(movement). In the post-1978 period, several overt “voice-disturbances” occurred 
among Hans, who sought to return to China proper. These youths had been deployed 
from urban centres during the Cultural Revolution, and now found that their residence 
permits only applied for Xinjiang. Hence, the authorities in China proper refused to 
                                                                                                                                                        
45      Moneyhon employs the following five principles by Hannum and Lillich to scrutinize whether Xinjiang has an autonomous 
arrangement; 1) Independent legislature 2) Locally chosen chief executive 3) Independent judiciary, 4) Status of autonomy consistent with 
powers granted, 5) Autonomy and self-government are consistent with power-sharing arrangements. In a brief, Moneyhon concludes that an 
“application of these five principles demonstrates that Xinjiang’s autonomy does not satisfy even the minimum standard” (2002:142). 
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accommodate returning Hans with residence and jobs. In order to reach a modus 
vivendi with the indignant youths, the PRC called in Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao 
(once again Xinjiang’s First Party Secretary), but they failed to forestall a net outflow 
of Hans in the 1980s. The tide nonetheless turned in 1990, when a new wave of Han 
immigrants now settled in Xinjiang by choice (the “peacock flying west”). At this 
stage the region appeared to be an attractive destination for Hans seeking to improve 
their socio-economic status. This trend has accelerated further as the region entered the 
new millennium and was exposed to PRC campaign “Open up the West” (Bovingdon 
2004:24-25, Becquelin 2004, Toops 2004a, Goodman 2004:327). The synopsis below 
illustrates the profound numerical increase of Hans.46  
 
Table 4. Population in Xinjiang, 1953-2004.47 
Ethnic groups 1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 2004 
Uyghur 3,640,000 4,021,200 5,995,000 7,195,000 8,345,622 
(45,2%) 
 8,976,700 
(45,7%) 
Han  299,000 2,445,400 5,284,000 5,696,000 7,489,919 
(40,6%) 
 7,802,500 
(39,7%) 
Kazakh  492,000  501,400  903,000 1,106,000 1,245,023 
(6,7%) 
 1,381,600 
(7,0%) 
Hui  150,000  271,100  567,000  682,000  839,837 
(4,6%) 
   876,300 
(4,5%) 
Kyrgyz   68,000   69,200  112,000  140,000  158,775  
(0,9%) 
   171,200 
(0,87%) 
Others  225,000  133,500  220,500  337,900  230,743 
(1,25%) 
    422,800 
(2,15%) 
Total 4,874,000 7,441,800 13,081,500 15,156,900 18,459,511 19,631,100 
   
According to Tyler, the 2000 census did not include one million members of the 
armed forces (soldiers and police) and 2.5 million Han Chinese, closely affiliated with 
the Bingtuan. Consequently, given Tyler’s (somehow imprecise) estimation48, Hans 
constitute by far the largest ethnic group, as about 12 million reside in Xinjiang 
(2003:214). Toops also underscores the point that the Hans outnumber the Uyghurs. In 
particular, he emphasizes the “floating population” (unofficial migrants in search of 
labour), which might add up to 2.8 million Hans. Combining this number with 
approximately 100,000 unregistered PLA troops, Hans add up to roughly 10 million 
                                                 
46    Stanley W. Toops considers the 1982, 1990, and 2000 census to be “accurate”, the 1953 census “adequate”, while the remaining census 
from 1962 is characterized as “poor” (2004b:245):  
47     The data between 1953 and 1990 are accessible from Toops (2004b: 246), the 2000 census is made available by Toops (2004a), while 
the 2004 census is accessible in Xinjiang Yearbook 2005 (2005:103).  
48      Shichor’s estimations on the PLA would to some extent undermine Tyler’s calculation. Moreover, a minor negligence is that Han 
Chinese does not constitute 100 percent of the personnel in the Bingtuan, more precisely about 92 percent. 
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(2004b:249). But who are these Hans? One plausible answer is Dillon’s taxonomy of 
five groups (I added the “floating Han-population” as a sixth category) (2004:75): 
1. Descendants of the early settlers.  
2. Guomindang troops and their descendants (many absorbed into the Bingtuan). 
3. Personnel who have been assigned to key government jobs. 
4. The transfer of young Chinese during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). 
5. Prisoners from the labour reform and released prisoners who have found a job. 
6. The “floating Hans” who drift around in Xinjiang in search of labour. 
 
A key factor in analysing Xinjiang’s demographic composition is the rate of 
natural increase among the ethnic groups. While there has been a steady natural 
increase of Uyghurs, the dramatic increase of Hans is mainly due to in-migration. In 
1988, Muslims in Xinjiang were subjected to the national family planning policies, 
where the quotas became two babies for urban couples and three for the peasants. Han 
immigrants were permitted two children per family. This policy is resented by 
Uyghurs and viewed by many as an affront to God (Tyler 2003:159). Furthermore, 
Uyghurs argue that fertility decisions fall under the purview of their autonomous rights, 
and that the underlying reason for Xinjiang’s population problems is the 
accommodative state-policy toward migrating Hans (Bovingdon 2004:26).  
The long-standing Han residents in Xinjiang (“lao Xinjiang ren”) also resent 
the latter policy, along with objecting to the authorities’ accommodative policies 
toward the new migrants, who settle deeper into the “Uyghur heartland” southwards. 
These “lao Hans” have like the Uyghurs, endured a harsh self-sacrificing life as tillers 
of the soil, and thus, a modus vivendi has progressed. They fear that the authorities’ 
accommodative policies toward the new Han settlers and general discrimination (“Han 
chauvinism”), may jeopardize this relationship (Becquelin 2000:85). 
 
Open up the West: Exposing Uyghur “heartland” to an increased influx of Hans. 
The PRC government’s state building efforts in Xinjiang, have since 1999 focused on 
the campaign “Open up the West” (Gladney 2004a:101). To get a further hold on the 
region, the Chinese authorities have endeavoured to upgrade Xinjiang’s 
communication networks and more comprehensively exploit the region’s untapped 
resources (mainly oil and gas). While this would provide the hinterland’s booming 
industries with energy supplies, these policies were also initiated to allure more Hans 
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to settle in the region. Hence, from a centre-periphery perspective, this addressed the 
spatial dimension (accentuating the PRC’s physical supremacy in the region), as well 
as to serve the centre, whose “machinery” is increasingly in need of raw materials.  
The campaign has particularly been embodied by a key project to build a 4,200-
kilometer pipeline for natural gas to a terminus at Shanghai (Wiemer 2004: 173). 
According to the Chinese scholar Huang Jun, the authorities aspire to produce 30 
billion cubic metres of natural gas annually by 2010, with only a third remaining in 
Xinjiang. Moreover, they aim to reach “a total crude oil output of 30 million tons by 
2010” (2005:297). With an estimated reserve of 21 billion tons of oil, 10 trillion cubic 
metre of natural gas (respectively 30/34 percent of national onshore totals), and an 
expected 40 percent of China’s coal reserves, Xinjiang is evidently an invaluable 
reservoir for the regime (Ma 2005:3). However, these are only conservative estimates, 
and further explorations remain to be conducted in the vast Tarim Basin.49  
            
Photo Truls Winje:  From my journey to a Uyghur village in outskirts of Turpan, where numerous oil exploiting devices are installed. 
 
Although the local authorities receive tax payments from these operations and 
support for infrastructure developments, Calla Wiemer nevertheless argue that the 
central government is the main beneficiary, rather than the region itself (2004:174).  
This generates grievance and an interesting allegory among Uyhgurs goes like this: As 
trains from China proper arrive in Xinjiang, they steam “chi, chi, chi (eat, eat, eat)”. 
Returning to China proper with Xinjiang’s riches, the following sound appears; 
“chibaole, chibaole, chibaole (I’m full, full, full)” (Tyler 2003:214). 
                                                 
49       As I travelled southwards from Korla to Khotan, numerous gas fields illuminated the dark Taklimakan Desert night. 
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Along with the extensive resource exploitation, the campaign “Open up the 
West” has as previously mentioned, also aspired to penetrate deeper in the region by 
upgrading its communication networks. With the construction of far-flung 
transportation-routes, Xinjiang’s northern and southern parts have been linked more 
thoroughly together, and Han Chinese settlers have followed along. The completion of 
Taklimakan Highway (through the desert) in 1995 and the extension of the southern 
Xinjiang railway to Kashgar in 1999, were especially “breakthrough events”. This in 
turn facilitated an increased Han migration into the rural south, where fewer than 10 
percent of the inhabitants were Hans in 2000. Prior to these achievements, the north 
and in particular the provincial capital Urümqi, had historically been more exposed to 
this migration (Becquelin 2000:68, Bovingdon 2004:25, Toops 2004a:25). Below is a 
synopsis of paramount “penetrating” landmarks in this regard: 
 
Textbox 5. Landmarks in the PRC construction of communication axis. 
Xinjiang’s railway system. 
1958: Railroad lines were extended to Hami in eastern Xinjiang from China proper. 
1962: The Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway reached Urümqi. 
1984: Southern Xinjiang Railway opened from Turpan to Korla. 
1992: China extended its rail line to Kazakhstan. 
1994: The Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway was double-tracked. 
1999: Southern Xinjiang Railway was extended from Korla to Kashgar. 
2001: Operating railway lines totalled 3,010. km. 
 
In 2005, the Chinese scholar Huang Jun estimated that in about ten years’ time, a railway link 
between Jinghe and Ili will have been completed, while a project to link Kuytun and Altay will have 
been initiated (2005:295). Consequently, more Hans will presumably settle in these areas as well. 
 
Xinjiang’s highway system. 
1949: Allegedly “crudely built highways”, totalling 3,360 km. 
1995: The completion of Taklimakan Highway, linking north and south across the desert.  
2001:  80,900 km highway network with the provincial capital Urümqi as the centre (Beijing’s 
“bridgehead” into Xinjiang), and linked to all the corners of the region. 
  
Xinjiang’s Aviation. 
The region has 11 airports for domestic and/or international flights. 
 
General sources: Xinjiang White Paper, Stanley W. Toops (2004b:258) and Nicolas Becquelin (2000:74). 
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My journey to Xinjiang in 2007, revealed that the area to the north of the Tarim 
Basin (I visited Urumqi, Turpan and Korla), was much more marked by the presence 
of Han Chinese, than in the southern part (Khotan, Kashgar, and numerous villages 
between these cities). However, particularly in Kashgar, I encountered numerous 
“Chinese-style” buildings, parks and streets, along with a substantial amount of Hans. 
Although the city accommodates an “old-city” (orbiting the famous Id Gah Mosque) 
with about 10,000 Uyghurs at the city hub, this is primarily a tourist curiosity. A stroll 
around in the city revealed the supremacy of the PRC government, and Chinese street 
names, statues, flags and wall paintings made sure to “remind the Uyghurs”, that 
Beijing is indisputably the monocephalic centre they do orbit. Even though this was 
not that pronounced in Khotan (also fewer Han Chinese), this depiction still applies 
here as well. Below are some illustrating pictures that I took downtown in Kashgar: 
     
Photo Truls Winje: From a schoolyard in the Uyghur “old-city” in Kashgar, showcasing    Photo Truls Winje: This 24-metre high statue  
Uyghur pupils’ allegiance to the “Motherland” (the building symbolizes Tiananmen Square   of Chairman Mao is situated in the centre of   
in Beijing).                                                                                                  Kashgar, at the People’s Square. 
 
From the Chinese authorities’ point of view, its recent policies have further 
strengthened their physical hold on Xinjiang. However, the current presence of PRC 
agencies and regime-loyal Hans southwards is not considered to be adequate. 
Traditionally, most of the violent Uyghur “voice-incidents” have taken place in this 
area, and in order to root out what Li Sheng labels “splittist undercurrents left over 
from Old China”, the government aspires to increase its presence here (2005:258).    
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Recollecting Ma Dazheng’s depiction of Bingtuan’s strategies as “two circles 
and one line” (the circles illustrated the Corp’s presence around the Gurbantunggut 
Desert to the north and the Taklimakan Desert to the south, while the line represented 
the PRC frontier to the Soviet), the southern “circle” is simply incomplete (2005:256). 
Thus, Ma in another publication has actually called for an encirclement of the Uyghurs, 
by “filling in blank spaces” with regime-loyal Hans. This was particularly pronounced 
for Khotan, as an expansion of Bingtuan’s activity in the area “will prove an excellent 
conduit for changing the minzu population ratio in Hotan, which has gotten out of 
balance” (Bovingdon 2004:27-28).  
Further, Fuller and Starr have addressed the possible future scenario of a PRC 
“Bantustan policy towards the Uyghurs” in the south. This entails a state where the 
Uyghurs are confined to exert local autonomous rule in a few core oasis-areas, “while 
remaining islands in a sea of Han-controlled territory” (2004:68). In the long run, this 
may actually become the unpleasant reality for the Uyghurs, especially if Ma’s line of 
reasoning gains momentum among the governing Han-elite. Anyways, the PRC 
government’s modus operandi in 2007 also indisputably facilitates an increased influx 
of Hans. Nicolas Becquelin asserts that the “sinicization” policy (settler colonization 
and homogenization of the Chinese nation) towards Xinjiang was by and large covert 
until 1999, when the authorities initiated the campaign “Open up the West”. However, 
currently these policies are allegedly “directly acknowledged” as a solution to the 
“nationality problem”, in the borderland area of Xinjiang (2004:359, 368).   
Consequently, the Chinese authorities have for instance allured many Hans with 
beneficial terms for land cultivation at remote farms areas, where the Uyghurs have 
traditionally been numerically dominant. Although pressure on the arable land 
southwards is already unsustainable due to scarce water resources, and the large scale 
cultivation of cotton, the authorities have nonetheless accommodated Han settlement 
(Becquelin 2000:76). Moreover, Toops alleges that the PRC modernization drive 
throughout Xinjiang, greatly jeopardizes the region’s vulnerable ecological system. If 
this course is not dramatically altered, he predicts a large-scale environmental crisis 
(2004b:275). This in turn fuels the conflict between Uyghur and Han communities, 
which is further reinforced by growing wealth disparities (advantageous for Hans), 
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clashes in lifestyles (“Han chauvinism”), policies of acculturation (“sinicization”) 
toward the Uyghurs, and importantly, the tough competition for jobs and positions. 
Regarding the latter aspect, Fuller and Starr depict a state where prestigious 
positions in the official and private sector, by and large are monopolized by Han 
Chinese. Consequently, the employment patterns reflect a “glass ceiling”, which in 
reality excludes Uyghurs from the top jobs (social stigmata). The corporations and 
work units (mainly headed by Han leaders), prefer Hans when they employ and 
expand their business. This is evidently reflected by the employment patterns, where 
Hans fill about four fifth of all jobs in manufacturing, oil and gas industries, science 
and technology, transport, and nine-tenths in the sector of construction. Moreover, the 
rate of unemployed and underemployed Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz is distinctly 
imbalanced, and hence, a formula for ethnical tension (2004:17-19).50  
A central aspect which potentially reinforces the “glass ceiling”-phenomenon is 
gunaxi practice, where social relations/networks are utilized in order to covertly  
accomplish tasks/ desired outcomes for family and friends (a “backdoor” system). This 
obviously conflicts with the rational-legal system and has a “flavour of” corruption. 
However, this practice has strong historical roots in ancient China and according to 
Torstein Hjellum, it increased significantly during “Dengism” (Deng Xiaoping’s 
initiated reform policies from 1978 and onwards) (2000, 2007:38, 76-7). Thus, one 
may assume that this applies for Xinjiang as well, and of particular interest are the 
lucrative exploitation of oil and gas, licence handling, and the process of foreign 
investments, which are largely run by the Hans. With the increased influx of Hans, the 
guanxi practice may increase and further marginalize the indigenous people. 
 Consequently, many Uyghurs perceive the campaign “Open up the West” as a 
PRC version of “the Trojan Horse—the pretext of economic assistance may cover the 
Han forces of assimilation” (Moneyhon 2002:148). An inherent rationale behind the 
campaign (besides state building), has been to arouse pro-regime sentiments (nation-
building) by increasing the Uyghurs’ prosperity. However, as Hans are the de facto 
main beneficiary, the PRC authorities have only gained further spatial ground, whereas 
endeavours to conquer Uyghurs’ hearts and minds seem to have been in vain.  
                                                 
50      During my journey in Xinjiang, I observed numerous workers affiliated with the state/local government. Indisputably, the Hans were 
numerically dominant compared to other ethnic groups. Surprisingly, I observed the same pattern in the south and especially in Kashgar.  
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4.2. Nation-building: Standardizations and restrictions on Uyghur distinctiveness.  
Surveying the reach and scope of the PRC’s nation-building policies toward the 
Uyghurs (weaken and redraw primordial boundaries to broaden the scope of a national 
Chinese identity), warrant a comprehensive analysis of various traits of Uyghur 
distinctiveness. Formulated into a Hirshmanian-Rokkanian jargon, the following 
subchapters survey the PRC’s employed “boundary-penetrating technologies” to 
institutionalize and control the “House of Islam” in Xinjiang, establishing Mandarin as 
the lingua franca among Uyghurs, and to ensure the production of “appropriate” (not 
regime dissenting) narrative arts from the Uyghurs. Furthermore, it addresses Uyghur 
boundary-maintaining counter-forces for the preservation of their distinctive markers.
 In order to assess the PRC government’s potential to weaken an overall Uyghur 
identity, it seem to offer much of relevance to address the following question in more 
detail; who are the Uyghurs? In this regard, a plausible starting point may be to 
examine junctures of historical relevance for the current state of Uyghur identity and 
potential courses of development. Thus, the section, “Uyghur Identity: Diversity the 
eldest daughter of distance?” introduce this subchapter (4.2.). 
 
4.2.1. Uyghur Identity: Diversity the eldest daughter of distance? 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed account of the link 
between Xinjiang’s oasis-dwelling Uyghurs, and various historical groups referred to 
as “Uyghurs”, a brief account nevertheless seems plausible. The origin of the Uyghurs 
is normally traced back to the Uyghur Empire (745-840), which was situated in central 
Mongolia and extended into northwestern China. This empire of nomadic traits had a 
shamanistic orientation, whereas the “succeeding” Uyghurs (844-932) were a blend of 
different orientations, and permanently settled in Turpan (eastern Xinjiang). During 
the period of 932-1450, an elitist Turkic society oriented towards Buddhism emerged, 
and it was known as “Uyghuristan”. Their Buddhist cultivation functioned as a clear 
demarcation to the Turkic Muslims, who resided in western parts of Xinjiang. 
However, in the 15th century, the label “Uyghur” allegedly fell into disuse for the next 
500 years, as the Uyghurs converted to Islam (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:302, 
Millward and Perdue 2004:40-50). 
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 In the 1930s, warlord Sheng Shicai as the first in the official discourse, started 
to refer to the Turkic Muslim oasis dwellers as Uyghurs. Sheng, closely affiliated with 
the Soviet Union at this time, was probably introduced to the term ‘Uyghur’ by his 
Soviet advisors (Tyler 2003:117). Allegedly this label was motivated by the notion 
that “such an identity had so many cracks and fissures that the newly self-defined 
Uyghurs would be easy to control” (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:302). By and large, 
the PRC government adopted Sheng’s designations, with its distinctions between the 
numerical dominant Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tungans (Huis) and Han Chinese. One 
rationale behind this line of continuation was their ambition to play Uyghurs and 
Kazaks against one another, in order to avoid the strengthening of pan-Turkic forces 
(Rudelson 1997:35). Moreover to generate loyalty, as emphasized by Gladney;  
The original creation of national groups was a strategic temporary recognition of 
ethnic difference in order to solicit support in the revolutionary process, it later led to 
the hardening of ethnic boundaries—the creation of identities, which were supposed to 
be only provisional (1991:93 in Petersen 2006:65). 
  
The establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on October 1, 
1955, was also motivated by aspirations to win over the trust and loyalty of the 
Uyghurs. This event nurtured both a region-wide Uyghur identity, as well as fuelling 
aspirations for their de jure autonomy to become a genuine one (Starr 2004:6). In 
hindsight, this policy was diametric to the creation of provisional identities, as Turkic 
oasis dwellers embraced the notion of “Uyghurness”. Related to this, Gladney 
observes that Uyghur nationalist now assert lineage kinship with the first Uyghur 
empire (745-840). However, concerning the perception that all dwellers in Xinjiang 
descend from the same nationality, he simply notes that this is an invention that stems 
from the “twentieth-century nationalism” (2004a:103). Rudelson and Jankowiak 
continue further along this path, and while they admit that the Uyghur identity has 
gained tremendous ground during the last fifty years, this has nevertheless been an 
artificial political construct, created by top-down administrative statutory instruments. 
Thus, they argue that family, clan and the oasis take precedence over an overall 
Uyghur identity, which is fairly easy to control (2004:303, 315). The remaining part of 
this subchapter surveys alleged cracks and subdivisions among the Uyghurs, and 
moreover incorporates academic contributions which challenge the notions above. 
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In chapter 1, Xinjiang was briefly accounted for as an utterly complex cultural 
zone, exposed to centrifugal forces pulling the region in different directions. In Justin 
Jon Rudelson’s groundbreaking “Oasis identities: Uyghur nationalism along China’s 
Silk Road”, it is argued that the vast distances previously isolated the oases and its 
population from one another. These geographical conditions rather cultivated cross-
border interactions and thus exposed Xinjiang territory and its people, to the influences 
of different bordering cultures. Hence, Kashgar has been strongly influenced by 
Islamic traditions westwards (Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Ferghana Valley), the 
northern Xinjiang has been affected by Russia (the Soviet Union) and Central Asian 
influences, Khotan has nurtured close connections with northern parts of India, while 
Turpan in the eastern part of Xinjiang, has been more exposed to the Han Chinese 
culture, due to its proximity with China hinterland (1997:17, 39-40).  
The geographical legacy of Xinjiang; oases isolated from one another, has thus 
generated an inward focus of the various oasis communities, with its own economic 
and social dynamics, “self-governing on a day-to-day basis” (Starr 2004:12).  
Allegedly this fostered local identities at the expense of an overall Uyghur identity, 
and Rudelson finds the words of Fernand Braudel especially illuminating; “diversity is 
the eldest daughter of distance” (1997:24). Supposedly the Uyghur identity “glossed 
over a host of internal differences present in the Uyghur oases that many Uyghurs 
refuse to recognise”, and these traits of diversity still functions as a major impediment 
for Uyghur nationalists’ program  (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:303). Gladney 
reasons along similar lines as he observes divisions among Uyghyrs by religious 
factions, territorial loyalties, linguistic varieties and political sympathies (2004a:110). 
In this regard, Rudelson finds it opportune to refer to the work of the Uyghur 
folklorist Nizamdin Yusuyun, who asserts that it exists seven divisions among the 
present day’s Uyghurs. In their quest for a glorious primordial Uyghur unity, Rudelson 
claims that Uyghur intellectuals often fail to acknowledge these subdivisions, as they 
indulge “in a mythic past” (1997:24,169). In my interviews with Uyghur expatriate 
leaders in Bishkek and Almaty, I presented Yusuyun’s classifications beneath and it 
was categorically denounced as it only illustrated geographical distance, and not in any 
way, significant divisions among the Uyghurs. 
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1. Dolans; living in Merkit nearby Kashgar and viewed by many Uyghurs as primitive 
and poor, due to their social custom of walking barefoot. 
2. Lopliks; a fishing community nearby Lap Nor (ex-nuclear weapons testing range). 
3. Abdals; a travelling/peripatetic group residing in the south of Xinjiang. 
4. Keriyaliks; situated east of Khotan in the southern rim of Taklimakan Dessert. 
These have been especially influenced by the northern Indian culture. 
5. Kashgarliks; living in the Kashgar area and profoundly influenced by Islam, due to 
the proximity of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia. 
6. Eastern Uyghurs; situated in Turpan and Hami, the historical centre of a previous 
Uyghur empire dated back to  the eight and ninth centuries C.E. Due to its proximity 
with China proper, Chinese influences have been more profound. 
7. Kuldjaliks or Taranchi; situated in Ili and not considered as Uyghurs prior to 1949. 
 
At the core of Rudelson and Jankowiak’s argumentation is then that Xinjiang’s 
geography (distance) generates a poorly organized and fragmented set of Uyghur 
responses to the Chinese presence in Xinjiang. While Xinjiang’s geographical 
conditions and its dynamics also challenge China’s aspirations for the region, it 
nevertheless more profoundly hamper the project of Uyghur nation-builders. Time 
allegedly works in favour of the Chinese government and “Uyghurs face the 
possibility of their own people being splintered and atomized in the immediate future” 
(2004:303-304). The renewed cross-border contacts with people situated in the 
independent Central-Asian states from 1990 and onwards, seem to reinforce these 
dynamics. However, other observers rapport on the contrary effect (2004:313). 
In the thesis “Rebirth of a nation”, David Brophy vigorously attempts to counter 
some of Rudelson and Jankowiak’s most central hypothesis. As a starting point, it is 
argued that their contributions have an inclination of “reading the past into the 
present”. Regardless of the undeniable past with identities in flux, they erroneously 
employ an inherent scepticism towards the homogeneity of a current Uyghur identity 
(2005:11-12). Moreover, he asserts that identity is not necessarily a finite space where 
you either identify as a Kashgarilik/Turpanlik or as a Uyghur. Quite the contrary, 
multiple sets of self identifications may co-exist. In this regard, Brophy observes a 
strong Uyghur identity, “as coherent as any national identity can ever be, which co-
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exists with various other forms of attachment, including to one’s oasis of origin”.51 In 
order to comprehend the dynamics behind this strong Uyghur identity, he advocates a 
perspective which incorporates both top-down administrative processes as well as the 
popular forces working from below (2005:14, 18, 21).  
Consequently, he then attempts to counter the perception that nations and 
national identities are solely an elitist construct à la Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined 
community” and Charles Tilly’s “Nations of design” (Brophy 2005:6-8). The national 
Uyghur identity has also been nurtured from below (by the Uyghur masses), and is not 
as viewed by Eric Hobsbawm, only resulted by elites who dash various ingredients 
(history, symbols, myths and languages) of often diverse origin, into an English 
“ploughman’s lunch”, as Anthony D. Smith puts it (1995:4-5). Allegedly this provides 
an explanation for the rise and strength of Uyghur national sentiments (as a part of a 
general wave of national sentiments around the world). This in general contradicts 
Hobsbawm’s predictions for a large scale demise of nationalism (Brophy 2005: 6-8). 
Furthermore, Brophy seemingly identifies another “major logical flaw” in 
Rudelson and Jankowiak’s contribution, as they assert that the current Uyghur identity 
“glossed over a whole host of internal differences”, while applying an unproblematic 
notion of the homogeneity of local oases identities. Brophy stresses that the oasis 
identity of “Hotan”’ also glosses over internal social differences among its dwellers, 
and allegedly their contribution does not acknowledge these oases’ intra-divisions. 
While this point in general is well taken, the criticism toward Rudelson is somehow 
misplaced. In Rudelson’s seminal study of Turpan’s internal dynamics, he revealed 
distinct divisions of orientation between the oasis’ intellectuals, farmers and merchants. 
Middle income and poor peasants tend to have a strong Islamic identification, which 
also fosters a strong “Turpanlik” oasis identity. Turpan merchants on the other hand 
have stronger feelings of belonging to the Chinese state, as beneficiaries of close 
economical interaction with China proper. Finally, Turpan intellectuals aspire to 
promote an overall and unifying Uyghur nationalist ideology. Allegedly, these 
intellectuals rarely transcend their Turpan “oases identity, which they tend rather to 
                                                 
51    Herbert S. Yee’s survey of ethnic consciousness and identity among the Uyghurs seems to support Brophy’s notion. Regardless of some 
drawbacks with his sampling and question design, he nevertheless asserts that the Uyghurs manifest both a strong ethnic identity as well as 
local identity (2005:50). The Hui Chinese scholar Yang Shengmin conducted a survey among Uyghurs in 2004, and also he revealed a strong 
Uyghur identity, although his numbers indicated even “stronger sentiments” for their Chinese identity (2006:10-13).     
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project broadly as Uyghur” (1997:8-9). Beyond these paramount findings of diversity, 
Rudelson, arguably in an inadequate way, pursues this insight for the remaining part of 
the book. Thus, he unintentionally becomes somehow more exposed to Brophy’s 
criticism, which concerned the handling of oases as “natural sizes”. 
  The following subchapters survey several cultural markers which seem to be 
closely affiliated with the notion of “Uyghurness”. It is my assumption that these 
markers foster Uyghur identity-building/non-spatial boundary-building towards the 
“other”, which is mainly embodied by the Han Chinese authorities and their policies. 
Especially at times of restrictive PRC policies toward these distinctive markers along 
with a notion of general group-stigmata, it may be expected that intergroup behaviour 
prevails among the Uyghurs, at the expense of interpersonal behaviour.52  
 
4.2.2. The “House of Islam” and its organization in Xinjiang.  
Islam first arrived in Kashgar from Central Asia by the tenth century C.E., and the city 
became a religious centre in the south of Xinjiang. However, it was not until the mid-
fifteenth century, that nearly all the Turkic-speaking people in Xinjiang converted 
from Buddhism to the Hanafi jurisprudence, which is the most liberal of the four law 
branches in the world of Sunni Islam. This paramount juncture deepened the cultural 
differences between the Chinese and the Turkic world (Fuller and Lipman 2004:326-8). 
Over the five succeeding centuries, the southern parts of Xinjiang were especially 
exposed to the influence and rule of several Islamic formations (khanates), based 
outside (in Ferghana Valley) as well as within the territory of Xinjiang. The era of 
Yaqub Beg and the short-lived (1933) Turkic Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan 
(in Kashgar and Khotan), were among the most significant events.  
The reminiscence of these regimes’ rise, modus operandi and eventually fall, 
influences on how many Uyghurs currently perceive other ethnic groups, the 
legitimacy of the PRC and their desired end-states for the territory. This section now 
proceeds by surveying the PRC’s policies between 1949 and 2007, to institutionalize 
and control Islam in Xinjiang. Moreover, it provides an account for how the Uyghur 
counter-cultures have covertly attempted to omit a variety of these restrictions.  
                                                 
52      This distinction by Tajfel and Turner was accounted for in subchapter 3.3.  
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In 1949, the PLA successfully penetrated the territory of Xinjiang and what 
followed for its indigenous people, was a comprehensive incorporation into the PRC 
jurisdiction. Initially, a policy of modest governmental supervision prevailed towards 
the practice of Islam. However, the authorities soon embarked on an all-embracing 
process to institutionalize Islam. As a starting point in early 1950s, the authorities 
confiscated the mosques’ valuable properties and arable land. This policy of land 
reform was not solely initiated to undermine the influences of the Islamic clerics, as it 
more widely targeted all major land owners. The Chinese scholar Li Xiaoxia justifies 
this policy as it repealed the “religious feudalist privileges and oppressive and 
exploitative system” (2005:194). The “House of Islam” was further weakened with the 
elimination of Islamic taxes. Gradually, Islamic courts and judge systems became 
abolished, and such matters as debts, pledges, divorce, the criminal law and the 
handling of other disputes, came under the jurisdiction of the PRC courts (Rudelson 
1997: 45, Dillon 2004: 29-30, Fuller and Lipman 2004).  
Another PRC strategy was to incorporate clerics institutionally and put them on 
the payroll of the Beijing-based Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). This official 
association provided the curriculum for the only officially sanctioned madrassah 
(religious school) in Xinjiang. An implication of this was (and currently is) that 
explanations of Islam, both written and publicly spoken, falls under state control. 
Furthermore, CIA has an exclusive right to educate the officially practicing clerics, 
and their curriculum also involves indoctrination in the tenets of socialism. The White 
Paper of Xinjiang (2003) justified this to ensure an “appropriate religious conduct”: 
In order to ensure the normal operation of religious activities, Xinjiang has 
established an Islamic college specializing in training senior clergymen. Islamic 
bodies in prefectures and prefectural-level cities, have opened Islamic classes to train 
clergymen in accordance with actual needs (my underlining).53 
  
Already by the regime’s first decade in operation, the Chinese authorities had 
thus managed to substantially weaken the position of Islam. Through a Rokkanian 
conceptual lens, the centre’s politico-administrative penetration of official Islam, was 
rendered possible by their brute power (the PLA and the Bingtuan embodied these 
state building capabilities). Islamic counter-cultures could not challenge these new 
                                                 
53   PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 9).  White Paper.    
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restrictions overtly54, and the foregoing Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76) left “the House of Islam” even worse off.   
The Cultural Revolution attacked “feudal oppression”, and Islam was allegedly 
one of the markers which represented the “four olds” (old custom, old culture, old 
habits, and old ideas). In this tense atmosphere, Mao’s Red Guardists brutally attacked 
Islam and Central Asian customs in general. Religious texts like the Qur’an, Islamic 
sites/mosques and other Islamic symbols were either burned/destroyed or sanctioned 
(closed, prohibited). There exist numerous accounts of Mullahs and other religious 
incumbents being tortured and paraded in the streets, while cadavers of pigs 
functioned as pennants in mosques (Tyler 2003:156, Millward and Tursun 2004:97). 
This is also acknowledged by the current Chinese regime and its scholars, as “the 
policy of freedom of religious belief was seriously undermined” (Li 2005:196). 
From the “wreckage” of the devastating Culture Revolution, Deng Xiaoping 
rose to replace the departed Mao (1976) in 1978. He initiated policies of controlled 
tolerance of ethnic minorities and their religious institutions. This was mainly initiated 
to undermine nationalistic resistance movements, which had gained momentum during 
the last decades, and further to recapture some trust among the indigenous people. In 
this new atmosphere, a large number of mosques were built and the authorities showed 
more sensitivity towards Muslim food-requirements and religious holidays. Uyghur 
communist leaders were even sent on the Hajj to Mecca, in order to increase their 
social prestige in the Uyghur society (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:308). 
Moreover, during the late 1980s, the borders of Pakistan opened up and 
Pakistani tradesmen and clerics played a crucial role in bringing ideas and information 
about Islam. They also brought “Muslim merchandize”, like the Qur’an and veils. 
Xinjiang Muslims were allowed to visit Pakistan and at their return, they brought with 
them impressions and experiences imprinted in Islamic piety. This combined with the 
education of Uyghur mullahs and imams at Pakistani madrassahs, were instrumental in 
introducing new and stricter interpretations of Islam. Especially southern parts of 
Xinjiang became affected by these religious sentiments and many women started to 
                                                 
54     The only religious tradition that the authorities have found hard to monitor and sanction is the traditions of Sufism, which is put into 
practice outside the mosques. Sufism is considered to be “Islam’s mystical arm” and is popular among Central Asian people, as it comprises 
ritual dances, music, and chanted remembrances of God. The strict Saudi Arabian Wahhabism strongly denounces this path. 
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wear veils.55 At this stage, Islam also revealed its potential as a force to question the 
legitimacy of the Chinese authorities. Hence, religious exchanges with Pakistan soon 
came to an end (Roberts 2004:226-227, Fuller and Lipman 2004: 330). 
What followed in the 1990s, was the eruption of violent Uyghur resistance 
(overt “voice” in a Hirschmanian jargon), which Millward in section 4.1.1. referred to 
as “three clusters of events”. This resistance varied from demonstrations, to riots and 
even detonations of bombs at various sites in Xinjiang and Beijing. These incidents 
profoundly affected the PRC’s policies toward Islam (as well as Uyghurs in their daily 
life). Starr notes that the government quickly labelled this “voice activities” as “illegal 
religious activities”. To counter these tendencies, the authorities embarked on a line of 
“hard policies”, embodied by the “Strike hard, maximum pressure”-campaigns (Starr 
2004:15). According to Fuller and Lipman, means to counter the “illegal religious 
activities” in Xinjiang simply meant to neutralize aspects of Islam, which the 
authorities could not sufficiently control (2004:324). In the White Paper “Freedom of 
religious beliefs in China” from 1997, the authorities stated:  
In China […] all religions must safeguard the people’s interests, the sanctity of the 
law, ethnic unity and unification of the nation […]. Since the 1980s some pernicious 
organizations have sprung up in certain areas of China, which engage in illegal and 
even criminal activities under the signboard of religion.56 
 
This document stressed the need to “falsify” separatism and “splittism”, allegedly 
veiled in religious banners and slogans. Moreover, it emphasized the authorities’ 
considerate and sensitive policies toward “normal” religious practices:  
Article 36 of the Constitution stipulates, Citizens of the People's Republic of China 
enjoy freedom of religious belief […] no state organ, public organization or individual 
may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they 
discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The 
State protects normal religious activities, and no one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere 
with the educational system of the State. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not 
subject to any foreign domination.57 
 
Peter Lom’s recent documentary “On a tightrope”, illuminated how the 
authorities utilize the educational system to indoctrinate among the youngsters, the 
                                                 
55        In my journey to Kashgar and Khotan, I encountered a higher rate of women with veils compared to that of Urumqi, Turpan and Korla. 
I observed three main “ways of veiling”: 1. A veiling solely of the women’s hair. 2. Veiling of hair and throat. 3. A complete veiling except 
of the women’s eyes. Although the first alternative was numerically most pronounced, alternative 3 (almost absent in the north), was also 
manifested, and significantly more among Uyghur women in Kashgar than in Khotan.   
56       PRC Embassy (1997).  “Legal Protection of the Freedom of Religious Belief” (part 2). White Paper. 
57       Opt. Cit. 
 74
need to denounce “illegal religious activities” (mosque attendance or religious study 
by any children under eighteen), along with glorifying the tenets of socialism. In brief, 
Lom followed some Uyghur orphanages who aspired to become tightrope walkers and 
by chance, he one day got an opportunity to film during an outdoor school-session. 
Here they stated the following illustrative student oath, while raising their clenched fist:  
 We will continue our ancestors’ communism.  
We will become stronger by following Marx. 
 We will fight those who oppose our country, our national unity and our culture. 
 We will respect science. We will not take part in any religious activities. 
 We strongly oppose national separatism. 
 We will study hard for China’s prosperity. We progress each day.58 
 
The incidents on September 11, 2001 had a profound effect on Islam around the 
globe, and evidently impacted on the PRC’s operations in Xinjiang as well. At this 
stage, the official Chinese discourse went from characterizing Uyghur nationalists as 
“separatists”, to equate them with international Islamic terrorists (Dwyer 2005: X). 
The Chinese authorities’ “hard policies” gained momentum in this aftermath, which 
were particularly directed at underground religious rites and instructions. Moreover, it 
greatly restricted the religious latitude for the publicly employed clerics, and the 
authorities now have an absolute definition power in; educating and approving the 
religious figures, defining a cleric’s latitude of expression, selecting “appropriate” 
Islamic literature (officially sanctioned) versus smuggled non-approved Islamic 
literature of foreign origin. Fuller and Lipman also report of spill-over effects into the 
public labour marked, where customs of dressing/ appearance are strictly sanctioned. 
Chinese Communist Party members are excluded from religious instructions/ prayers, 
and violations seem to lay waste on their prospects for upward social mobility (2004: 
324-5, 339, Tyler 2003:156).59 Dillon also refers to reports which allege that Uyghur 
Muslims have been denied fasting during Ramadan (2004:157). 
The brief segment above, arguably illustrates the comprehensive sanctions of 
Islam and its Uyghur followers in Xinjiang. Moneyhon argues that these policies of 
control are far stricter, compared to the practice of Islam among other people in China 
(2002:13). What is particularly frustrating for the Uyghur followers of Islam, seems to 
                                                 
58       Lom, Petr (2007). On a tightrope. (About 22-23 minutes into the documentary, one may find this student oath). 
59      The Human Right Watch report “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang” provides numerous accounts of 
surveillance, forced shaving of moustaches/ beards, and an ongoing indoctrination of governmental policies (2005).  
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be how strictly the authorities enforce their rules against religious instructions and 
mosque attendance by any children under eighteen. Islam is a major pillar of the 
Uyghur culture, as Christian Tyler puts it (2003:158), and this nurture a fear of loosing 
an important mechanism for educating young people in religious matters and 
traditions.60 As a consequence, underground educational movements have emerged to 
teach youngsters about Islam and general codes of moral. Thus, covert Uyghur 
counter-cultures have mobilized toward these policies of acculturation, and at present 
day strive to stay away from the authorities’ attentive “radar”.   
The Meshreps have been one such activity, and while the PRC authorities 
initially endorsed it, this forum is now viewed as a place for potential religious 
extremism and separatism. Meshreps were established to address social problems like 
alcohol (embodied by the Olterax, an Uyghur drinking party), drugs and other modern 
“ills”, and by such, focused on codes of appropriate conduct through Islamic ideals 
(Dautcher 2004:285-7, Millward 2004:17). Western scholars, who have studied the 
dynamics of the Meshreps, depict their gatherings as sessions where young Uyghur 
males assemble to recite poetry, sing folksongs or religious songs, dance and share 
traditional foods. In recent years these events have become more concerned about the 
Chinese rule, and “the foci for Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule” (Gladney 
2004a:109). Consequently, the government vigorously endeavours to effectively root 
out these arrangements.61  
A major incentive for Uyghur counter-cultures to continue with this operation 
seems to be their aspiration to pass on to the next generations, distinctive markers 
attached to Islam and “Uyghurness”. Despite the lurking dangers of being extradited to 
the authorities, these Uyghurs still conduct a covert “within-exit” from the Chinese 
policies, to “fortify” and accentuate their boundaries. As such, they aspire to generate 
what Tajfel and Turned characterized as intergroup behaviour, at the expense of 
interpersonal behaviour. This entails a state where Uyghurs do not give in for the 
                                                 
60       According to the Human Right Watch report “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang”; Uyghurs “report that 
the ban is implemented against them more harshly than against members of other ethnic or religious groups, but it applies to all religions in 
the region. This ban on religious activity among children has no basis in Chinese law and is not known to exist anywhere else in China. The 
national Law on the Protection of Minors does not include this clause. Neither do similar implementation measures adopted by other 
provinces. Even Tibet does not have such stringent regulations. The Chinese government has always denied the existence of such a 
prohibition, which contradicts both China’s own constitution and international legal obligations” (2005). 
61      Human Right Watch bulletin (2001): Meshreps were “formally banned in 1994 and labelled as ‘illegal organizations’ and accused of 
fanning ‘reactionary views’ and ‘separatist ideas’ ” . 
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Chinese authorities’ “boundary-penetrating technologies” of acculturation. An 
implication of this is the strengthening of an in-group identity, which paves the way 
for more behavioural conformity among Uyghurs. Rudelson reasons along similar 
lines as he presents the following dilemma for the authorities in their policy-framing:  
When they suppress Islam, most Uyghurs feel oppressed and oppose the government; 
when they allow or encourage it, Uyghurs become more content with the government 
but their strengthened Islamic practise leads them to feel more separate from and 
apathetic toward Chinese society (1997:48). 
 
With Rudelson’s comment in mind, it is immediately important to note that 
while the authorities’ strict policies on Islam may alienate many Uyghurs, the very 
same policies might deter others. Some Uyghurs are by and large oriented toward the 
Chinese mindset and thus completely detached from religious practices. On the 
contrary, other Uyghurs embrace Islam as an objective to staunchly resist the PRC 
government (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:309). In this respect, Fuller and Lipman 
timely emphasize the dilemma ambitious Uyghurs face, when they seek public 
education or civil service professions. The marker of Islam distinguishes them from 
their Han counterparts, but simultaneously seems to be incompatible with prospects for 
upward social mobility. Regardless of this dilemma, they nevertheless argue that Islam 
will continue to “be a powerful weapon of identity for Uyghurs” (2004:335-6).  
 To sum up in brief, Islam seems to be a main pillar of “Uyghurness”, and thus 
serve as an instrumental “boundary-demarcating technology” towards possible 
acculturative governmental policies. Alongside the factor of ethnicity (an arguably 
artificial designation by Sheng in the 1930s), the religious component of Islam seems 
to reinforce an overall Uyghur awareness of “us” versus the “others” (in particular the 
Hans). Even Uyghur intellectuals who are vigorously against Islamic traditionalism, 
take part in Islamic cultural practices, and as noted by Rudelson; “to call oneself a 
Uyghur is also to accept Islam” (1997:47). With the following subchapter, I continue 
to survey Uyghur markers and more specifically focuses on the PRC’s educational 
policies in Xinjiang. The emerging question is: Among Uyghurs, do governmental 
policies nurture a feeling of national unity (Chinese nation-building), or on the 
contrary, reinforce a notion of “us” and the “others” (Uyghur nation-building)? 
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4.2.3. The PRC’s overt and covert educational policies in Xinjiang. 
From the inception of the PRC in 1949, the CCP leadership aspired to generate a 
feeling of national unity and a sense of regime-loyalty among the 55 minority 
populations and the numerically dominant Hans. In Xinjiang as elsewhere in China, 
educational institutions became the foci for the PRC’s nation-building policies. 
Arienne M. Dwyer depicts the early years of the regime as a period where national 
minority identification was considered to be synonymous with nation-building. Thus, 
their policy was responsive to local conditions. This atmosphere reflected the de jure 
principle of equality and unity among the officially designated ethnic groups (minzu), 
which was emphasized in article 53 of the 1949-interim Constitution. In an egalitarian 
fashion, minorities were endowed the “freedom to develop their dialects and languages, 
and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs” (2005:1-8).  
Paradoxically, as Xinjiang obtained the status as an autonomous region in 1955, 
the PRC authorities embarked on a set of “harder policies”. Rudelson actually depicts 
this era as a more comprehensive attempt to “fusion Uyghur culture with Chinese 
communism” (1997:101). “Boundary-penetrating policies” were among other things 
directed at a major pillar of Uyghur identity and its cultural production; namely 
Uyghur language. Dwyer timely notes that while language policies hardly ever attract 
attention, it nevertheless “permeates all aspect of society”, and as such is an important 
aspect of the nation-building project (2005:6). The dynamics of language also 
occupied as central role in Rokkan’s studies of state- and nation-building, and he 
simply noted that “language is fate […] the most pervasive and obvious stigma of 
distinctiveness”. Language was thus viewed as a pivotal identity-building and 
“boundary-maintaining technology”, crucial for the survival of peripheral identity. In 
this regard, he emphasized something of relevance for my study of Xinjiang as well; 
“the ability to speak a language is of little value if there is no way in which the 
individual can use it” (Flora 1999:66, Rokkan 1999:171). 
Hence, a critical question for the educational policy in the 1950s, was language 
of instruction. However, a permanent clarification on this matter did not materialize 
and the following decades were imprinted in dramatic changes. Prior to 1956, Arabic 
script was the basis for language instruction, but with the close relationship between 
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China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, a modified Cyrillic alphabet became the 
written standard. Rudelson explains this change as a means to undermine Islamic 
influences and allegedly to address the challenge of the high illiteracy rate (1997:101). 
Linda Benson however asserts that the choice of script was more due to China’s 
political allies, and changes of scripts were mainly driven by China’s shifting foreign 
relations. Consequently, when Sino-Soviet relations soured in the 1960s, the Latin 
alphabet replaced the Cyrillic alphabet (2004:195-7). Rudelson, on the other hand, 
perceives this change as a policy to severe the “ties between the indigenous people of 
Xinjiang and their kinsmen across the Sino-Soviet border” (1997:102). 
In the early 1980s, the government eventually allowed a return to a slightly 
modified Arabic script, which coincided with a “softer political climate” for the 
indigenous people. Today, this remains the official written form for Uyghurs, and 
Dwyer notes that the PRC government has a particular incentive for a status quo here. 
In terms of boundary-demarcation, this accentuates a linguistic distance to the Central 
Asian countries, which eventually have adopted the Latin-based alphabet (2005:21-22).  
Nevertheless, previous changes of scripts have created divisions between 
generations of Uyghurs, and this has been viewed by many as a deliberate strategy, 
combined with the PRC aspiration to undermine their language (Benson 2004:197). 
Tyler actually depicts a state in many Uyghur families, where the generations can only 
write to each other in Chinese. Moreover, in the near future, changes of script may 
actually come again, in order to make it more adjusted to the new era of computer-
technologies (2003:261). Another observation has been that the standard Mandarin 
Chinese has increasingly been favoured as the region’s new lingua franca, at the 
expense of other “low quality/ more backward” languages (Dwyer 2005:37).62  
In this respect, Dwyer asserts that the year of 1984 was crucial for the 
authorities’ language policies in Xinjiang. Language instruction in Mandarin was 
introduced at all levels of the education, and eventually paved the way for the present 
day’s state, with instructions from the first grade and onwards. This, at the expense of 
instructions in Uyghur language, and from the mid-1990s, Dwyer argues that “Uyghur 
                                                 
62       Languages with the highest prestige is reflected on the PRC’s paper currency, where the phrase ”People’s Bank of China” is written in 
the scripts of Mandarin, Uyghur, Mongolian, Tibetan and Zhuang. However, in an interview with the China Central Television, Wang 
Lequan, the CCP Party Secretary of Xinjiang, asserted that “minority languages in Xinjiang contain only limited amounts of information, and 
cannot express some more advanced knowledge” (Dwyer 2005:15, 37). 
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is taught as if it were a second language”. Another paramount change came in 2002, 
with the termination of instructions in Uyghur language at Xinjiang University. The 
main objective of the policy was allegedly to avoid that Uyghur students fall behind 
their Chinese classmates. Moreover, to address the situation of inadequate Uyghur 
course materials, as well as to improve Uyghurs’ job prospects (2005:38-40).  
With Mandarin as the de facto number one language of instruction, a mastery of 
it seems to be a sine qua non for secular advancement. Hence, when Uyghur parents 
enrol their child into the educational system, they have to choose between Uyghur 
(language) schools and Chinese (language) schools.63 This is truly a dilemma for the 
parents, as their choice for a Chinese school so profoundly affects their child’s 
prospects. On the one hand, it entails a radical improvement of their child’s career 
opportunities, while on the other hand, such an orientation towards the Han society 
most likely engender a comprehensive impairment of important Uyghur traits 
(boundary de-accentuation). Education in Uyghur minority schools are expected to 
bring about the opposite effects, and a prevailing compromise solution for Uyghur 
parents has been to send their sons to a Chinese- language school, while their 
daughters enrol at Uyghur-language schools. At least to some extent, this safeguards 
Uyghur language and traditions, which can then be passed on to future generations 
(boundary-accentuation) (Tyler 2003: 260, Benson 2004:208, Dillon 2004:26). 
The system of Uyghur-language schools (and minority-language schools in 
general) and Chinese-language schools, has created a prima facie favouritism of 
students from the minzu-schools. To the great dismay of Hans, these students face 
lower demands in the university entrance examination. Graduates of Uyghur and other 
minority-language schools have to achieve a minimum score of 300, while Han and 
minority students graduating from Chinese-language schools need a score of 480. The 
Chinese authorities present this as a proof of their flexibility towards minorities. 
However, graduates from these minority schools have to spend an additional year 
studying Chinese, in order to obtain a standard adequate for university studies. This in 
turn represents a great financial burden for the parents (Benson 2004: 208). 
                                                 
63      Regardless of the school, religious instructions are strictly forbidden, and their child is in any case, largely exposed to the indoctrinating 
tenets of socialism. 
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Photo Truls Winje: From a Uyghur school in Kashgar. The blackboard has evidently been used for a lecture in Mandarin. Notice the 
symbols of PRC’s supremacy above, with the Chinese flag and the photo of Chairman Mao. 
 
Secular education in Xinjiang: A streamlined notion of national unity. 
 
The PRC government has had the capacity and will to control that the educational 
system promotes expedient and “correct” interpretations of the past, while rooting out 
“undesirable thinking”.64 Hence, some Uyghurs have alleged that the authorities 
deliberately utilize the educational institutions to downplay their history and traditional 
culture. Moreover, as addressed in a previous section, the extract from Peter Lom’s 
documentary unmistakably unveiled employment of propaganda slogans in their 
schooling. Bovdingdon asserts that this line of “large scale coordination of students” 
perceptions (overt and covert), has prevailed at every level of the educational system 
(2004:373). The “Xinjiang White Paper” reveals similar educational coordination:  
In order to further consolidate and develop the great unity among ethnic groups, since 
1983, the government of the region has launched an ‘educational month of unity 
among ethnic groups’ throughout the whole region every year. In a lively and up-to-
date form, the publicity and educational event is carried out in a concentrated, 
extensive and profound manner, to promote the concepts of equality, unity and 
progress (my underlining).65 
                                                 
64       The Human Right Watch report “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang” alleges that the authorities have 
confirmed their strict surveillance policy in the schools, as a communist cadre gave the following statement to the Xinjiang Legal Daily: “In 
every school we have established an information network integrated with the local police station, with the teachers in charge of a class acting 
as the basis [of a network] comprised of classroom heads, section heads, teaching offices and school directors”. The objective was to” teach 
and guide them” (“them” refers to the educational personnel) (2005). 
65        PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 8).  White Paper.   
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 Another telling example has been the lecturing of Xinjiang’s history, with the 
publishing of the textbook “Local history of Xinjiang” in 1992. The authors from 
Xinjiang University vigorously underscored the historical link between Xinjiang and 
China proper. Moreover, Xinjiang was depicted as an indisputable part of 
contemporary China, with an emphasis on the latter part’s positive cultural and 
economical contribution to the region (Bovingdon 2004:368). This book became 
mandatory for minority students, as well as Han students at colleges/universities in 
Xinjiang. Every candidate had to pass an examination on its contents to graduate, and 
the latitude for divergent history interpretations was basically non-existent. To ensure 
a “proper” understanding of Xinjiang’s past, the educational authorities provided a 
study guide with the most important arguments. Younger students were exposed to an 
even more streamlined and indoctrinating version, with thirty-six questions and a 
corresponding set of “correct answers” (Benson 2004:198, Bovingdon 2004:368).   
 
   
Photo Truls Winje: From another Uyghur schoolyard in Kashgar, depicting Xinjiang’s indigenous people surrounded by an advanced PRC 
modernity (the painting allegedly has a slogan from the former Party boss Jiang Zemin). As I entered the schoolyard to take a photo, I was 
immediately chased away. 
 
4.2.4. Contested histories: “Appropriate” Uyghur tales versus “splittist” tales. 
The preceding subsection illustrated the authorities’ monopoly to define the region’s 
past, and in general, all official PRC documents promulgate a strong historical Chinese 
presence in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang White Paper (2003) is safely embedded in this 
tradition: 
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Since the Western Han Dynasty ( 206 B.C-24 A.D. ), Xinjiang has been an inseparable 
part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation […].The Chinese central governments 
of all historical periods exercised military and administrative jurisdiction over 
Xinjiang. The jurisdiction of the central governments over the Xinjiang region was at 
times strong and at other times weak, depending on the stability of the period.66 
 
This official version of Xinjiang’s past is strongly contested by Uyghur 
nationalists. A diverging and “radical” history interpretation came in connection with 
the sensational archaeological excavations, three decades ago in Taklimakan Dessert. 
The findings of 2,000 to 6,000 years old dried out corpses of Caucasian’ origins, made 
the Uyghur historian Turghun Almas assert that these corpses were their Uyghur 
ancestors. Allegedly, this solved the puzzle of a missing link in their history. When the 
Tarim basin desiccated 3,000 to 6,000 years ago, the indigenous Uyghurs moved on to 
the Mongolian steppe. “Solving this puzzle” and referring to the Jews who reclaimed 
their homeland after 2,000 years, he argued that the Uyghurs were also in a position to 
legitimately regain their homeland (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:314). 
 Bovingdon depicts this line of reasoning as far-fetched syllogism: “(1) The 
earliest Uyghurs practiced shamanism; (2) the orientation of the buried suggests that 
they were shamanists; (3) ergo, the mummies were Uyghur”. This is allegedly an 
observable trend among both Chinese historians and the diametrically opposed Uyghur 
historians (2004:358). Nevertheless, in the 1980s’ atmosphere of official tolerance 
towards minority tales, Almas was in full action to illuminate that; “the motherland of 
the Uyghurs is Central Asia”. His volume “The Uyghurs” along with two other books, 
were engulfed by this notion, and thus, he was implicitly denouncing the authorities’ 
history interpretations. With the row of critical junctures at the end of the 1980s (the 
Tiananmen student movement, “velvet revolutions” in East Europe and a Soviet Union 
in decline), the regime seized its accommodative policies. Hence, the PRC authorities 
sanctioned Turghun’s work, and generally curbed the popular discourse (2004:363-6). 
 According to the Chinese scholar Li Sheng, Almas’ contributions undermined 
“the unity of the country and inter-ethnic solidarity in the name of academic research 
by distorting, cooking up and falsifying history”. Consequently, his books with 
“history-defying fabrications and political mistakes” allegedly aroused grievance and 
indignation among people from all ethnic groups. In 1990, experts from the CCP 
                                                 
66      PRC Embassy (2003). “History and development of Xinjiang” (part 3).  White Paper.    
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convened and found that he “completely violated the Marxist viewpoint on ethnicity 
and history” (2005:278-9). Moreover, in 1991 the Xinjiang Daily published the 70,000 
character essay “A list of one hundred historical errors in the three books including 
Uyghurs”, vigorously defaming Almas’ contributions “as a historical basis for 
separatism”. The Chinese authorities went even further to undermine his work when 
they made it illegal to sell, purchase and possess. However, this strict policy made 
even more Uyghurs aware of the books’ content and the demand for it skyrocketed 
(Bovingdon 2004:366-7). Hence, Li emphasizes the need to “uproot the influence of 
the three books” and embark on an ideological battle, which must be conducted 
through “positive education”. This implies that “various ethnicities in Xinjiang learn 
about their local history and ethnic history correctly” (2005:281). 
Regardless of the Chinese authorities’ stricter policies toward Uyghur cultural 
production, they were unable to quell these sentiments in song lyrics, poems and books.   
The publishing of Ömerjan Alim’s “Remembering mother” in 1994, serves as a good 
example in this regard, where it arguably encourages Uyghur action (Harris 2005:636-
38). However, his follow-up poem in 2000, “Mother you have gone” seems to be 
coloured by an even stricter political climate, as it reveal sentiments of apathy. 
“Mother” among Uyghurs, serves as a central icon for the flag and motherland.  
 
Remembering Mother (1994)                                         Mother, you have gone (2000) 
For a long time I’ve had bad dreams                                 People depart this earth when 
I pass my days depressed                                                   their lifespan is up 
See, today bad news has come                                          Neither the beggar nor Adam 
Words fail me                                                                    can remain 
                                                                                           None can escape from their 
Mother, you went to that place                                          fate 
I call mother, no one answers                                            The joy of this life is shared 
Heavy suffering has come upon me                                   by all 
Remembering I am sick with grief 
Ah...I have eaten grief                                                        I can no longer see your face 
 
Who will I make pay for this grief?                                   Your children pray for your soul 
Who will I make pay for this pain?                                    Rest peacefully in your grave 
Destiny has turned out like this                                          dear mother 
And so I will not ask what…                                              In my dreams I will be together 
Ah… what should I do                                                       with your image. 
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In 2000, the Uyghur author Zordun Sabir, published the three-volume historical 
novel “Motherland”, which dealt with the Eastern Turkistan Republic (1944-49). 
Originally this work passed the official sensors and became popular among the 
Uyghurs. However, the authorities in the end banned “Motherland”, along with other 
contributions that were perceived as regime-challenging. In 2005, Human Right Watch 
published the thorough rapport, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs 
in Xinjiang”, which among other things illuminated how Chinese authorities reasoned 
around “diverging and regime- threatening tales”. In February 2002, the Xinjiang 
Party Secretary released (in Xinjiang Daily) the manifest “For the first time Xinjiang 
reveals the six forms of sabotaging operations of the separatist forces in the ideological 
sphere”, instructing the local authorities to sanction these six “separatist techniques”: 
            1. Using all sorts of news media to propagate separatist thought. 
2. Using periodicals, works of literature and art performances; presenting the subject 
in satires or allegories that give free reign to and disseminate dissatisfaction and 
propagate separatist thought. 
3. Illegally printing reactionary books and periodicals; distributing or posting 
reactionary leaflets, letters and posters; spreading rumours to confuse the people; 
instilling the public with separatist sentiment. 
4. Using audio and video recordings, such as audio tapes, CDs or VCDs, to incite 
religious fanaticism and promote “holy war”. 
5. Forging alliances with outside separatist and enemy forces, making use of 
broadcasts, the Internet, and other means to intensify campaigns of reactionary 
propaganda and infiltration of ideas into public opinion. 
6. Using popular cultural activities to make the masses receptive to reactionary 
propaganda encouraging opposition.67 
 
In this atmosphere, the authorities have clamped down on Uyghur authors who 
allegedly have penetrated the ideological sphere, by publishing and spreading 
separatist sentiments. Some authors have even been sentenced to jail according to the 
international association PEN (writers who defend freedom of expression) and Human 
Right Watch. In 1998, the historian Tohti Muzart was sentenced to fifteen years of 
prison and in 2005, Nurmemet Yasin was convicted to ten years imprisonment “for 
publishing a story allegedly inciting separatism”. The latter’s work “The blue pigeon”, 
employed an allegory of two birds to address Uyghurs’ situation in Xinjiang. One day 
a blue pigeon is captured in a birdcage by other pigeons and Yasin addresses the great 
                                                 
67     Human Right Watch (2005): “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang”.  
 85
value of freedom. The Chinese authorities allegedly perceived this story as a 
resentment of their policies in Xinjiang, and thus found it opportune to sanction it.68 
As Bovingdon notes, restrictions and sanctions were only part of the official 
strategy, as the authorities acknowledged that an important part remained in their 
nation-building campaigns; namely to “get the story ‘right’ […] and tell the ‘right’ 
stories” in a way that makes people read them. This resulted in “A hundred Questions 
about Xinjiang History”, and a simplified version became educational curriculum. A 
shrewd new strategy has also been to employ authors with some credibility among its 
potential readers, to write about historical themes. However, Bovingdon timely 
remarks that “Uyghurs contend with the party in many spheres; the ‘contest of 
histories’ is only one campaign in the larger battle. The party is least likely to win this 
campaign for Uyghur minds” (2004: 370-74). The popular Uyghur poems below 
depict typical sentiments toward the PRC, and if not per se threatening their state 
building project in Xinjiang, these sentiments surely illustrates the challenges the 
communist regime confronts in their nation-building campaigns.69  
 
Statue                  Guest 
I saw an statue standing in the park,               I invited guests to my home, 
covered by a cloak handed with a firearm,              Let them sit on soft blanket, 
I recognized him but he didn’t,               But now I can't enter, 
because he stands on top while I was down.              The house built by myself. 
 
We met each other in this spot long years ago,   I respected the guests 
with wide open welcome when we were grazing the cattle,  Become homeless myself, 
today he eats the walnut alone high above,      No place left for me  
while I was sitting down watching him enjoy.    in the garden,   
                                                                                                      I stray in the desert. 
 
I still remember once he said we were inseparable,             I changed the desert to oasis 
today what happened to this amnesia,     plenty guests come  
I am so regret for what I have done before,    for the harvest  
my eyes were burning and my soul is full of sadness.  They broke the branches of   
         trees, took the fruits away 
 
         I invited guests to my home 
Let them sit on soft blanket, 
now they hold on the 
important spot, 
become our boss. 
                                                 
68       Opt. Cit. and Norwegian PEN (2006): “Rebiya Kadeer: Kina dreper sine egne”.   
18     “Statue” (1986) by Abdukera’m Hujayof, while “Guest” is a Uyghur folk song. Accessible at Meshrep (www.meshrep.com)  
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4.3. A summary display of Uyghur means and goals: Three broad strategies. 
In previous subchapters, I surveyed a) the centre-building elite’s endeavours to “lock-
in” peripheral actors and resources by external boundary-demarcation and internal 
hierarchical organization (centre-formation/ state building) and moreover, b) their 
attempted nation-building campaign (cultural standardization) to engender sentiments 
for China as the “destined motherland”. In recent years, this has entailed a “carrot and 
stick” approach, where the “Strike hard, maximum pressure”-campaign has been 
designed to contain and deter separatists, while the campaign “Open up the West” was 
prime facie initiated to improve the indigenous peoples’ socio-economic prospects 
(“carrots” to generate goodwill). However, as previously accounted for, this campaign 
has also orbited the PRC-quest for a strengthened spatial hold on Xinjiang.  
Nonetheless, among the Uyghurs, one can arguably observe three broader 
responses to this “carrot and stick” approach, as some Uyghurs do acculturate, while a 
majority either ask for a genuine autonomy or a territorial breakaway from the PRC 
(Fuller and Starr 2004:22). A presentation of these main strategies may provide a 
adequate summary for the whole chapter. Furthermore, I more thoroughly bring into 
consideration the theoretical insights from section 3.3., which concerned the potential 
reach and scope of within-group behavioural-conformity, versus greater in-group 
variability (individualistic actions) among the Uyghurs. 
To shortly recapitulate the most important aspects, one may start with the 
twofold distinction of Tajfel and Turner, on whether an individual’s conduct is mainly 
determined by individual traits (interpersonal behaviour) or by its social group’s codes 
of conduct (intergroup behaviour). As Bartolini notes, the scope (level of intensity) of 
an intergroup-conflict is more extensive where individual interaction can be traced 
back to their group belonging. Another interesting distinction can be made between 
individuals’ perception of a society as “open” (social mobility belief) or “closed” 
(social group stigmata). In this regard, he asserts that the latter perception fosters 
intergroup behaviour (strengthening of in-group identity, in-group behavioural 
conformity and inter-group conflict), while social mobility beliefs generate greater in-
group variability (decline of in-group identity, in-group behavioural conformity and 
inter-group conflict), and consequently, a decreased level of inter-ethnic tension. 
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We now proceed with a survey of the above-mentioned Uyghur-responses, to 
what I previously depicted as the Chinese “carrot and stick approach”:  
1. Acculturation: These Uyghurs accept an acculturation of their language, 
culture and Uyghur identity, as means to be fully incorporated into the Chinese 
political and social order. In order to address the challenges of modernization, Uyghurs 
have to adjust to a “Han-style modernity”, which is considered to provide a more 
sophisticated model for social organisation. Few in numbers, these Uyghurs tend to 
perceive Islam as an impeding factor for this “advanced modernity”, and thus they 
hold a secular outlook on life. Their sole objection to the communist leadership is the 
current discriminatory regime, which is a substantial barrier for their principal 
aspiration; to thrive in a Chinese society with equal access for all its citizens (Fuller 
and Lipman 2004:345-46, Fuller and Starr 2004:22).  
In the case of these few acculturated Uyghurs, one may argue in a Rokkanian 
terminology that the PRC government’s “boundary-penetrating technologies” have 
succeeded in overcoming the non-spatial membership space. Their dissociation (“exit”) 
from important Uyghur markers (“outdated customs”) and “all-embracing entry” into 
the Chinese society, indicate a hope for a future state, where they may be able to thrive 
despite their minority background (“social mobility belief”). Thus, interpersonal 
behaviour progresses with a decline of in-group conformity among this minor segment.  
Arguably, a large-scale Uyghur acculturation into the Chinese “mindset” is the 
preferable endgame for the authorities. Regarding Giesen and Eisenstadt’s distinction 
of collective identities in section 3.3., one may allege that the PRC government has 
missionary ambitions for their “superior Han-modernity”. An “entry” into- and 
partaking of their sacred collective identity, is rendered possible by a reorientation, 
education and adoption of these normative standards (PRC nation-building). While a 
few Uyghurs acculturate and adapt to this notion, a large-scale Uyghur acculturation 
seems unlikely. Despite Rudelson and Jankowiak’s assertion that the overall Uyghur 
identity is fragile and an artificial construction, they still allege that Uyghurs are the 
most culturally impenetrable of all the ethnic peoples in China (2004:311).  
2. Autonomists, on the other hand attempt to conserve their distinctive markers 
as an indigenous people. The current state of communist rule in Xinjiang is not only 
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perceived as discriminatory, but also as a substantial threat to the Uyghur “way of life”. 
Hence, these autonomists call for a de facto autonomy, which is already de jure 
guaranteed in the Chinese constitution. Only by such a dramatic alteration of power, 
may a dominant Uyghur “voice” manage to control; Han migration (in particular the 
flow of low-skilled workers), Xinjiang’s overall political processes, and the 
exploitation of the region’s invaluable natural resources (Fuller and Starr 2004:22). 
Their nightmare scenario is a Uyghur future resembling the present situation of 
Inner Mongolia, where the local Mongol population has been reduced to less than 20 
percent (Fuller and Lipmann 2004:345). Due to the massive influx of Han Chinese, 
Mongols have been pushed to the margins and this has also started to manifest itself in 
Xinjiang, where the “footprints” of an expanding Han contingent (unofficially about 
50 percent of the region’s population) is simply indisputable. The extensive inflow 
does not merely impair Uyghurs’ job prospects (widespread guanxi practice), it also 
consolidates the regime’s physical hold on the region and expose distinctive markers 
of “Uyghurness”, to additional pressure.  
Hence, a review of the current state in Xinjiang suggests that; Mandarin has 
become the region’s lingua franca, the official “House of Islam” has been 
institutionalized and comprehensively controlled, regime-biased tales displace Uyghur 
tales and narratives, the important educative Meshrep-gatherings have been sanctioned, 
and Chinese architecture and symbols have been erected at a frequent rate throughout 
Xinjiang, to manifest the supremacy of the PRC. The autonomists obviously aspire to 
reverse this trend, and while accepting that Xinjiang lies under the overall domain of 
the PRC, adherence to the authorities’ nation-building project is precluded. Their 
primary concern is to conserve and strengthen Uyghur distinctiveness, and as such 
cultivate a non-spatial distance to the other indigenous people in the region. In the case 
of the Han Chinese, this extends to comprise a spatial distance (physical distance), 
preferably by witnessing a large-scale return of Hans to China hinterland.  
As a consequence of the autonomists’ preference for an increased non-spatial 
(social) distance between Uyghurs and in particular the Hans, one may expect the 
continuation of, or an increased degree of in-group behavioural conformity (intergroup 
behaviour). This is nurtured by the widespread perception of social group stigmata, as 
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important positions in the labour market and within the CCP, in reality are reserved for 
the Hans. Hence, I contend that many Uyghurs do struggle with such frustration on a 
daily basis, particularly as the Han contingent expands further south. Unless the PRC 
government addresses this grievance, social tension may increase and simply make 
harmonization between Uyghurs and Hans an inconceivable outcome. 
3. Separatists by and large share the same ends as autonomists, but advocate a 
full territorial breakaway (transcendence) from Chinese domination, in order to 
embark on an unrestrained cultivation of Uyghur distinctiveness and the continuation 
of their “glorious past”. Co-existence with the “outer-group” (Hans) under the auspices 
of a PRC government is simply an anathema, and I assume that intergroup behaviour 
more strongly displace in-group variability. This depiction particularly applies for the 
violent separatists, who in 2007 run a significant risk of being fatally sanctioned. The 
separatists may be divided into subgroups of secularists and religious activists, who 
employ non-violent, alternatively violent strategies. (Fuller and Starr 2004:23). Thus, I 
suggest the following simplified illustration of separatists and their activities: 
Table 5.         Non-violent strategy                     Violent strategy 
 
Secularists 
 
 
    
 
Islamic       
activists       
 
 
 
 
Fuller and Starr timely note that an increasing number of militant separatist 
groups embedded in an Islamic ideology, have emerged the last few years. Some of 
these movements have forged links with similar groups in countries adjoining Xinjiang, 
and thus, by violent means, endeavoured to undermine the PRC state- and nation-
building campaigns (2004:24). However, as accounted for in section 4.1., this has been 
effectively addressed by the Chinese authorities as they bandwagoned with the U.S. in 
1)  Endgame: A secular East Turkistan/Uyghuristan. 
  
Credo: Internal democratization and a peaceful 
solution of the Xinjiang-question. 
 
-Uyghur nationalists within Xinjiang have to keep a 
low profile in order to avoid the regime’s “radar”. 
 
-Uyghur exile groups around the world voice their 
grievance to attract international sympathy.
2)  Endgame: An Islamic East Turkistan state or a 
grand Central Asian Islamic caliphate, based on the 
rule of Sharia.  
 
-Religious Uyghur individuals with a low profile in 
present day Xinjiang. These Islamic Uyghurs are 
under a constant surveillance by the authorities, and 
many have already been incarcerated. 
3)  Endgame: A secular East Turkistan/ Uyghuristan.
-No officially known secular groups are in operation, 
although the PRC authorities link western exile 
groups with acts of terrorism. 
-Some secular expatriate individuals from Central 
Asia, may be willing to travel to Xinjiang if major 
uprisings erupt.   
4)  Endgame: An Islamic East Turkistan state or a 
grand Central Asian Islamic caliphate, based on the 
rule of Sharia.  
Credo: Jihad against the infidel China. 
 
-A variety of groups like the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement, East Turkistan Islamic Party, with others 
have emerged. The PRC government alleges that they 
have a link to the Al-Qaeda network.  
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the “War on terrorism”, and incorporated the concept of the “three ills of separatism, 
extremism and terrorism” in the charter of the SCO. This has rendered it utterly 
difficult for non-violent expatriate activists, as well as Uyghur terrorists to continue 
their operations in the neighbouring countries. Hence, I contend that the government’s 
hold on the region is historically strong and by and large uncontested (a strong 
manifestation of the PRC’s boundary-accentuation in spatial sphere).  
To establish an accurate overview of Uyghurs’ preferred endgame for Xinjiang 
is evidently impossible, as the region is a terra incognita for conducting independent 
surveys. Nevertheless, Fuller and Star assert that the autonomists clearly constitute the 
largest group of politically active Uyghurs. Only a few Uyghurs might be considered 
to be “outright acculturated”, while separatists as a group, probably constitute a 
“distant third” (2004:24-25). A survey by the Hui scholar Yang Shengmin in 2004, 
suggested that 67 percent respectively 25 percent of the Uyghur respondents were 
“very proud of” or “proud of” their ethnic group. Interestingly, 60 percent respectively 
31 percent were “very proud” or “proud of” being a Chinese national. Moreover, 43 
percent respectively 45 percent of the Uyghurs “fully agreed” or “agreed”, that 
“separatist activities are harmful to the majority of the people”. Consequently, Yang 
concluded that ethnic separatism “do not enjoy popular support” (2006:10-13). 
While one could write a separate chapter about methodological difficulties 
attended with Yang’s survey, I will confine myself to contend that these “sensational” 
numbers, most likely reflect a concern among the respondents to provide the “correct 
responses”. Although Uyghur surveyors conducted the survey among the Uyghur 
respondents, the latter part does still not have any incentives to reveal their separatist 
sentiments. Quite the contrary, the Chinese authorities have effectively demonstrated 
that a possessor of such attitudes is simply a persona non grata in Xinjiang.  
The Uyghurs I talked with in Xinjiang manifested sentiments for a breakaway 
from China, but emphasised that the Chinese government would effectively clamp 
down on any uprisings. Consequently, many Uyghurs do not support separatist 
rebellions as their sacrifice would simply be in vain. An unbiased survey among 
“unrestrained” Uyghurs, would probably reveal that a majority have sentiments for a 
breakaway, but as they have made peace with the new realities, they refrain from 
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advocating or participating in such activities. However, Gladney has timely noted that 
an independent East Turkistan has about the similar prospects as the Central Asian 
countries. This implies a state of relatively poorer conditions, and with this in mind, 
Uyghurs’ enthusiasm for independence may be considerably moderated (2004b:393). 
Another important aspect to be addressed is whether a breakaway from Chinese 
domination has popular support among Xinjiang’s Kazakhs, Huis, Kyrgyzs, and 
Mongols. Rudelson and Jankowiak assert that the PRC government has nurtured local 
conflicts between the Uyghurs and these ethnic groups, by disproportionately 
strengthening the voice of the latter groups (2004:305). A prospected Uyghur-
dominated state on the other hand, would most likely undermine the influence of these 
groups, and hence, they rather prefer a continuation of Chinese domination (Fuller and 
Lipman 2004:351). In the event of independence or large-scale rebellions, Gladney 
even predicts at state of equally intense clashes between Muslim peoples as between 
Han Chinese and Muslims (2004b:395).  
The latter suggestion is also substantiated by the profound suspicion that many 
Uyghurs nourish to the Huis (non-Turkic Chinese-speaking Muslims). Huis have even 
been referred to as a “wobbling watermelon”; at times siding with the Uyghurs and in 
other cases with the Han Chinese. Some Uyghurs have also depicted them as “Muslim 
(green) on the outside and Communist (red) on the inside”. Consequently, Huis have 
an intermediate function, which render it difficult for either the Uyghurs or the Hans to 
completely trust them (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:311-12). One may argue that the 
latent tension and conflict between the Muslim Uyghurs, Huis and Kazakhs, has been 
masterfully manipulated by the PRC government, as it now constitutes an invaluable 
“locking-in” mechanism in their state building campaign.  
 As a natural closure of this section, the following considerations emerge: While 
a few Uyghur gladly acculturate into the “Han modernity”, a remaining majority of 
discontent Uyghurs (autonomists and separatists) stay behind in a current state where; 
a) genuine autonomy is out of reach, and b) where all imaginable “exit-strategies” for 
a territorial secession of Xinjiang, seem to have been effectively precluded. In the 
perspective of Rokkan, a variety of “locking-in” mechanisms have simply made the 
penalty for overt separatist activities and uprisings too severe to be considered. The 
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authorities’ monitoring and sanctioning of “splittists activities” and dissent, have had 
the ripple effect of restricting Uyghurs in their performance of such distinctive markers 
as language, religion, important customs and communication of “inappropriate” 
Uyghur tales/narratives. This is particularly the case for Uyghurs in the public space. 
Thus, they have to preserve their identity in the private realms of life.   
 Arguably, one may assert that Uyghur individuals refusing to acculturate into a 
“Chinese mindset” are left with two alternative courses of “rational action”. The first 
option is a continuation of the current life in Xinjiang, where they express prima facie 
“loyalty” to the communist regime, while practicing their distinct features more 
discretely at home. In reality, this is a “within-exit” from the authorities’ nation-
building project, where Uyghur individuals only learn to master the most necessary 
skills (Mandarin, “Xinjiang’s correct history” and the tenets of socialism) to survive 
within the framework of the PRC. In the private sphere, they continue to cultivate the 
most important traits of “Uyghurness”, and by this effort render possible a 
continuation of their cultural heritage, and the partaking of future Uyghur generations. 
For some Uyghurs, the incentive to stay in Xinjiang has simply perished. After 
a visit in Xinjiang in late August 2001, Dru Gladney reported a sense of 
disillusionment and disappointment among Uyghur activists. One of his acquaintances 
mentioned; “We’ve given up our independence, we just want to emigrate”. Thus, in a 
Hirschmanian jargon, “loyalty” to the Chinese regime or the “voice” of dissent “for 
many Uyghurs, have turned into exit” (2004b:382). Interestingly, only as Uyghur 
individuals pursue Hirschman’s “exit”-alternative from Xinjiang, can oppositional 
voices continue to be heard. This course of action has evident costs in terms of leaving 
your family, friends and hometown behind, a classical dilemma for all refugees and 
migrants. Nevertheless, many migrating Uyghurs have concluded that this is the only 
viable option to raise the Uyghur voice. Chapter 5 now proceeds with a survey of the 
Uyghur diaspora, and their undertakings to discredit the PRC regime internationally.   
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Chapter 5: 
  
Diasporic voices for an independent East Turkistan. 
 
 
 
Photo Semet Abla: Exile Uyghurs demonstrating against the PRC government in front of the Norwegian 
parliament on February 3, 2007. The occasion was to honour the victims from the Ghulja-uprising in 1997.  
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5.0. The Uyghur Diaspora: Voices for East Turkistan. 
Within present-day Xinjiang, a prevailing trend has been the effective silencing of 
regime-critical Uyghur voices, as the political climate by no means invites to dissent. 
The Chinese authorities continuously keep a watchful eye on potential underground 
“splittists” along with clamping down on overt Uyghur voice. Thus, large-scale public 
demonstrations which hallmarked the region in the 1990s, seem to have been rendered 
utterly difficult in 2007. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the PRC government 
aspired to exert further control on Xinjiang’s course of events, and overt as well as 
covert opposition have been profoundly sanctioned. Consequently, only regime-
endorsing Uyghur voices (communist cadres and some scholars) stressing their 
allegiance to their “beloved motherland China” can be heard today in Xinjiang itself. 
In this regard, Gladney observes that many Uyghurs have abandoned the idea of 
voicing their aspirations for independence in Xinjiang, and rather migrate (“exit”) to a 
country with a greater latitude for oppositional “Hirschmanian voice” (2004b:382-83). 
 After several stages of Uyghur migration the last century, Yitzhak Shichor 
estimates that approximately 500,000 Uyghurs constitute the current Uyghur diaspora 
(Petersen 2006:65). Numerically speaking, neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
accommodate a majority of these Uyghurs, while many have also moved on to Turkey, 
Western Europe, Australia and North America. In the last decade, many of these 
Uyghurs have initiated exile groups to illuminate the pressure on Uyghurs in Xinjiang, 
and to discredit the Chinese regime.  
In section 5.1, I proceed to give an account of the major exile Uyghur groups, 
their aspirations and employed means, along with their actual achievements. Section 
5.2 continues with a survey of the latitude for Uyghur voice in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, as these countries constitute a major centre for Uyghur expatriates. 
Finally, in section 5.3., I scrutinize Uyghur voices on the World Wide Web, and their 
activities of cyber-separatism. In this regard, a main observation is the paramount 
importance of internet as a medium to rally international sympathy for the Uyghurs’ 
situation, to undermine the PRC’s international legitimacy, and to mobilize and 
coordinate Uyghurs worldwide. Moreover, each section also contains a discussion on 
how the PRC authorities endeavour to defame the Uyghur diaspora. 
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5.1. The mobilization of the Uyghur diaspora against the PRC government. 
With the inception of the PRC in 1949, Uyghurs leaders had to demonstrate their 
allegiance to the new communist regime, or flee from Xinjiang to avoid persecution. 
Along with about 2,000 other Uyghurs, the East Turkistan Republic’s Mehmet Emin 
Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin escaped in 1949 to Kashmir in India. In 1955, both 
moved on to find permanent shelter in Turkey, and from their base in Istanbul, they 
campaigned for Uyghur independence. Bughra became the father figure of the Uyghur 
diaspora until he departed in 1965, and at that stage, Alptekin succeeded to be the 
uncontested “patriarch” until he passed away in 1995 (Tyler 2003:223-25).  
Yitzhak Shichor asserts that neither Bughra nor Alptekin embarked on any 
serious attempts to establish a universal Uyghur forum to generate support from the 
West. This may be explained by that time’s limited communications technology, the 
isolated PRC government’s indifference to international criticism (especially during 
the Cultural Revolution), the fact that the bulk of the diaspora was situated in the 
Soviet Union, and finally, that the West at the height of the Cold War, had more 
precarious concerns than the fate of oppressed minorities (2007).  
From the 1970s, Isa Yusuf Alptekin’s son Erkin Alptekin also got a paramount 
role in the exile community. With his profession in Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 
news and “democratic propaganda” were broadcasted into the PRC and the Soviet 
Union.70 Eventually, he left the radio channel but continued to advocate the cause of 
East Turkistan, along with initiating cooperation with exiled leaders from Tibet and 
Inner Mongolia. In 1991, Alptekin established the Eastern Turkistan Union in Europe 
(ETUE) in Munich, and were among the founders of the Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organisation (UNPO) the same year. From the mid-1990s and onwards, a 
wide range of expatriate Uyghur organisations emerged to “legitimately represent” the 
silenced Uyghur voice in Xinjiang. Uyghur groups established competing world-wide 
fora, all proclaiming to be the sole and authentic representative body for the Uyghurs. 
In the remaining part of this section, I will provide a closer examination of the main 
groups’ history of origin, their policies, their recent accomplishments and thus, their 
relative strength in 2007. 
                                                 
70       Following the opening of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the U.S., the radio station’s Uyghur division was dismantled in 
1979. This was seen as a concession from the U.S. authorities to the PRC government (Shichor 2007). 
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One of these exile groups is the Washington-based East Turkistan National 
Freedom Center (ETNFC), which was established in 1996. After a careful survey of 
the various groups’ content and accentuation, ETNFC evidently seems to be the group 
that is a) the most insistent on independence from the PRC’s domination, and b) 
focuses more on an overall East Turkistani identity and less on Uyghur ethnicity. On 
September 14, 2004, this group proclaimed the establishing of the Government-in-
exile of East Turkistan Republic, with Anwar Yusuf Turani as the “designated” prime 
minister. The inception of their “reign” was heralded as Turani proclaimed:  
For years, the people of East Turkistan have wondered: does anyone hear them? Is 
there a voice abroad for East Turkistan? Is there any entity, a government, an authority 
that speaks for them? That wondering: that longing has ended. East Turkistan has 
found its voice one again […]. We, the East Turkistani community in exile have 
established a government of the Republic of East Turkistan in exile.71  
 
Moreover, ETNFC adopted a comprehensive constitution, which comprised 70 
articles that dictated the “new regime’s” modus operandi. In article 8, it was stated that 
the government-in-exile of East Turkistan Republic “has been accepted as the sole 
organ that has the authority over the people of East Turkistan in terms of representing 
East Turkistan Republic until East Turkistan will be liberated from the rule by 
imperialist Communist China”. According to article 2, “the character of the state is a 
democratic, unified and fully legal state that respects all human rights”.72 
In addition, the constitution in a detailed fashion outlined the people of East 
Turkistan (Turkistanis: Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Farsi speaking Tajiks and 
Mongols), the state’s national symbols (flags and emblems), holidays (national day, 
religious days, memorial days), state language (Uyghur) and other official languages 
(Kazakh and Kyrgyz), official religion (Islam), the electoral system (electoral 
constituencies, cabinet of 12 persons, parliament with 61 representatives on a four year 
term (2004-08), the parliaments function to pass laws and decrees etc.), and aspirations 
for international support against the PRC. Interestingly, the constitution also comprises 
several articles which address how Uyghur “traitors” and collaborators with the PRC 
government, will be punished and denied any ministerial or parliamentarian posts.73 
 
                                                 
71       ETNFC (2004). “Declaration of the formation of the Government-in-exile of the Republic of East Turkistan”.  
72       ETNFC (2004). “The constitution of the Government-In-Exile of the Republicnof East Turkistan”. 
73       Opt. Cit. 
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Another important diasporic organisation was the East Turkistan National 
Congress (ETNC), which originated from a meeting in 1998, when 40 Uyghur leaders 
and about 300 representatives from 18 countries, initiated the Eastern Turkistan 
National Center in Istanbul. The Chinese authorities became disturbed by this event 
and pressured the Turkish authorities to restrict the diasporic Uyghur voice. 
Consequently, the following year in 1999, the delegates convened at their new base in 
Munich, to establish a permanent exile organisation known as the East Turkistan 
National Congress (Shichor 2007). In their “Appeal to world leaders” in 2001, ETNC 
asserted that it constituted the sole umbrella organisation for the Uyghurs:  
It is the only legitimate representative organ of the Uyghur people and speaks and acts 
on behalf of that people in the free world […]. The East Turkistan National Congress 
was founded as the international democratically elected representative body of the 
Uyghur people. Delegates to the ETNC are elected by the million Uyghurs in exile. 
The ETNC maintains close contacts with the people in East Turkistan and speaks on 
their behalf so long as they are prevented from doing so by the Chinese authorities.74 
 
The ETNC continued its operations until 2004, when the organisation merged 
with the World Uyghur Youth Congress and heralded the era of a new umbrella 
organisation, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC).  The leadership of WUC proclaims 
to “serve the collective interests of the Uyghur people […] as the sole legitimate 
organization in the world”.75 Its expressed purpose is to “use peaceful, nonviolent, and 
democratic means to promote democracy, human rights and religious freedom for the 
Uyghur people”.76 Moreover, the leadership of WUC aspires to achieve a peaceful 
settlement of the Xinjiang question, through the means of dialogue and negations with 
the Chinese authorities. Shichor timely points out how important it was for these 
activists to emphasize their nonviolent nature, in the new “post-September 11 
environment of heightened fear and increased monitoring” (2007). 
In April 2007, I met with the WUC delegates Islam Tursun, Rozimuhammed 
Abdulbakiev and Khahriman Gojamberdi in Central Asia, and urged them to outline 
their preferable end state for Xinjiang. They were harmonized in the desired outcome; 
a multiethnic and secular East Turkistan (deliberately avoiding the name Uyghuristan), 
modelled after Kemal Attaturk’s Turkey. Gojamberdi expressed that while Islam is 
                                                 
74      ETNC (2001).  “Appeal to World Leaders”.  
75      WUC (2005).  “Introducing the World Uyghur Congress”. 
76      Opt. Cit. 
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“like a jacket for the Uyghurs”, it is not suitable for the purpose of organizing a state. 
Moreover, they all expressed inclusiveness toward the Han Chinese as citizens of an 
independent East Turkistan, although the WUC considers them to be illegally settled. 
This is however provided that the Hans accept to be citizens of East Turkistan and 
Central Asia, which the following WUC document also emphasizes: 
East Turkistan is the homeland of the Turkic speaking Uyghurs and other Central 
Asian peoples such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars and Tajiks […]. East 
Turkistan is located beyond the logical boundary of China, the Great Wall. 
Historically and culturally, East Turkistan is part of Central Asia, not of China. The 
people of East Turkistan are not Chinese; they are Turks of Central Asia.77 
 
Regarding the organisation of WUC, about 30 democratically elected 
representatives on a two-year basis currently constitute the top leadership of the 
Congress. At the first Congress in 2004, Erkin Alptekin was designated as the 
president of the WUC for the period of 2004-06.  In 2006, Rebiya Kadeer was 
unanimously elected as the new president for the term 2006-08, while Alptekin 
became WUC’s new chief advisor. Other prominent community leaders from Uyghur 
subgroups worldwide were nominated and elected for the remaining board posts. 
Altogether, the WUC’s leadership are comprised of delegates from the following 13 
countries; Germany, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Sweden, 
Holland, France, Austria, Turkey, Australia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.78  
Moreover, the most noticeable Uyghur subgroups affiliated with the WUC are 
among others the Uyghur American Association (UAA) and their initiated Uyghur 
Human Rights Project (UHRP), Uyghur Canadian Association (UCA), East Turkistan 
Culture and Solidarity Association (Turkey), Eastern Turkistan Foundation (Turkey), 
Eastern Turkistan Europe Union, Uighur U.K. Association, Ittipak (Kyrgyzstan), 
Ittipak (Kazakhstan) and the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy 
Foundation (the U.S.).79   
 
                                                 
77      WUC (2005). “East Turkistan”. 
78      WUC (2006). “Leadership of the World Uyghur Congress”. 
79        Along with heading the WUC, Kadeer was also elected to be the new leader for the UAA in 2006. Moreover, in 2005 she initiated the 
International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF). According to Amy Reger in UAA, the difference between the 
IUHRDF and Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) is that the former has a particular focus on “issues affecting Uyghur women and 
children”, while the latter has a general focus on human rights (personal communication 2007). 
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In order to improve their organisational capacity and to train present and future 
leaders of the Uyghur community, the WUC has embarked on a co-operation with the 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO). Ever since its inauguration 
in 1991, the UNPO has been a paramount medium for unrepresented nations (currently 
69), not recognised in international fora such as the UN. Simultaneously with his 
commissions in the Uyghur community, the former WUC leader Alptekin has also 
been one of UNPO’s most prominent leaders. Thus, UNPO has been strongly involved 
in the Uyghur diaspora and the situation in Xinjiang. In May 2007, UNPO hosted a 
workshop for approximately 50 Uyghur leaders and activists in Hague, Holland. On 
their agenda were grass-roots democratisation, human rights activism and how to enlist 
“international forums and courts in the campaign for Uyghur human rights”.80  
The Uyghur diaspora and in particular the organisation of WUC, got a fair wind 
in 2005, when Kadeer was released after 6 years of Chinese imprisonment. This was 
only rendered possible after intense diplomatic pressure from the U.S. ahead of an 
official visit by Condolezza Rice the same year. Kadeer was arrested by Chinese 
authorities on her way to meet an U.S. congressional delegation in 1999.81 In 2000, she 
was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment, allegedly revealing Chinese state 
secrets. The same year, Amnesty International adopted her as their prisoner of 
conscience and on several occasions arranged campaigns to pressure the PRC 
authorities. In 2004, the Norwegian Rafto Peace Foundation designated Kadeer as 
their laureate. As the international “War on terrorism” campaign had to some extent 
smudged the activities of all Uyghur counter forces (peaceful as well as violent 
initiatives), this designation endowed the diaspora with much needed positive 
exposure. Altogether, these events combined with an intense lobbying from the 
Uyghur diaspora made the U.S. government more concerned about Kadeer’s fate, and 
hence, they stepped up their pressure on the PRC government. Upon her release in 
2005, Kadeer was assigned political asylum in Washington, USA, the main base for 
Uyghur diasporic groups lobbying in North America.  
                                                 
80       WUC (2007): “Training the leaders of tomorrow”.  
81     In 1997, Kadeer founded the “Thousand Mothers Movement” to provide Uyghur women with job training and employment. She also 
established evening schools for Uyghurs. Prior to this, she also held several official commissions in the PRC, but became a person non grata 
by the meeting with an official U.S. delegation. In addition, her regime-dissenting Uyghur husband had already attained political asylum in 
the U.S. and his criticism of the PRC was not well taken in Beijing.  
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The WUC soon enrolled Kadeer in their organisation and in 2005, they adopted 
a resolution which designated her as “the Mother of the Uyghur nation and the leader 
of East Turkestan”.82 In 2006, she was unanimously elected as the new leader of the 
WUC and the Uyghur American Association. In a hectic year as the new leader, 
Kadeer has been able to get private audience with such prominent leaders as Kofi 
Annan and on June 5, 2007, the U.S. president George W. Bush.83  
                 
Photo: UAA                                                                                                        Photo: UAA 
These meetings are of great symbolic value for the Uyghur diaspora and a 
diplomatic sting to the Chinese authorities, who were obviously provoked by Bush’s 
meeting with Kadeer. In a press conference on June 7, 2007, the PRC Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu defamed both Kadeer and the U.S. involvement:  
Every one knows well what kind of person Rebiya Kadeer is. She is a convicted 
criminal. The relevant remarks and activities of the US are blatant interference in 
China's internal affairs. We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to it.84 
Similar reactions were generated in 2006, when Kadeer was mentioned among the 
main favourites for the Nobel Peace Price. The Vice-Secretary of the CCP in Xinjiang, 
Nuer Baikeli stated at that time that Kadeer had no qualifications for the prize. He also 
rejected the notion that she is the “Mother of all Uyghurs”, based on her alleged errors 
as a mother for her own children.85 Moreover, when a delegation from the Norwegian 
parliament visited the Chinese Vice-Foreign minister Zhang Yesui in 2006, he and 
other PRC officials made it clear that a Nobel peace prize to Kadeer would be 
damaging for the relationship between Norway and China (Fyhn 2006). 
                                                 
82       WUC (2005). “WUC Holds Its Second Executive Meeting”. 
83       The Uyghurs I talked with in Xinjiang were unaware of Kadeer’s meeting with Bush, but became enthused when I informed about it. 
84        PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007). “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 7 June, 2007”. 
85        PRC Government (2006). “Xinjiang party head says Kadeer is a separatist”. 
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With Kadeer as the new WUC leader, it is evident that the organisation and the 
diaspora in general have created a “matriarch”, who will continue to be the most 
paramount spiritual figure in the years to come.86 With her charisma, peaceful 
appearance and adherence to moderate Islam, I contend that the Uyghur diaspora has 
found the most expedient leader to attract attention and sympathy from international 
leaders and an international audience. Uyghurs’ situation in Xinjiang slowly makes an 
entry into their awareness, which at previous stages exclusively centred around the 
Tibet question. Another important aspect to be considered is Kadeer’s reputable name 
among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Due to involvements in charity organisations prior to her 
incarceration in 1999, she is renowned and respected throughout the region.87  
Chinese authorities and scholars are obviously concerned about the impact of 
Kadeer at the international scene, and the incarceration of her sons in Urumqi seems to 
be a strategy to silence her vigorous voice.88 However, this has only provided her with 
more international support and simultaneously further smudged the PRC government’s 
reputation. Finally, Kadeer’s rise has altered the balance among the Uyghur diasporic 
groups in favour of the WUC. Previously, there have been some disputes between the 
ETNFC’s exiled government and the WUC, where the former part accused WUC 
under Alptekin’s leadership, to embark on a compromise-oriented policy towards the 
PRC, and not vigorously enough champion the cause for independence. WUC on the 
hand implicitly denounced the exiled government’s authority, by as previously 
mentioned, depicting itself as the sole legitimate world-wide Uyghur organisation. 
By examining issued statements from the ETNFC’s leader Turani in 2006, he 
did no longer emphasize the role of the exile-government. Since August 2006, only 
two statements have been published on the government’s webpage. Now it seems to be 
in a phase of inactivity, with the last press release dated back to January 2007. Thus, 
Shichor asserts that the ETNFC has actually disbanded as an organisation (2007), and 
the WUC’s Semet Abla confirmed this to me in a personal correspondence (August 
2007). Abla argues that this was resulted by their marginal support and he perceives 
                                                 
86       In interviews with the WUC representatives from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, they revealed a genuine admiration and enthusiasm for 
Kadeer as the new leader. These diasporic leaders have faith in her skills, working capacity and support among all Uyghur people. 
Notwithstanding, it was stressed that her impact would be even more profound if she learns to master English.   
87      According to Uyghurs I met around in Xinjiang, all Uyghurs know about Kadeer and do respect her.  
88      UAA (2007). According to the UAA, Kadeer’s son Ablikim was sentenced to nine years in prison on April 17, 2007, as he was found 
guilty on the charges of “instigating and engaging in secessionist activities”. The other children have also been sanctioned in various ways. 
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the operation of the ETNFC as a wrong step “in the political mobilizations of the 
Uyghurs”. Consequently, the WUC now appears to be unchallenged and the expatriate 
Uyghur community is comparatively more unified than just a few months ago.  
Increased internal harmonization renders possible a more effective Uyghur 
voice at the international stage. The absence of severe internal disputes obviously 
presents the community in a more favourable light, and provides various governments 
with a clear overview on who to deal with. Moreover, this may facilitate an effective 
cooperation with other expatriate groups representing the voice of Tibet, Inner 
Mongolia and Taiwan, and thus, further strengthen the pressure on the Chinese 
authorities.  With the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, the leaders of these 
communities have a unique possibility to coordinate their efforts and attain exposure 
from the world press. While I doubt that these leaders have the capacity and 
willingness to initiate large scale rebellions inside China during the Olympics, one 
may expect some joint manifestations both in Beijing and abroad.89  
 
Uyghur diasporic activities: From the Chinese authorities’ point of view. 
Previously in this section, I presented several extracts from the PRC government’s 
reactions to the rise of Rebiya Kadeer. In the remaining part, I illustrate how the 
Chinese authorities perceive the Uyghur diaspora and how they attempt to defame 
their operations. The Chinese scholar Li Sheng asserts that “East Turkistan splittist 
forces” have been on unsafe grounds ever since September 11, 2001. Thus, they have 
been forced to change tactics, where their current campaign is “deceptively” embedded 
in the name of “striving for human rights” and the right to “national determination” 
(2005:291). In this regard, Li allegedly observes the following trends (2005:291-3):  
 
1.  These groups aspire to smudge the name of the PRC government by depicting a 
situation of state-initiated terrorism in Xinjiang. Thus, they with deceptive endeavours, 
hope to stay clear of “the charges of being violent and terrorist”, and “to get away 
from the punishment they well deserve for their terrorist acts”. 
2. The diaspora is “speeding up internal consolidation and planning to build the “exile 
government””. With exile arrangements like the ETNFC and the WUC in mind, Li 
                                                 
89     According to the Kyrgyz Ittipak leader and WUC delegate Abdulbakiev, the WUC already started to plan peaceful actions during the 
reign of Alptekin. Their means may include petitions, demonstrations and protest letters. 
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denounces their operations as “the perverse act of a small number of splittists”. These 
groups “have never been, nor can ever be, representative of people of all ethnic origins 
in Xinjiang”. Therefore, he depicts this as a simple trick to “confuse and deceive the 
international public opinion”, and by all practical means to derail the international 
anti-terror campaign.  
3.  “East Turkistan terrorist organisations” are allegedly still “sticking to violent and 
terrorist means”, such as establishing terror camps and training cells to continue their 
activities. At this stage, Li refers to a rumour that some of these forces allegedly 
threatened to crash a hijacked plane in the big dam at the Three Gorges.90 
4.   “The splittist forces” are operating under the banner of “political resolution of the 
Xinjiang question”, in an attempt to involve the international community and facilitate 
a referendum. Li asserts that “unity and integration is the trend of historical evolution”, 
and that there is no genuine “Xinjiang question” to be addressed. Hence, the approach 
of “political resolution”, only represents a “child-like mentality” (2005:291-93).  
 Concerning the future developments of anti-separation and anti-terror struggles 
in Xinjiang, Li finds wisdom in the following old Chinese idiom; “the tree craves calm, 
but the wind will not subside”. In other words, he predicts that “the fight between 
separatism and unity” will intensify and challenge the regime in the years to come 
(2005:293). With the Uyghur diaspora in mind, I have already demonstrated how 
vigorously the PRC government attempts to defame these activists at the international 
stage. Moreover, they pressure countries that have been a safe haven for the Uyghur 
diaspora. Through regional cooperation arrangements like the SCO, the Chinese 
authorities have presented various incentives for the member countries to sanction 
exiled Uyghur activists. A main concern for all the diasporic groups has been the 
extradition of Uyghur activists from Central Asia and Pakistan, to the custody of the 
PRC government. Especially disturbing was the extradition of the Canadian citizen 
Huseyin Celil from Uzbekistan. On April 2007, he was sentenced to life in prison by a 
PRC court, due to allegedly “splittist” and terrorist plots.91 
                                                 
90       I contend that Li and other Chinese scholars with him in the book “Xinjiang of China: Its Past and Present”, at times tend to present 
tendentious depictions and to get tangled in a hotchpotch of rumours, ideological utopia, and operate without the necessary scientific 
humility. Thus, it is rendered more difficult to entrust findings and conclusions that actually are perceptive and illuminative for the field of 
study. However, one should not forget that these scholars are expected to have a certain allegiance to the regime and not distribute findings 
or hypothesis in public, that might put the authorities in an unfavourable light.  
91      On June 19, 2007, the U.S. Congress urged the PRC government to immediately release Celil and Kadeer’s children (Resolution 497). 
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5.2. Uyghur voices in Central Asia: The cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In April 2007, I went to Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan and Almaty in Kazakhstan to meet 
with Uyghur exile leaders that a) stand as representatives for the largest Uyghur 
expatriate communities in the world, and b) are central in passing on information 
about recent developments in Xinjiang. Due to these countries proximity with Xinjiang, 
they have been the natural first destination for migrating Uyghurs. Consequently, in 
2007, approximately 300,000 Uyghurs reside in Kazakhstan and 50,000 in 
Kyrgyzstan.92 Moreover, news and bulletins have made its way back and forth across 
the borders, along with the movement of the commuting Uyghur tradesmen.  
 
5.2.1. Kazakhstan: China’s most favoured ally in Central Asia. 
Khahriman Gojamberdi is the leader of Ittipak (“Solidarity”), the main society for 
Uyghurs in Kazakhstan and chairs their political organ, the People’s Party of 
Uyghuristan.93 Ittipak is the sole relevant organisations for the Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, 
and it is organized with several branches to attract different segments of Uyghurs.94 
According to Gojamberdi, about 3,000 to 4,000 active members constitute the core of 
Ittipak, and by and large finance the society’s activities. These Uyghur activists keep a 
very low profile in order to avoid undesirable attention and sanctions from the Kazakh 
authorities.  
Ittipak’s main focus is to preserve Uyghur distinctive markers in Kazakhstan 
and to address the situation in Xinjiang. Uyghur tradesmen and migrants from 
Xinjiang often seek out Gojamberdi and the Ittipak organisation, to communicate the 
recent news from the Chinese region. Ittipak then passes on this information to the 
wider Uyghur diaspora, along with mediating information from the outside world to 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang. However, after the inception of the Shanghai Five in 1996 and its 
successor the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001, regional cooperation and 
heavy pressure from China have greatly restricted the voice of the Uyghur diaspora in 
Central Asia. Eventually, the Chinese concept of the “three evils, separatism, 
                                                 
92     Khahriman Gojamberdi, the leader of Ittipak in Kazakhstan provided me with the Kazakh numbers, while Rozimuhammed Abdulbakiev, 
the leader of Ittipak in Kyrgyzstan presented the Kyrgyz numbers. Concerning the latter figure, Abdulbakiev asserts that the actual number is 
much higher as many Uyghurs during the Soviet times, rather chose to register as Uzbeks due to the low standing of Uyghurs. 
93     Other places referred to as Uyghuristan Freedom Association. 
94     Other scholars have previously depicted these branches as independent organisations, but according to Gojamberdi, there are no other 
independent organisations. Previously, Nozugym, an independent Uyghur women group operated in Kazakhstan.  However, their operations 
seized with the mysterious death of the leader Dilbirim Samsakova in May 2001. 
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extremism and terrorism” also came in vogue among the Central Asian states, and the 
Chinese authorities have vigorously aspired to link the diaspora with these regime-
threatening “evils”. This effort has been largely successful, and Gojamberdi alleges 
that the domestic latitude for the Uyghur diaspora to criticize China’s mode of 
operations, has been significantly reduced since 1996.  
 Thenceforward, the Chinese authorities presented several incentives (diplomatic 
pressure) for these countries to curtail Uyghur expatriates’ activities on their own soil. 
In particular, a weighty argument has been China’s economical rise and prospected 
status as a financial primus inter pares in the region. The ripple effect for Ittipak has 
been an intensified surveillance from the Kazakh authorities, along with accusations 
that the Uyghur diaspora jeopardizes the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and 
China. Their leader Gojamberdi has even been arrested twice, in 2003 and 2005, while 
addressing the situation in Xinjiang. The last decade, approximately 30 Uyghurs have 
been extradited to China, and Ittipak continuously voice this theme, to the frustration 
of the Kazakh authorities. Additionally, Gojamberdi is regularly exposed to telephone 
threats with unknown addressees, and his position in Ittipak evidently has private costs. 
The leader’s “life assurance” against potential encroachment from the Kazakh 
authorities, evidently lies within his ability to raise international awareness of the 
diaspora’s activities. His position as the vice-president of the WUC and the support 
from this apparatus is also of paramount importance. 
 Comparing to Kyrgyzstan, Gojamberdi asserts that Uyghur top-activists situated 
in Kazakhstan are more exposed to governmental pressure, whereas Kazakh Uyghurs 
in their daily round have better conditions for maintaining their distinctiveness. This is 
facilitated by thirteen Uyghur schools (Uyghur the language of instruction) which only 
enrol Uyghur pupils, a Uyghur cultural centre, a weekly newspaper, and a weekly 
Uyghur news telecast (of 15-20 minutes). However, the last few years, the Kazakh 
authorities have restricted the operations of their media channels.  
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5.2.2. Kyrgyzstan: Latitude for domestic opposition, but not against the PRC. 
The Kyrgyz Ittipak was incepted in 1989 to preserve Uyghur language and culture, to 
raise a Uyghur consciousness among the youngsters, and to help arriving Uyghur 
migrants from Xinjiang.95 Their activities are covertly funded by Uyghur businessmen, 
while the Kyrgyz authorities provide the society with an office and free electricity at 
the People’s House in Bishkek. According to their current leader Rozimuhammed 
Abdulbakiev, the Ittipak society adopted a clause in their charter in 1994, which urged 
for a separation of East-Turkistan from the PRC. Thus, he asserts that the Chinese 
authorities perceive him as the foremost separatist in Kyrgyzstan, which in turn 
exposes him to intense pressure from various (covert) directions. 
 The former leader of Ittipak, Nigmat Bazakov was killed by unknown assassins 
on 28 March 2000, and to be “in the frontline” has also occasioned subtle as well as 
directly manifested threats for the successor Abdulbakiev. In conversations with high-
ranked officers from the police and the armed forces, he has been warned not be too 
visible in discrediting the Chinese regime. Otherwise, he or his family would allegedly 
be sanctioned in various ways. In connection with the celebration of Ittipak’s fifteenth 
year anniversary in 2004, more threats were passed on to Abdulbakiev. Ittipak with its 
700 invited guests was also denied to rent the Kyrgyz Drama Theatre in Bishkek, 
allegedly after direct order from the State Secretary. This was caused by a statement 
from Abdulbakiev, where he revealed sentiments for an independent East Turkistan to 
a Kyrgyz newspaper. At that stage, the Kyrgyz State Secretary gave Abdulbakiev the 
following ultimatum; publish a refutation note and the celebration can be carried out. 
In the end, Ittipak’s board rejected this “offer” and chose not to make any concessions. 
Another important organisation in Bishkek is the human rights organisation 
Democracy, which was initiated in 1998 by Tursun Islam (also one of Ittipak’s 
founders). Their activities are self-financed by 120 members and coordinated by a 
board of twelve members. The organisation’s main activity is to provide Uyghyrs with 
                                                 
95       The head of the Kyrgyz Ittipak society, Rozimuhammed Abdulbakiev argued that the Uyghur language had been undermined during 
the reign of the Soviet Union. Therefore, many Uyghurs are not fluent in the Uyghur language and thus tend to communicate in Russian, 
Uzbek or Kyrgyz language. Naturally, this is something that Ittipak aspires to do something with. At a major Nawroz celebration (heralding 
the spring) in Oslo in 2007, I observed that a majority of the Uyghurs previously living in Almaty or Bishkek, tended to communicate in 
Russian. Uyghur refugees directly from Xinjiang may actually encounter problems while communicating with these exile Uyghurs. Hence, a 
plausible reflection may be that the Soviet authorities were more successful to weaken Uyghur boundaries of distinctiveness, compared to 
that of the PRC Government in Xinjiang. Thus, the Uyghur expatriate leaders have a formidable task to rejuvenate the Uyghur language, in 
order to pass on this heritage to the future generations. 
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help in legal matters, and they are also linked with the WUC, where Islam functions as 
their legal advisor. In May 2006, Democracy demonstrated in front of Uzbekistan’s 
embassy due to their extradition of the Uyghur-Canadian Celil to the Chinese 
authorities. Two weeks later, they organized a similar demonstration in front of the 
Chinese embassy, and afterwards, the Kyrgyz national Security Service carried out a 
control of the participants’ documents. Islam was detained for interrogations, but 
released after pressure from demonstrating Kyrgyz human rights groups. Moreover, 
Islam received two telephone calls with unknown addressees, which “reminded” him 
about the fate of the former leader of Ittipak.  
A common deep sigh expressed by Islam and Abdulbakiev is how the media 
and in particular Channel Five and the newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek portray the 
Uyghurs. In crime-related events, these mediums only mention ethnicity when 
Uyghurs are involved. Moreover, some published articles tend to label Uyghurs as 
terrorists and extremists (Mukhamedov 2004, personal communication 2007). 
Unfortunately, the activities of these mostly secular and western-oriented Uyghurs are 
at times equated with radical Islamist movements, operating in the complex Ferghana 
Valley, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan coincide.96 
 
5.3. Uyghur cyber separatism on the World Wide Web. 
Since the late 1990s, the Uyghur diaspora and its activists have discovered the utility 
value of the World Wide Web as an instrument to mobilize and coordinate Uyghurs 
worldwide, as well as to generate international awareness of recent events in Xinjiang. 
The ripple effect of a plethora of increasingly vocal and well organized Uyghur 
movements abroad, is the establishment of various online websites. The accelerated 
accessibility to the internet has turned it into the major instrument for communication 
among Uyghur activists (Kanat 2005). Thus, by employing this mass communication 
technology, they have to some extent managed to overcome the boundaries of time and 
space, along with political censorship (Petersen 2006:65). 
                                                 
96      The Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) have been the main movements operating in the Ferghana 
Valley. Their supporters have been persecuted and incarcerated in large numbers by the authorities in all the three countries. In particular, 
this was showcased for a wider world-audience in 2005, when the Uzbek security forces clamped down on the IMU-initiated Andijan 
uprising, killing several hundred demonstrators (Mihalka 2006:132-33). 
 
 108
Gladney timely depicts this as cyber-separatism, where virtual voices constitute 
a new outlet of opposition towards the Chinese regime (2004b:383). This is the new 
scenery for an ideological battle, where the PRC’s propaganda machinery and the 
leadership of the diaspora clash. Both parts employ a wide range of “irrefutable” 
cyber-narratives to denounce one another’s modus operandi, and to “lock-in”, 
alternatively “unlock” Uyghurs and the territory from Chinese domination. 
Consequently, the Uyghur diaspora invest substantial energy in their endeavours to 
design sophisticated and up-to-date sites, as they aspire to attract international 
attention and to be considered as a credible source among their audience. 
The competing World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and the East Turkestan 
National Freedom Center’s (ETNFC) government-in-exile (still accessible online) are 
among the diasporic groups with the most advanced online homepages. The design 
and content of the WUC’s webpage (uyghurcongress.org) have evidently been inspired 
by their affiliated subgroup, the Uyghur American Association (UAA) 
(uyghuramerican.org). The UAA has been a frontrunner in the virtual diasporic world 
and they also run a professional, lucid and updated webpage for their Uyghur Human 
Rights Project (UHRP) (uhrp.org). These websites have links to each other and are 
written in English, Uyghur, Chinese and German versions, in order to be accessible for 
a wider audience. Additionally, the Munich-based and seemingly pro-WUC, Eastern 
Turkistan Information Center (uygur.org), distributes electronic newsletters and 
operates a semi-professional, semi-updated webpage. Regarding ETNFC’s webpage 
for the exiled government (eastturkistangovernmentinexile.us), this site has been 
relatively inactive in 2007, although it still distributes newsletters about Xinjiang. 
Another popular site among expatriate Uyghurs is Meshrep (meshrep.com), 
which was established in 2004, to introduce “Uighur culture, art, music, jokes and 
songs to those who are interested in Uighur tradition and culture” (2007). Meshrep 
contains articles about the history of East Turkistan, poetries with subtle resistance 
against the PRC, links to Xinjiang-articles penned by international scholars, and a 
calendar which presents important memorial days, national days, founding dates for 
various diasporic groups, and contributions from a variety of Uyghur personalities. 
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Nevertheless, Meshrep is considerably less focused on political activism and 
independence for East Turkistan, than the above-mentioned groups/ websites. 
After a comprehensive survey of these diasporic websites, the following 
commonalities frequently appear; cyber-narratives showcasing a glorious Uyghur past, 
Uyghur poetry and folklore, maps crossing out the name of Xinjiang and replacing it 
with East Turkistan, Uyghur symbols as the blue flag of the ETR (1944-49) and other 
national icons (sites and holy mosques), pictures allegedly revealing Chinese brutality 
towards incarcerated Uyghurs, and a general denouncement of the PRC government. 
Moreover, these sites provide recent news updates from the region.  
Regarding a potential connection between Uyghur diasporic groups and militant 
Islam at the virtual arena, Gladney found very little evidence suggesting such a link in 
2004. Moreover, he found almost no requests for an Islamic Jihad against the PRC 
(2004b:388). Overall, the same depiction applies for 2007, with a few exceptions that I 
partly addressed in chapter 4.1.1. In 2006, two videos calling for Jihad in Eastern 
Turkistan were published online. These videos displayed Uyghur militants and 
showcased their archenemy, Xinjiang’s de facto number one communist cadre, Wang 
Lequan. Both videos also contained a map where the name Xinjiang was crossed out. 
Additionally, I have come across an alleged homepage for the Islamic Party of 
Turkistan, which calls for Jihad against the PRC and displays photos of previous 
sabotage acts in Xinjiang. To be affiliated with such activities would be devastating for 
the diaspora, and thus, they operate with a distinct secular outlook to be 
distinguishable from violent religious activists, aspiring to incept an Islamic caliphate.  
Another important aspect concerning the diasporic websites is the initiated 
debate forums and chat rooms, which enable exile groups and individuals to interact 
more effectively at the virtual scene. The Uyghur scholar Kilic Kanat emphasizes that 
these forums have mobilized a wider segment of the diaspora, as they now may enter 
heated discussions with invented nicknames. This anonymity ensures a wider spectrum 
of expressed aspirations and ideas on the Uyghur question (2005). Not all Uyghurs 
have been willing to voice their discontent and preferences publicly, as such activities 
may expose their remaining relatives in Xinjiang to the wrath of the PRC security 
forces.  In phone calls with relatives in Xinjiang, my Norwegian acquaintance Semet 
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Abla has on several occasions been interrupted by the local security forces, and with 
regards to his diasporic activities, been urged not to “forget” about his remaining 
relatives in Xinjiang.  
 A plausible question to address at this stage is whether these Uyghur “cyber-
activists” constitute a transverse section of the diaspora? Kanat argues that well-
educated male nationalists and political activists, with a middle- to higher- income 
level are still numerically dominating the “virtual Uyghur world”. Their language of 
operation is typically English or alternatively Uyghur with Latin script. Hence, these 
activists do not constitute an accurate sample of neither Uyghurs situated in Xinjiang 
nor the diaspora at large. Their transnational Uyghur virtual world is characterized by 
an attempt to construct a “diasporic Uyghur identity”, which is mainly secular (de-
emphasizing Islam), nationalistic (Uyghur, not pan-Turkic), and that orbits a western 
mindset of democracy and human rights (2005:2-4).  
 Kristian Petersen gives his consent to Kanat’s depictions and further notes that 
these cyber activists employ the internet to display for a wider audience, their 
perception of “Uyghurness”. From a survey of these sites, he contends that the 
diaspora depicts a state where “all Uighurs are aligned in their goals and desire of a 
free ‘East Turkistan’ ”. Petersen emphasizes that this is erroneous and that the diaspora 
in general “have been able to usurp the modern Uighur identity”, as not all Uyghurs 
aspire a breakaway from the PRC (2006:66-71). This is evidently a plausible point, 
although I do not possess any unbiased and reliable figures on Xinjiang-Uyghurs’ 
preferred end-state for the region. A certain share of the population does most likely 
“only” ask for a de facto regional autonomy under the auspices of the PRC.  
Nevertheless, the Uyghurs I met with in Xinjiang expressed sentiments for 
independence, but stressed that such thoughts would only lead to sanctions from the 
authorities. One Uyghur also emphasized that some Uyghurs are sceptical about the 
initiation of East Turkistan, due to financial concerns. Independence from China may 
hamper the economical development with a prospect for relatively poorer conditions, 
such as in the other Central Asian states (Gladney 2004b:393). However, my 
prediction is still that a majority among the Uyghurs are supportive of a territorial 
breakaway from China. Notwithstanding, this is only a hypothetical question that 
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presumably amounts to nothing else than a far-off utopia for resigned Uyghurs, with 
more urgent concerns in their daily life. 
 Another aspect to consider is that the most prominent diasporic leaders have not 
visited Xinjiang for a long time, due to an understandable fear of being imprisoned by 
the Chinese authorities. Hence, they may have “lost touch” with prevailing sentiments 
among the Uyghur population. Nor have they experienced the improved living 
conditions in the region. However, with the increment of Kadeer to the diaspora in 
2005, this situation has improved, even though she was incarcerated back in 1999. In 
addition, with her enrolment in the WUC, the diaspora in general got a voice that is 
well-known and seemingly respected among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This is a great 
asset for the WUC, but does not change the fact that the Uyghurs in the region have 
very limited knowledge about the diaspora, and the outside world’s involvement.  
From the PRC government’s point of view, an advanced “Great Firewall of 
China” (internet filter) has to be credited for this “veil of ignorance”. A report from 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, concluded in 2004, 
that China’s filtering regime is the most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world. 
According to Johan Lagerkvist and other international experts, the PRC government 
has access to the to leading IT companies that provide them with the necessary supply 
solutions to monitor online activities.97 With a Chinese online population that reached 
approximately 123 million by mid-2006, the authorities have had to figure out “what is 
fit to know” for this stratum (Dai 2007:189). Evidently, Uyghur diasporic virtual 
dissent has been considered an anathema and effectively blocked. Thus, it has 
naturally rendered it utterly difficult for the Uyghur “online population” in Xinjiang, to 
learn about the diaspora’s endeavours.98  
 
 
                                                 
97     Lagerkvist depicts the following “grand paradox” in the Chinese public sphere: Currently, two diverging trends have been manifested 
simultaneously, as the old traditional media has endured a stricter authoritarian state control (“locking-in the public sphere”), whereas the 
new online medium experiences more social freedom (“unlocking the public sphere”) (Dai 2007). However, the Chinese authorities also 
clamp down on online dissent and the Human Right Watch estimated in 2005, that 60 persons were serving prison sentence for their Internet-
based political crimes (Forney 2005:27). 
98     During my round trip in Xinjiang, I was unable to enter a wide range of diasporic websites.  I visited internet cafés in Urumqi, Korla, 
Khotan and Kashgar. In Kashgar, they strictly enforced a document check and a registration before I could use their services. This was the 
standard procedure at all of the city’s internet cafés, and increases the authorities’ capacity of monitoring the users. In neighbouring Bishkek 
(Kyrgyzstan) and Almaty (Kazakhstan), I was able to access all major Uyghur expatriate homepages during a stay in April 2007. 
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6.0. PRC state- and nation-building in Xinjiang: A concluding synopsis.   
An expressed objective of this thesis has been to analyse the situation in Xinjiang 
through a conceptual state- and nation-building lens, and as such, potentially fill a void 
in the Xinjiang-literature. The focal point of my study was to illuminate the continuous 
tension between order (centres’ “locking-in” of a territory, its resources and actors) 
and movement (boundary-breakdown and transcendence) which typically characterize 
a centre-periphery relation. Consequently, my research questions embodied this 
inherent tension as I aspired to scrutinize the following:  
A) The PRC government’s “technologies of deterrence” to foreclose Xinjiang’s 
external territorial boundaries, and domestically, their “locking-in technologies” to de 
jure and de facto monopolize their mode of operation in the region. Moreover, whether 
any peripheral Uyghur counter-cultures or neighbouring states constitute a credible 
threat to the PRC state building project in Xinjiang. 
B) The PRC’s centre-initiated efforts to strengthen a notion among the Uyghurs 
that their “Manifest Destiny” is to orbit the Chinese nation, and as such, weaken their 
religious, linguistic, folkloristic and general affinity bonds to other civilizations in 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Furthermore, Uyghur counter-cultures’ 
(nation-builders’) aspire to solidify/accentuate their membership space and to 
undermine the Chinese authorities’ nation-building campaigns. 
Striking a balance in 2007, what can be inferred about the status of Beijing’s 
overall state- and nation-building project in Xinjiang? In brief, I argue that the 
communist regime’s physical hold on Xinjiang is historically strong in 2007. Their 
adequate deterrence capabilities toward potential state-aggression and “locking-in 
mechanisms” to domesticate Uyghur separatists, effectively hold “exit”/ transcendence 
at bay. Recollecting the region’s historical function as a “cultural blotter” for different 
civilizations, polity formations and warlords, this has not been a matter of course.  
However, brute force cannot itself conquer Uyghurs’ “hearts and minds”. The 
Uyghur minzu is arguably among the most culturally impenetrable groups, and the 
non-spatial distance between the traditional “Uyghur way of life” and the “Han 
modernity” is evidently vast. The regime’s nation-building thrusts have for the most 
parts conveyed standardizations/ restrictions (“sticks”) rather than confidence-
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inspiring “carrots” (socio-religious latitude and economical prosperity). With the 
campaigns’ negative resonance, the government has attempted to create new heroes, 
myths and legends at the expense of corresponding Uyghur ideals, epics and tales. 
What many Uyghurs perceive as a “Trojan Horse” (influx of Han assimilating forces), 
may strengthen the regime’s physical hold on the region, but simultaneously alienate a 
larger segment of the Uyghurs. This in turn might engender an inverted effect 
(challenging the PRC machinery), where Uyghur activists eventually employ more 
desperate means to address their situation. Nonetheless, the Chinese government’s 
military-administrative control of the region is as strong as ever in 2007.  
 
6.1. The PRC state building machinery: “Locking-in” Xinjiang and its Uyghurs. 
With this section I summarize the most important “locking-in” junctures in Xinjiang: 
1. The paramilitary Bingtuan has together with the PLA functioned as vectors 
of the centre, by a) deterring potential state aggression and b) safeguarding Xinjiang’s 
internal order. Although Xinjiang at times has been exposed to external as well as 
internal challenges, these coercive agencies have nevertheless managed to uphold the 
PRC’s territorial integrity in Xinjiang. Especially the “footprints” of the Bingtuan has 
been manifested throughout the region, as it has functioned as a powerful colonizing 
force for the large scores of regime-loyal Hans. However, their presence in the south is 
currently inadequate and this will be their future area of concentration. 
2.  With the XUAR’s autonomous status in 1955, it seemed like the numerically 
dominant Uyghurs attained a de jure proxy to become masters of their own house. In 
reality, the “Noah’s ark” principle of parcelling the territory into sub-autonomies, 
“locked” the Uyghurs within the “Chinese House”. Xinjiang’s other indigenous 
peoples obtained a disproportional share of the power and became more aligned with 
the PRC government (status quo oriented, rather than aspiring a territorial breakaway).    
3.  The disintegration of Soviet in 1991 radically altered the geopolitical 
environment in the region and thus the PRC’s external threat perceptions. With the 
inauguration of the Shanghai Five (1996) and its successor the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (2001), the neighbouring states did no longer constitute a likely threat to 
China’s territorial integrity. Quite the contrary, tension-reducing efforts resulted in a 
more extensive inter-state cooperation, and from the PRC government’s point of view, 
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the SCO-arrangement has been especially useful in terms of sanctioning “troubling” 
Uyghur diasporic organisations and prominent individuals. This clamp-down gained 
further momentum in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and at present, the SCO-
members more vigorously emphasize the need to confront the “three evils, terrorism, 
separatism and extremism”. Thus, the PRC has achieved a twofold gain; reduced 
external state aggression and an “emasculated” Uyghur diaspora in the SCO-region. 
4.  Simultaneously as China dramatically improved its external inter-state 
relations, Xinjiang itself was exposed to an intensified regime-dissenting Uyghur voice. 
Hence, the authorities embarked on the anti-separatism campaign “Strike hard, 
maximum pressure”, and eventually clamped down on these dissenting forces. Further, 
the campaign “Open up the West” facilitated the settlement of regime-loyal Hans 
deeper into the “Uyghur heartland” (“the peacock flies westwards”). Although these 
strategies have caused some social unrest and been perceived as a PRC version of the 
“Trojan Horse”, it has nevertheless strengthened their “physical lock” on Xinjiang.  
5.  The incidents on September 11, 2001 had ripple effects on various centre-
periphery conflicts around the world, and in its aftermath, a window of opportunity 
unveiled for many regimes to bandwagon with the U.S. in their “War on terrorism”. 
Consequently, the PRC authorities found it opportune to equate Uyghur nationalists 
and separatists with international terrorists, and as such aspired to obtain an 
international carte blanche to clamp down on this “threat”. The attentive PRC 
“terrorist radar” has thus rendered it utterly difficult for counter-cultures to challenge 
the PRC’s state building machinery. This is also a widespread notion among the 
Uyghurs, and during my journey to Central Asia and Xinjiang, most people stressed 
that armed resistance is simply a futile spill of Uyghur blood.  
 
6.2. Chinese nation-builders versus Uyghur counter-cultures operating covertly. 
While the PRC government has managed to effectively address the spatial dimension 
of their campaigns in Xinjiang, they have encountered more ardent opposition 
(boundary accentuation) from Uyghur counter-cultures in their nation-building efforts. 
These policies have been initiated to weaken Uyghurs’ orientation toward their 
traditional cultural centres and to strengthen the notion of “a Manifest PRC Destiny” 
(Beijing as the cultural epicentre). Thus, Uyghurs as citizens of the Chinese nation are 
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first of all expected to show their allegiance to the regime’s modus operandi. Their 
Uyghur group identity should be of secondary importance to that of the “beloved 
Chinese Motherland”. In this regard, I surveyed on the one hand, the regime’s efforts 
to institutionalize the “House of Islam”, the region’s educational system (promoting an 
“advanced Han modernity”), and their actions to ensure cultural conformity among 
ordinary Uyghurs and artists. On the other hand, I scrutinized the state of the Uyghur 
identity and Uyghur counter-cultures’ overt and covert counter-thrusts to preserve their 
distinctive markers, and as such, its denouncement of “a Manifest PRC Destiny”. In 
the sections below, I summarize this centre-periphery tension: 
 Uyghur identity: Evidently the potential reach and scope of the regime’s 
nation-building endeavours depend on how strong the collective Uyghur identity is, 
and to what extent it dictates its members’ conduct. In this regard, Rudelson argued 
that although the Uyghur identity has gained tremendous ground the last fifty years, it 
is nevertheless an artificial top-down administrative construct. Hence, local oasis 
identities take precedence over an overall Uyghur identity, which is fairly easy to 
manipulate. The core of his argument is that “diversity is the eldest daughter of 
distance”, and thus, the Uyghur nation-builders’ project is rendered utterly difficult. 
Brophy on the other hand argues that this assertion has an inclination of “reading the 
past into the present” as he observes a strong and coherent Uyghur identity. 
 My personal reflection is that even though the Uyghur identity initially was an 
elitist construct à la Anderson’s “imagined community” (this is naturally debateable), it 
has at later stages also been cultivated from below (by the Uyghur masses). Conducted 
surveys in Xinjiang support this notion and although it is a vast territory, the regime’s 
infrastructural developments have rendered it much easier for Uyghurs to 
communicate with each other. This was illustrated during my journey to Xinjiang, 
where I encountered a) a female Uyghur on an inter-oasis bus, who was on her way 
southwards to Khotan from the far north; and b) a male Uyghur university student also 
from the north, who ended up in Kashgar due to his previous mediocre grades. Hence, 
the PRC authorities’ efforts to “open up” the region, might also enable the Uyghur 
nation-builders to more effectively address the challenge of Xinjiang’s huge distances.   
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Xinjiang’s “House of Islam”: Islam is a major pillar of the Uyghur identity 
and perceived as their “protecting jacket”, which provides the proper codes of conduct. 
However, the PRC authorities have undermined Islam’s position by confiscating the 
mosques’ properties, eliminating Islamic taxes, abolishing Islamic courts/ judge 
systems, educating Xinjiang’s religious figures and by deciding what religious 
literature Uyghurs may legally possess. Recently, the authorities’ “locking-in” of the 
“House of Islam” has become even more comprehensive, and Uyghurs under the age 
of eighteen are prohibited from mosque attendance and religious instructions. Uyghur 
counter-cultures have secretly attempted to omit these restrictions with the Meshrep-
gatherings and private education. In this manner, they hope to ensure that future 
generations obtain appropriate codes of Uyghur conduct, through the ideals of Islam. 
Official policies toward the sphere of education and cultural production: 
Rokkan once pronounced that “language is fate”, and as such a paramount identity-
building “technology”. Hence, a critical aspect of the regime’s educational strategy in 
Xinjiang has been the language of instruction. Eventually, Mandarin has become the 
lingua franca at the expense of Uyghur, and a mastery of it seems to be a sine qua non 
for secular advancement. This poses a great dilemma to the Uyghur parents: Should 
their child enrol at a Uyghur or Chinese language school? A compromise solution has 
been to send their daughters to Uyghur language schools (boundary-accentuation), 
while the sons have enrolled at Chinese language schools (boundary- de-accentuation). 
The educational system has also been employed to present a streamlined 
version of Xinjiang’s history, the tenets of socialism, and in general, to downplay 
Uyghurs’ history and traditional culture. The same depiction applies for the sphere of 
cultural production, where Uyghur narrative arts containing regime-dissent, separatist 
sentiments, or general grievance with the PRC government, have been sanctioned. 
Hence, the authorities have aspired to “lock-in” Uyghurs in the ideological sphere and 
pressure them to present “appropriate tales”. Uyghur countercultures can only “re-
educate” (boundary accentuation) their children discretely in the private realms of life, 
but need to stay alert, in order to avoid the attentive and repressive “PRC radar”.  
Uyghurs socio-economic prospects: The nation-building aspect of the 
campaign “Open up the West” has been to increase Uyghurs’ prosperity (“carrot”) and 
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as such, to arouse pro-regime sentiments. However, this has by and large been 
counterproductive as a) the Central Government has been the main beneficiary of the 
extraction of Xinjiang’s invaluable resources, and b) “the peacock who has flown 
west” (Han Chinese), has occupied the most lucrative positions in the state and private 
sector. Uyghurs on the other hand strive with the “glass ceiling” of the labour market 
(social stigmata), and its widespread guanxi practice (“backdoor system”). This in turn 
is a major hindrance for the regime’s nation-building endeavours. Rather than winning 
Uyghur “hearts and minds”, the PRC authorities have further alienated the Uyghurs.
 Uyghurs’ responses to the PRC state- and nation-building: Among the 
Uyghurs, one may observe three broader responses to the PRC’s campaigns in 
Xinjiang: 1. Acculturation: A few Uyghurs adjust to the “Han-style modernity”, in 
order to thrive in the Chinese society (boundary-de-accentuation). 2. Autonomists: 
Their strategy is to obtain a de facto autonomy as an instrument to conserve the 
“Uyghur way of life”, and as such, cultivate a non-spatial and spatial distance to the 
Han Chinese (reverse settlement). Furthermore, to accentuate a non-spatial distance to 
Xinjiang’s other indigenous peoples. 3. Separatists: They also aspire to safeguard 
distinctive Uyghur markers, but perceive it as necessary to break away from Chinese 
domination. In this regard, one may distinguish between secular and Islamic activists, 
and whether they employ a violent or non-violent strategy.  
 While few Uyghurs are outright acculturated, it is more difficult to assess 
whether the path of autonomy or separatism has the strongest support. Arguably, an 
unbiased survey among “unrestrained” Uyghurs would reveal separatist sentiments. 
However, as they have made peace with the new realities, they also refrain from 
participating in such activities, and rather await better times. Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the negative resonance of the PRC state- and nation-
building endeavours has strengthened the notion of social group stigmata, and as such, 
fostered Uyghur intergroup behaviour (strengthening of in-group identity, in-group 
behavioural conformity) and increased the potential for inter-group conflict. But for 
the time being, one cannot escape the impression that Uyghurs in general are resigned 
as their irresolution is pronounced. Consequently, several activists have chosen to 
emigrate abroad, in order to vigorously (and more freely) raise the Uyghur voice.  
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The Uyghur diaspora: Voices for East Turkistan: The exiled Uyghurs have 
aspired to rally international sympathy for their situation and undermine the 
communist regime’s international legitimacy. In the late 1990s and onwards, several 
diasporic groups have emerged to represent the “silenced voice” of Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang, and to coordinate Uyghurs’ efforts worldwide. An important forum in this 
regard has been the World Wide Web (cyber-separatism), which has enabled the 
diaspora to overcome the boundaries of time and space. However, these virtual 
activities are mainly directed at Uyghur expatriates and an international audience, as 
the “Great firewall of China” block their access to Xinjiang’s online population.  
Until recently, the diaspora has been restrained by fragmentation and internal 
disputes as far as policy framing are concerned. However, with the WUC’s acquisition 
of Kadeer (their “matriarch”), the exile-community is more unified than ever before, 
and currently operates with a fair wind as she obtains private audience with important 
world leaders. This is evidently a challenge for the PRC leadership, and presumably, 
her appearance raises greater concern than Uyghur militancy in Xinjiang itself. 
 
6.3. Possible development in Xinjiang the coming years: Some final thoughts. 
Concerning potential courses of development in Xinjiang, one cannot avoid 
considering the interplay between endogenous factors (political decisions, activities, 
trends, and incidents within contemporary China) and exogenous factors (international 
relations, popular movements, trends and incidents outside the PRC), that might have 
an impact on the situation in Xinjiang. While the centre-initiated campaigns “Strike 
hard, maximum pressure” and “Open up the West” embody the former, the September 
11, 2001 incident with its ripple effects extending to Xinjiang, exemplifies the latter. 
It seems safe to predict that the Chinese authorities will continue to vigorously 
pursue their strategic interests in Xinjiang, and make no concessions to forces that 
might undermine their state- and nation-building endeavours. The region is simply too 
important from a geopolitical and geo-economical perspective, and according to the 
PRC threat perception, also vulnerable to non-traditional security threats (the “three 
ills of terrorism, separatism and extremism”). Consequently, “the peacock will 
continue to fly westwards”, and by so doing, further “open up” the region, to more 
effectively encircle the Uyghurs southwards. This is bound to increase the pressure on 
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Xinjiang’s fragile ecology and to expose the tight labour market to additional pressure 
(increase the rate of Uyghur unemployment and underemployment). Hence, a principal 
question for prospective research on Xinjiang is whether the increased “footprints” of 
the Hans will eventually cause more inter-ethnic conflict and increase the rate of 
violent acts by desperate Uyghur activists. Even though most Uyghurs currently 
appear to be quite resigned, one cannot preclude that new generations might be 
radicalized in their efforts to disrupt the PRC machinery.  
The Chinese scholar Li finds wisdom in this old Chinese idiom; “the tree craves 
calm, but the wind will not subside”, as he predicts that “the fight between separatism 
and unity” will intensify and challenge the PRC in the years to come (2005:293). This 
forecast seems especially realistic for the issuant Uyghur diaspora, and it may possibly 
culminate with a designation of Kadeer as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2007 or 
2008. Moreover, the upcoming Olympic Games in 2008 unveils a window of 
opportunity to illuminate the Xinjiang question. Although the Chinese authorities 
vigorously defame Kadeer and the Uyghur diaspora, they are neither immune to 
international criticism, and particularly not in the prelude to the Olympic Games.  
However, there are tendencies suggesting that while China is solidifying its 
position of power internationally (both in absolute and relative terms), the PRC 
authorities have also become more inclined to brush aside international criticism. This 
tendency is likely to be more pronounced in the aftermath of the Olympic Games, 
when Beijing’s operations are not as intensively in the limelight of the international 
media. Moreover, with the SCO-arrangement’s major boost the last few years (lately 
manifested in August 2007, with the extensive anti-terrorist exercise “Peace Mission”) 
and the Sino-Russian rapprochement, Chinese authorities by no means orbit the 
“Western (U.S.) solar system”. Quite the contrary, Russia and China operate in tandem 
to contain the influence U.S. in Central Asia (the new “Great Game”), and the Sino-
U.S. relation may become tenser in the next years. Hence, when the U.S. authorities’ 
seek to address their concerns for the PRC’s mode of operation in Xinjiang, they have 
quite poor prospects to find understanding from the Chinese authorities. To conclude, 
great-power politics evidently have an impact on the region and its peoples, and thus it 
need to be thoroughly considered in prospective analysis of Xinjiang. 
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